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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the assessment of implicit cognition in disordered eating behaviour, and 
specifically on the role of implicit attitudes towards the self and food in sub-clinical levels of 
eating disorder (ED) pathology. Chapter I reviews key theoretical approaches to implicit 
cognition and an assessment of the properties of implicit attitudes. Chapter II discusses 
methodological approaches to implicit attitude assessment, with a focus on the Implicit 
Attitude Test (IAT) which was used in the empirical studies. Chapter III (Study 1) outlines 
research in implicit cognition in ED pathology and assesses differences in implicit self-esteem 
(i.e., implicit attitude towards the self) between high-pathology and low-pathology participants. 
While the results of the study supported the presence of a self-esteem discrepancy in the high-
pathology group, the findings were insufficient to pursue further research in this area. The next 
three studies were focused on the role implicit food attitudes. Chapter IV (Study 2) introduces 
the hypothesis that implicit food attitudes and ego depletion may play a role in elevated ED 
pathology. However, the ego depletion procedure used was not successful and the results were 
therefore insufficient to either support or reject the hypothesis. Chapter V (Study 3) assessed 
similar questions to Study 2, but from the angle of automatic approach and avoidance towards 
food stimuli and dietary restraint failure. Contrary to expectations, the results suggested that it 
is unlikely that either ego depletion or a positive implicit attitude towards high-fat foods 
contributes to dietary restraint failure. Chapter VI (Study 4) was designed to clarify the findings 
of Study 3 and found that implicit food attitudes may change following novel goal activation or 
changes in behaviour. Chapter VII is a general discussion which summarises the findings, 
discusses the outcomes within the broader context of implicit cognition theories, and proposes 
directions for further study. 
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CHAPTER I 
Implicit attitudes: concepts and definitions 
 
 
The human body is a remarkably efficient system. Our homeostatic systems function 
automatically and require little or no conscious input to operate effectively: we can breathe and 
digest, heal when we are injured and shiver to warm up when we are cold, all without effort or 
awareness. Automatic reflexes ensure that we do not spend precious seconds deliberating 
whether to flee from a predator or remove a hand from a hot frying pan. The human mind, 
while capable of making complex decisions, also partially relies on automatic shortcuts for 
efficiency. Heuristics allow us to categorise and make sense of an incredibly information-dense 
environment (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994), make choices quickly (Marsh, Todd, & 
Gigerenzer, 2004) and predict future events (Gigerenzer, 2008). Unfortunately, efficiency comes 
at a cost: for instance, our tendency to misunderstand statistics, which leads to unrealistic 
optimism (Armor & Taylor, 2002), or the prejudice which stems from stereotyping (McCauley, 
Stitt, & Segal, 1980).  
Our behaviour towards the objects in our environment is predicated on our attitudes: 
evaluative judgments of attitudinal objects (Allport, 1935). These evaluations are subjective, 
introspective, affective and usually constructed on the basis of acquired experience and 
knowledge (Eiser, 1996). How we feel about something affects our behaviour intentions: 
positive attitudes tend to elicit approach tendencies while negative attitudes are more likely to 
result in avoidance (Elliot & Covington, 2001). Of course, this is an oversimplification of reality: 
how we construct attitudes and how they subsequently affect our behaviour is subject to the 10 
 
effects of context and motivation (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). The cognitive heuristics which allow 
us to respond efficiently to encountered stimuli also allow us to efficiently retrieve attitudes; 
the ability to effortlessly carry out evaluations is a processing advantage which allows us to 
conserve time and energy (Fazio, 2001). This thesis is concerned with the differences between 
automatic attitude retrieval (implicit attitudes) and effortful (explicit) attitude construction and 
their effects on cognition and behaviour. 
 
1. Introduction to structure and terminology 
 
The concept of “implicit cognition” is a somewhat controversial one. Different 
researchers have used different terms, including associative, experiential and impulsive, to 
describe automatically elicited associative processes. Different theoretical models have also 
ascribed different properties to these processes, including conscious inaccessibility, 
uncontrollability and goal-independence. It is important to note that the measurement of 
implicit attitudes, particularly at this early stage in the research field, is fallible. The specific 
problems and limitations of implicit attitude measures will be discussed in Chapter II; however, 
it is worth bearing in mind that while theoretical models tend to make hypotheses on the 
nature of “implicit attitudes” as an abstract concept, measurement outcomes (or the results of 
studies) are not the same as the concepts they are designed to measure. For the sake of 
parsimony it should be assumed that references made in this thesis to “implicit attitudes” in the 
context of theory pertain to the abstract concept of an implicit attitude. However, when 
“implicit attitudes” are discussed in the context of experimental data, the term refers to “the 
outcome of an implicit attitude measure” and cannot be used to make assumptions about the 
nature of the theoretical concept being assessed. 
This chapter will begin by summarising the key theories in the field, from dual-process 
theories, which conceptualise implicit attitudes as distinct from explicit ones, to integrated 
models, which argue that cognition exists on an implicit-explicit continuum. Once the key 11 
 
models have been introduced, empirical evidence supporting the common claims about the 
nature and properties of implicit attitudes will be evaluated. The chapter will conclude by 
summarising the literature and drawing conclusions with regards to the definitions and 
assumptions which will be upheld during the design and analysis of the empirical research 
carried out over the course of the thesis. 
 
2. Dual-process theories 
 
Dual-process theories posit that cognition can be broadly categorised into “implicit” and 
“explicit” processes. The terminology varies between models; implicit processes have been 
variably defined as unconscious, preconscious, automatic, uncontrollable, affective, effortless 
and/or efficient. Explicit processes have been conceptualised as conscious, rational, resource-
dependent, effortful, slow and/or logical. The distinction echoes concepts familiar from 
literature, poetry and art: the dichotomy between the heart and the mind, the rational and the 
emotional. The idea that we experience an internal conflict between conscious beliefs and 
subconscious desires stems from psychodynamic theory (see Hall & Lindzey, 1978), but this 
dichotomy was not formulated within the approach in a way that would allow for empirical 
validation (Popper, 1963, Chapter 1).  
Psychological research in the mid-twentieth century tended to focus on explaining 
behaviour from a rational, or at least conscious, standpoint: attitudes were assumed to be, and 
therefore defined as, a conscious construct (Greenwald, 1990). Direct measures, in which a 
participant is overtly asked to report their feelings about something, were (and still are) the 
prevalent method of attitude assessment. This approach requires introspection on the part of 
the participant, which assumes that people are capable of accurately identifying and reporting 
their mental states. On first consideration, this assumption seems reasonable: people usually 
know how they feel (Hixon & Swann, 1993) and we are taught from childhood how to identify 
and express our emotions (“If you’re happy and you know it, clap your hands”). However, self 12 
 
report measures, which ask a participant’s careful and rational opinion of an attitude object, 
assume that people tend to construct their opinions carefully and rationally, which is not 
necessarily the case (Zajonc, 1980). Self-report is especially problematic in research concerning 
ambivalent, ambiguous or sensitive topics. People are simply capable of lying (to both 
experimenters and themselves); as a result, self-report measures are susceptible to intentional 
deceit and self-presentation biases such as social desirability (Blair, 2002; Vartanian, Polivy, & 
Herman, 2004; Vitousek, Daly, & Heiser, 1991). 
Despite the accuracy of introspection, people may know what they feel they may not 
necessarily be able to articulate why they feel it and what has caused the feeling. Zajonc (1980) 
noted that the affective response often precipitates the articulation of a rational response: first 
impressions, for instance, are formed within seconds of stimulus presentation (Berry, 1990). 
Fiske (1982) proposed that encountering an attitudinal object automatically triggers previous 
associations in memory; this is considerably more efficient than constructing a new attitude 
upon each new encounter. However, we may not always accept the triggered association as 
valid and therefore reject it. This may be the case in, for example, racial prejudice. However, 
even when we rationally reject an implicit, emotional response in favour of an explicitly-held 
attitude, the former still has the power to affect our behaviour (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 
1991). Try as we may, we are not the calculating, rational creatures we are presumed to be by 
economic behaviourists (Sen, 1977; Friedman, 1976). 
Dual-process theories use a binary classification system to distinguish between the 
spontaneous, automatic reaction to an attitude object, and the subsequently consciously 
articulated attitude (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In this approach, implicit and explicit attitudes are 
deemed to be distinct responses to the same stimulus. The terms implicit and explicit, 
respectively, are used most frequently, although terminology varies depending on the 
theoretical model. The models also vary somewhat in the specific ways they define each 
system. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) were among the first to formalise observations about the 
dichotomy of automatic and conscious attitude formation into a theoretical model. Their model 13 
 
was focused on attitude change; the processes identified were termed heuristic and systematic. 
Heuristic evaluations are made faster than systematic ones and are largely based on a hedonic, 
emotional reaction to the object. Attitudes arrived at in a systematic way come later as a result 
of conscious processing of information, but do not need to be rational (in the sense of being 
logical) as a prerequisite. 
Epstein’s (1994) dual-process model terms the two systems experiential and rational. 
This model draws heavily on psychodynamic principles and each system is defined through 11 
contrasting features (e.g., the experiential system is passive and preconscious; the rational 
system is active and conscious). Smith and DeCoster (2000) use the terms associative and rule-
based processing. Although their model is predominantly concerned with differentiating 
between memory systems they do outline the mechanisms involved in automatic attitude 
retrieval, similar to those proposed by Fiske (1982). The associative system quickly and 
automatically activates previously acquired associations in memory to form an ‘intuitive’ 
impression of the target object. The rule-based system deliberately retrieves knowledge stored 
in memory in order to construct the attitude; its operation is dependent on the availability of 
cognitive capacity and motivation. 
The importance of cognitive resources also features in Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) 
reflective-impulsive model. A key difference here is that the two systems are thought to operate 
in parallel, rather than sequentially. The importance of cognitive resources also features 
prominently, where the impulsive system comprised of an associative network capable of 
operation without taxing cognitive resources. The activation of the reflective system, by 
contrast, requires motivation to use resources and effort to process data. The impulsive system 
is not limited to affective associations: rather, an attitude object triggers a complex schematic 
representation in memory which is then made available for conscious analysis as a proposition. 
Most dual-process theories assume a certain degree of interaction between the two 
systems, but still conceptualise them as distinct processes. Correlations between implicit and 
explicit attitudes tend to be low; mean correlation between the two has been found to be .24 in 14 
 
one meta-review (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Greenwald and 
Banaji (1995) have argued that implicit attitudes are inaccessible to conscious introspection, 
which could account for the lack of correspondence between the two and also supports the 
approach that the two systems are largely independent. But are they? How do we reconcile our 
automatic, affective responses to attitudinal constructs with the attitudes we derive from 
conscious deliberation, especially when they differ? Which of the features ascribed to the 
implicit system (unconsciousness, automaticity, stability, uncontrollability) are supported by 
empirical evidence? How do we measure implicit attitudes and how do we reconcile 
methodological flaws with the theoretical conceptualisation? These questions are essential in 
the discussion of the dual-process approach to cognition, and the validation of dual-process 
models. 
 
3. The properties of “implicitness” 
 
Dual-process models are similar from a conceptual standpoint, but the variations in 
terminology, however slight, are meaningful. As De Houwer (2006) notes, many empirical 
studies fail to specify which definition of implicit attitude they are using. First of all, this 
complicates the discussion of the findings. Conclusions about empirical results are more difficult 
to draw if the nature of the cognitive processes involved is unclear. Second, choosing a specific 
definition has relevance to the selection of appropriate methodology. Different implicit 
measures are founded on different assumptions about implicit cognition. In this section, the 
most prevalent assumptions about implicit attitudes will be discussed in terms of their validity 
in the face of supporting data, compatibility with theoretical approaches and ecological validity. 
 15 
 
3.1. ASSUMPTION 1: IMPLICIT ATTITUDES ARE UNAVAILABLE TO 
CONSCIOUS INTROSPECTION 
 
This definition (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Kihlstrom, 2004) suggests that implicit 
attitudes are implicit in the sense that people are not aware they hold them. From a 
methodological point of view, awareness of an implicit attitude is difficult to assess, as it 
depends on how we define awareness. Gawronski, Hofmann and Wilbur (2006) draw the 
distinction between source awareness (origin of attitude), content awareness (contents of 
attitude) and impact awareness (what influence the attitude has on other processes). This 
section is predominantly concerned with people’s implicit attitude content awareness, as this is 
the definition predominantly used. 
There is some evidence to support unconscious “liking”, where affective responses to 
target objects can be primed in participants without conscious awareness but nevertheless 
affect subsequent behaviour (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003). An example of this is the mere 
exposure effect, which suggests that we have a tendency to like the familiar more than the 
unfamiliar. In a study by Monahan, Murphy and Zajonc (2000) participants were repeatedly 
presented with subliminal stimuli; subsequently, participants rated the previously encountered 
stimuli more positively even though they had no awareness of having been presented with 
them.  
Schwitzgebel (2008) argues, from a philosophical standpoint, that we are, by and large, 
terrible at introspection – not only as a consequence of various deliberate and unconscious 
biases, but also through sheer ineptitude. Some neurobiological data suggests that the mere act 
of introspection can attenuate emotional arousal (Herwig, Kaffenberger, Jäncke, & Brühl, 2010), 
which complicates the interpretation of self-report data. Our prospects for accuracy in 
identifying our own implicit attitudes, it would seem, looks rather bleak. 
Low correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes have also been cited as possible 
support for the assertion that people are not aware of their implicit attitudes (e.g., Phelps et al., 16 
 
2000; Banaji, 2001). However, a lack of explicit endorsement does not imply a lack of 
awareness. For instance, a person may hold unfavourable implicit associations with an ethnic 
minority, be aware of their bias, but consciously reject it because they believe racial prejudice 
to be wrong. This is supported by studies which have contrasted people with high and low 
motivation to control their prejudice: implicit-explicit correlations tend to be lower for highly 
motivated participants (Hausmann & Ryan, 2004; Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008). 
Additionally, correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes tend to increase when 
participants are more inclined (or instructed to) respond on self-report measures in a more 
intuitive, less deliberative manner (Jordan, Whitfield, & Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Hofmann et al., 
2005). This suggests that self-report partially involves analysing initial, intuitive reactions for 
their truth value – and rejecting them if they are found to be subjectively wrong. This, in turn, 
suggests that conscious awareness of implicit attitudes is possible at least to some extent. 
In the instance of unambiguous, or uncontroversial attitudes, people presumably have 
very little reason to alter their automatic associations during self-report. Studies within ‘known 
groups’, where objects used as stimuli are strongly and uncontroversially valenced, tend to 
have considerably higher correlations than more ambiguous stimuli (Nosek, 2007). An example 
of a known group measure is the flower-insect Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), on which people typically report more positive associations with 
flowers compared to insects1. Most people also report holding similar attitudes explicitly; 
entomologists notwithstanding. However, the question is: does a high positive correlation 
denote awareness, or simply a correspondence between the implicit and explicit attitudes? 
Several studies have directly asked participants about their experiences with implicit 
measures. Monteith, Voils and Ashburn-Nardo (2001) asked people about their experiences 
with the race attitude IAT, where participants completed two trial blocks: in one, faces of white 
people were paired with positive words and faces of black people were paired with negative 
                                                             
1 The IAT procedure is discussed in detail in Chapter II (p.48). Figure 1 (p.50) illustrates the 
procedure. 17 
 
words; in the other, the pairings were reversed (white with negative, black with positive). Most 
participants (64%) noticed that they were faster to respond in the white-positive/black-negative 
pairing, and 37% suggested that this may reflect a more favourable attitude towards white 
people. In fact, bearing in mind the sensitive nature of the research and the biasing effects of 
social desirability, it is likely that the figures are underestimated. Still, these findings suggest 
that people are at least to some extent, aware of the implicit associations they hold and how 
these might affect performance on implicit measures. 
However, it is worth noting that while these findings support introspection to an extent, 
people are also not very good at estimating contextual influences on their performance on 
implicit measures. Mitchell, Nosek and Banaji (2003) found that participants were not able to 
correctly predict their implicit attitudes towards black athletes and white politicians on 
different IATs measuring attitude on the basis of race and occupation. Perhaps this is another 
example of the extent to which we are blind to our own biases (Pronin, 2007), but regardless of 
the underlying cause, our introspection seems to be limited.  
An experimental approach to assessing awareness of implicit attitude involves measuring 
implicit and explicit attitudes towards novel, neutral objects. Olson and Fazio (2001) presented 
participants with images of unfamiliar cartoon characters, paired with either negative or 
positive stimuli (words and pictures), disguised as a video surveillance task, in a classical 
conditioning paradigm. Following the task, participants reported a more positive implicit 
attitude towards characters paired with positive stimuli, compared with characters that were 
paired with negative stimuli. Participants were also able to articulate the preference on an 
explicit level, although they were not able to rationalise it and did not remember seeing 
consistent stimuli pairs during the ‘surveillance’ task which could account for it. These findings 
suggest that people can accurately identify their affective, automatic response to target objects 
(as assessed by the implicit attitude measure), even if they cannot articulate a rational reason 
for that response. 18 
 
Together, the evidence suggests that while implicit attitudes appear to be at least 
partially available to introspection, people are not as accurate at identifying them as explicit 
attitudes. Gawronski, LeBel and Peters (2007) point out that just because an implicit attitude 
does not require accurate introspection to be valid, it does not follow that implicit attitudes 
must therefore be unavailable to introspection. In other words, implicit attitudes can be, and 
are, activated on the periphery of conscious awareness (e.g., the mere exposure effect), but 
they become available to conscious processing if necessary (e.g., prejudice suppression). 
 
3.2. ASSUMPTION 2: IMPLICIT ATTITUDES ARE MORE STABLE 
THAN EXPLICIT ATTITUDES 
 
Several approaches to implicit cognition suggest that implicit attitudes are formed over a 
longer period of time than explicit attitudes and are therefore more stable (Beck, 1976; Wilson 
et al., 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Conner & Feldman-Barrett, 2005). In the context of 
Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) definition of implicit attitudes as introspectively unidentified, 
implicit associations can be viewed as the non-conscious consequence of the things we have 
experienced or encountered. One possible hypothesis stemming from this approach is that 
implicit attitudes would reflect a person’s “true” attitude; the net associations a person has 
accumulated over the course of their lifetime. This approach is supported by the fact that 
implicit attitudes are measured indirectly and are therefore presumably less susceptible to the 
effects of self-presentation bias. An alternative hypothesis is that implicit attitudes reflect 
experience, but are more closely indicative of a person’s socialisation experiences as opposed 
to the attitudes they actually endorse as being subjectively true (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, 
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Rudman, 2004). For instance, negative implicit associations with a 
particular ethnicity could be the consequence of living in a prejudiced society and constant 
exposure to racist ideas, images and text – rather than the consequence of personal beliefs or 
behaviour. 19 
 
In terms of real-life experience, the hypothesis that implicit attitudes are formed over a 
longer period of time than explicit ones is better applied to more unambiguous attitudes. For 
instance, the implicit association cake–good might form through repeated different instances of 
eating different cakes and consistently experiencing a pleasant taste as a consequence. By 
contrast, the hypothesis that implicit attitudes reflect a person’s social environment might 
explain (beyond the biases of self-report) why people who do not consider themselves to be 
racist still respond in a way that suggests ethnic bias on implicit attitudes measures (Devine, 
1989; Stangor et al., 1991; Hausmann & Ryan, 2004). Constant, repeated exposure to images or 
text in the media which consistently portray black people in a negative light could potentially 
contribute to the formation of the automatic association black–bad. Without an equally salient 
source of alternative information to counteract the negative exposure in the environment, we 
would expect ethnic prejudice to be present on an implicit level even in members of the 
stigmatised group – which has, in fact, been found in cross-population studies (Uhlmann, 
Dasgupta, Elgueta, Greenwald, & Swanson, 2002). In this context, the negative implicit attitude 
can be interpreted as a reflection of social or cultural bias, rather than a suppressed “true” 
racist attitude, as “true” racism would require additional conscious endorsement of such 
associations. The validity of this hypothesis can be assessed through research in implicit 
attitude formation.  
Findings from operant conditioning paradigms support the hypothesis that implicit 
attitudes are formed through repeated exposure to an object-response pairing (e.g., cake–good 
or black–bad) in close temporal or spatial proximity. Several studies have found that repeatedly 
pairing target objects with indicators of valence results in implicit attitude change (Olson & 
Fazio, 2001; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Ebert, Steffens, von 
Stülpnagel, & Jelenec, 2009; Hollands, Prestwich, & Marteau, 2011). Dijksterhuis (2004) found 
consistent positive changes in participants’ implicit self-esteem (effectively, positive implicit 
associations with the self) following a lexical decision task where the word ‘I’ was primed before 
positively-valenced words. Hollands, Prestwich and Marteau (2011) conducted a study where 20 
 
participants were shown images of high-fat, calorie-dense food followed by aversive body 
images (or a neutral screen in the control condition). Participants in the aversive condition 
subsequently reported a more negative implicit attitude towards high-fat food compared to 
controls, and also were more likely to select fruit as opposed to a high-fat snack at the end of 
the study. It is possible that this outcome is the result of social bias, as negative attitudes 
towards obesity are prevalent in Western culture. 
It can be argued that these studies demonstrate how implicit attitudes are formed in 
naturalistic settings; repeated pairing of stimuli eventually becomes automated as an implicitly-
accessible heuristic, available to memory retrieval spontaneously and effortlessly. However, 
these studies also suggest that implicit attitudes respond to conditioning fairly quickly and 
easily, to the extent where changes can be seen as a result of one experimental session. The 
claim that implicit attitudes are more stable than explicit attitudes implies that they are more 
resistant to change. However, the evidence largely does not support this. For instance, Olson 
and Fazio (2001) found corresponding attitudinal change in both implicit and explicit attitudes 
as a consequence of their conditioning procedure. Gawronski, Walther and Blank (2005) 
similarly found that presenting imaginary ‘new’ colleagues in pair with a known, liked colleague 
positively affected participants’ implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Some studies even suggest that implicit attitudes are more susceptible to change than 
explicit ones (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). For instance, Dasgupta 
and Greenwald (2001) found that it was possible to induce change in participants’ implicit 
attitudes towards white and black people simply through exposure. Participants who saw 
images of positively-valenced black people (such as Martin Luther King) and negatively-
valenced white people (such as Jeffrey Dahmer) subsequently reported more positive “black” 
associations compared to people who saw images of negatively-valenced black people (such as 
Mike Tyson) and positively-valenced white people (such as Tom Hanks). However, the groups 
did not differ in their explicit attitudes. This finding may be attributed to the processes through 
which implicit and explicit attitudes are formed; a paradigm based in operant conditioning can 21 
 
be expected to be more likely to affect implicit attitudes, while an exercise in deliberation and 
the analysis of evidence might be more likely to affect explicit ones. Although some studies 
have shown implicit attitudes to be more stable than explicit ones (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; 
Gawronski & Strack, 2003), the majority of the findings do not support the assertion that 
implicit attitudes are more resistant to change than explicit ones. 
Further evidence against the heightened stability of implicit attitudes comes from 
research on the effects of context. Explicit (self-reported) attitudes are known to be susceptible 
to context: self-reported attitudes change with a variety of factors, including how a question is 
asked, which questions have been asked previously and the participant’s mood (Schwarz & 
Strack, 1991). For example, Salancik and Conway (1975) found that participants cued to 
endorse religious behaviour were more likely to subsequently express a more positive attitude 
towards religion, compared to participants who were cued to reject religious behaviour. One 
explanation is that we hold a lot of information about attitudinal objects in memory, but 
retrieve it selectively depending on which information has been primed and which behavioural 
goals are activated (Tourangeau, Rasinski, & Bradburn, 1989). If implicit attitudes constitute 
automatic memory retrieval, it would seem possible that this retrieval process can also be 
manipulated. 
Indeed, responses on implicit measures, such as the IAT, have been found to be affected 
by both the content of the stimuli and the actual context in which the measure is completed. 
For example, implicit attitudes towards ethnic groups have been found to change according to 
the ethnicity of the experimenter conducting the study (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). 
Mitchell, Nosek and Banaji (2003) found that participants tend to report an implicit preference 
for white, compared to black, people on race IATs; however, if the categories are labelled as 
politician vs. athlete, people tend to prefer black athletes to white politicians. This suggests that 
implicit attitudes are, at least to an extent, malleable. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2007) 
suggest that activations in the associative memory network depend on a) the pre-existing 
structure of the network, and b) the content of the input which elicits the response. So, to use 22 
 
the race IAT example, responses on the measure would depend on the types of associations 
which had been formed in relation to black people, but also on the specific person to whom the 
response is activated (e.g., corrupt politician or admired athlete). That is, assuming the 
respondent holds at least some positive and negative associations with each stimulus. 
Hypothetically, it should therefore impossible to influence the outcome of an implicit attitude 
measure through context if the attitude being assessed is unambiguously positive or negative. 
It must be noted that none of these findings adequately disambiguate the conflict 
between implicit attitudes derived from personal beliefs and behaviours, from implicit 
associations which reflect cultural norms. Drawing the distinction may be important for some 
experimental paradigms. Olson and Fazio (2004) developed a personalised version of the IAT 
intended to reduce the ‘contaminating’ effects of extra-personal associations by rephrasing the 
valence categories in the first person (e.g., ‘I like’ cf. ‘Positive’). The modified version of the IAT 
was found to reduce implicit racial bias, suggesting that people may hold personal implicit 
attitudes which are different from their internalised cultural norms. However, while the source 
of any implicit attitude could lie in cultural norms or personal experience (or both), there is no 
evidence that differences in source origin has any behavioural or cognitive effect. First of all, 
data about information source is stored separately from information content and there is no 
evidence to suggest that one can influence the other in automatic association retrieval 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Attitudinal source information may be important for 
attitudinal change, or from the perspective of theoretical modelling. However, automatically 
activated associations appear to have the same consequences regardless of why they are 
activated. 
In sum, there is not much evidence to suggest that implicit attitudes are older, more 
stable or more resistant to change than explicit attitudes. Although the change occurs through 
different means (operant or classical conditioning for implicit attitudes and information-
processing for explicit attitudes), both seem to be susceptible to manipulation in an 
experimental setting. Perhaps the question is how well this translates to a real-world setting; 23 
 
how often are we exposed to repeated stimuli pairings which might lead to implicit attitude 
change, or how often do we encounter information which forces us to re-evaluate existing 
opinions? It is likely that the answer will depend on the specific attitudinal construct and the 
social context in which it is processed. However, it does not appear that stability can be cited as 
a “benefit” of implicit attitude assessment. 
 
3.3. ASSUMPTION 3: IMPLICIT ATTITUDES ARE AUTOMATIC, 
UNCONTROLLABLE AND/OR GOAL-INDEPENDENT 
 
Implicit attitudes have variably been ascribed the properties of automatic (De Houwer, 
2006), efficient (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), uncontrollable (Perugini, 2005), or goal-independent 
(De Houwer & Moors, 2007) activation in memory upon encountering an attitude object. These 
definitions are not entirely synonymous, and differ on how supported they are by empirical 
evidence. Efficiency refers to the amount of cognitive resources a process requires for 
operation. Controllability and goal-independence refer to the activation of associations 
regardless of the intention to (not) activate them. The definition of automaticity is somewhat 
more complex and will be discussed in greater detail later on in this section. 
In terms of implicit attitude measurement, goal-independence can be translated to the 
question of whether people are able to deliberately affect their performance on measures such 
as the IAT. As discussed previously, people are somewhat aware of the purpose of implicit 
measures and their own response biases while completing them (e.g., Monteith, Voils, & 
Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). Awareness constitutes the first pre-requisite to deliberate manipulation; 
however, it does not seem to be sufficient, as for the most part people do not seem to be very 
good at faking their responses on the IAT when explicitly asked to fake their attitude. Failure to 
fake has been found in attitudes towards homosexuality (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001, Study 
2), flowers (Kim, 2003, Study 1), race (Kim, 2003, Study 2), imaginary social groups (Gregg et al., 
2006, Study 4), and gender (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Some evidence does suggest that 
some degree of faking is possible if novel stimuli (with valence ascribed to them) are used in the 24 
 
study, and participants are instructed to behave contrary to the researcher’s expectations  (De 
Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007). However, these results cannot be extended to familiar 
stimuli. 
Faking success seems to improve when people are given more explicit instructions. For 
instance, Steffens (2004) found that participants attempting to fake self-conscientiousness on 
an IAT tended to increase error rates in the congruent block, which is an incorrect strategy. 
Participants were more adept at faking when given specific instructions to alter their response 
latencies. Similarly,  Fiedler and Bluemke (2005) found that participants were reasonably 
capable of faking their responses on a Turkish-German IAT; 34 out of 50 participants were 
successfully able to reverse their IAT score from positive (pro-German) to negative (pro-
Turkish). Again, success rates increased when participants were given explicit instructions on 
how to fake IAT responses. Faking seems to be more difficult when implicit attitudes are 
assessed using the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006), 
in which participants use key presses to make relational responses (such as “similar” or 
“better”) to stimuli pairs. The key to faking on the IRAP is to increase response times for the 
“undesired” attitude. However, even with explicit instructions, people appear to find faking 
IRAP responses challenging (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007). 
It must be noted that even though some evidence suggests that faking responses on 
implicit measures is technically possible under certain circumstances, this does not imply that 
this is something participants normally attempt. It is conceivable that faking may be more 
prevalent for studies on subjects where socially desirable responses are more important, such 
as research in prejudice. However, a meta-review of the research found that social desirability 
does not tend to  moderate implicit-explicit attitude correlations (Hofmann, Gschwendner, & 
Schmitt, 2004). It must be noted that there is a difference between a deliberate control of 
implicit attitudes and a deliberate control of responses on an implicit attitude measure. The 
studies outlined above provide some evidence for people’s ability to do the latter. Strack and 
Deutsch (2004) argue that if implicit attitudes constitute the automatic activation of 25 
 
associations in memory, then they are uncontrollable by definition. Perception is involuntary: 
we cannot, by a sheer act of will, perceive a blue square as red (Shanks & St John, 1994). By the 
same reasoning, perception of its valenced properties is also involuntary. If we believe an 
affective response to be invalid or incorrect, we can attempt to correct it; however, this will 
constitute a conscious, propositional process and therefore fall within the classification of 
explicit attitude formation. 
Efficiency refers to the amount of resources required for the operation of a cognitive 
process. The associative memory network which constitutes implicit attitudes is thought to 
operate highly efficiently, with little effort or demand on resources. This implies that implicit 
attitudes should be relatively unaffected by concurrent tasks which do require effort and 
resources. In support of this, Hermans, Crombez and Eelen (2000) found that performance on 
an affective priming task was unaffected by the amount of simultaneous memory load. Friese, 
Hofmann and Wänke (2008) also found that cognitive load did not affect implicit attitudes as 
assessed by the IAT. These findings support the conceptualisation of implicit attitudes as a 
cognitive heuristic which allows for judgments to be made quickly and efficiently. 
Whether or not implicit attitudes can be considered automatic depends, to a large 
extent, on how automaticity is defined. For instance, Posner and Snyder (1975) include 
unintentional and unconscious processing in their definition of automaticity. However, as we 
saw previously, these definitions do not necessarily apply to implicit associations. Hasher and 
Zacks (1979) conceptualise automaticity on a continuum, with fully automatic processes on one 
end, and non-automatic at the other. The continuum is defined as a function of cognitive effort: 
the more automatic a process is, the fewer resources, attention and effort it requires to 
operate. Fully automatic processes are therefore spontaneous and effortless. This definition is 
more consistent with what we know about implicit associations, including efficient operation 
and the difficulty associated with faking responses on implicit measures; it is also consistent 
with the theoretical premise of implicit attitude measures, and supported by findings in 
neuroscience. 26 
 
Implicit measures often limit windows of response time, typically a few seconds, to 
ensure that participants respond spontaneously, rather than deliberatively (e.g., Greenwald et 
al., 1998). Although this does not act as evidence of implicit attitude automaticity, it can at least 
be argued that the responses on implicit measures constitute a series of automatic responses. 
This assertion is supported by behavioural data, which suggests that implicit attitudes are 
better predictors of spontaneous, automatic behaviour, compared to explicit attitudes (Stangor 
et al., 1991; Dovidio et al., 2002; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007). Research from Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell and Kardes (1986) and Hermans and colleagues (Hermans, De Houwer, & 
Eelen, 1994; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996) supports the automatic nature of implicit 
attitudes. The studies assessed implicit attitudes using affective priming paradigms, where 
responses to stimuli following a prime are thought to be facilitated or inhibited by the implicit 
associations with the prime object. Facilitation and/or inhibition was found to occur when the 
prime was presented for 300msec (including interval to stimulus), but not when it was 
presented for 1,000msec. These findings support the automatic nature of the effects assessed 
by response-compatibility paradigms. 
Implicit attitude automaticity is supported by neuroimaging data. Single-neuron 
responses to emotional visual stimuli have been found as soon as 120-160ms after exposure 
(Kawasaki et al., 2001). The key area thought to be implicated in the automatic processing of 
valenced information is the amygdala. The amygdala is connected to the orbitofrontal cortex, 
which regulates affective processing, and with the hypothalamus, which is associated with 
autonomic functioning (Kringelbach, 2005). Its role in implicit attitude processing is supported 
by findings that amygdala activation is correlated with implicit, but not explicit attitudes (Phelps 
et al., 2000). Additionally, the amygdala has been found to respond to valenced stimuli (Zald, 
2003), even if the stimuli are primed non-consciously (Whalen et al., 1998), which is consistent 
with affective priming paradigms (Klauer & Musch, 2008). Amygdalar response to valenced 
stimuli appears to be very rapid: as quick as 200ms after stimulus presentation (Krolak-Salmon, 27 
 
Hénaff, Vighetto, Bertrand, & Mauguière, 2004). These results support automatic implicit 
attitude activation in response to attitude object exposure. 
De Houwer (2006) argues that ‘automatic’ (referring to the automatic activation of 
associations in memory following stimulus exposure) is the least ambiguous definition of 
‘implicit’ and the one most consistent with the theoretical premise of most implicit attitude 
measures. Performance on implicit tests does not appear to be entirely uncontrollable or goal-
independent, although people certainly find it harder to deliberately manipulate them than 
self-report measures. By contrast, the actual activation of implicit attitudes does indeed appear 
to be efficient (in the sense of being effortless) and automatic (in the sense of being 
spontaneously activated in response to an attitude object). 
 
3.4. SUMMARY 
 
This section outlined the evidence for some of the common claims made about implicit 
attitudes in experimental research and as components of dual-process models. Dual-process 
models tend to conceptualise implicit and explicit cognition as a dichotomy, with different 
properties assigned to each. However, research findings suggest that the distinction may not be 
as categorical as they assume. Implicit attitudes do not appear to be entirely outside of 
conscious introspection or entirely immune to the effects of different goals or contexts. While 
responses on implicit measures can be consciously manipulated to some extent, people find it 
significantly more challenging than faking responses on a self-report measure, and generally 
require explicit instruction to attain a significant level of success. As a consequence, implicit 
attitudes can only be said to be less conscious or susceptible to manipulation than explicit ones. 
These findings cast some doubt on theoretical accounts which conceptualise cognition as two 
entirely distinct processes.  
Research for the most part does not support the notion that implicit attitudes are older, 
more stable or more resistant to change than explicit attitudes, although the findings have been 28 
 
somewhat mixed. It is unclear to what extent implicit attitudes reflect personal, compared to 
culturally normative, associations. Some methodological solutions have been proposed to 
disambiguate the two, if this is contextually necessary for the study being carried out. However, 
there is no evidence that the source of the attitude has a significant effect on how people 
perform on most implicit attitude measures, or on their behaviour. 
Several dual-process theories have suggested that implicit attitudes are automatic and 
efficient, in the sense that they a) do not require effort or cognitive resources to operate, and 
b) occur spontaneously in response to attitude objects. These assertions are supported by both 
experimental and neuroimaging data, and are consistent with the premise of implicit attitudes 
and the conceptualisation of implicit attitudes as associative networks in memory. 
In sum, implicit attitudes can best be described as less introspectively available and 
controllable than explicit attitudes, although not necessarily more robust. The most 
parsimonious definition of an implicit attitude given the evidence available at this stage is a 
valenced association stored in memory which is automatically activated in response to an 
attitude object. 
 
4. Integrative models 
 
Integrative models of cognition are conceptually similar to dual-process models, in that 
they discuss cognition in terms of implicit and explicit processes. However, with increasing 
evidence to challenge some of the earlier assumptions about the nature of implicit cognition 
and its interaction with explicit attitudes, more recent models aim to account for an integration 
of the two components. 
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4.1. THE MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY AS DETERMINANTS OF 
BEHAVIOUR (MODE) MODEL 
 
Fazio (Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) developed the MODE model to address 
dual-process cognition from a social psychology perspective. The model is still a dual-process 
one in the sense that implicit and explicit processes are viewed as qualitatively and functionally 
distinct, but integrative in the sense that allowances are made for how these components 
interact with each other and, crucially, how these interactions can be used in predicting 
behaviour. The acronym refers to the ways in which the behavioural context can influence 
whether behaviour will be driven predominantly by spontaneous (implicit) or by deliberative 
(explicit) processes. 
The extent to which (the activation of) an attitude is spontaneous or deliberative is 
defined by the amount of conscious deliberation involved; attitude automaticity therefore lies 
on a spectrum from more automatic to more controlled. Spontaneous behaviours are driven by 
judgments of attitude objects in their current context, made as a consequence of automatically 
activated attitudes. Fazio (1990) disagrees with reasoned action theories (e.g., Fishbein, 1979; 
Ajzen, 1991), which suggest that people’s behaviour is, for the most part, conscious and 
rational. Rather, human behaviour is often not consciously deliberated upon before execution 
(Zajonc, 1980); this would be an inefficient and laborious way to go through life. Most daily 
behaviour is therefore routine, according to Fazio, and happens relatively efficiently and 
effortlessly. Implicit processes are defined as automatic; Fazio (1990) argues that this is 
supported by people’s performances on implicit attitude measures, such as the IAT: differences 
in association strengths can be seen even though participants are not instructed to make any 
judgment about the test stimuli. 
The deliberative processes which underlie consciously enacted behaviours, consist of a 
cost-benefit analysis of a behavioural response. Such an analysis can be expected to take place 
in contexts where people are motivated to re-evaluate their automatic responses to attitude 
objects. One example of such a motivation is the “fear of invalidity” (Freund, Kruglanski, & 30 
 
Shpitzajzen, 1985), or the belief that making mistakes in judgment will be costly to oneself. Of 
course, deliberative analysis can only take place when resources and motivation are available to 
do so. The MODE model therefore differs from more categorical dual-process models in that it 
allows for the fact that a) people are at least to some extent aware of their implicit attitudes 
and b) implicit attitudes are activated automatically but do not necessarily lead to consistent 
behaviour if resources and motivation are available to engage in inconsistent behaviour. 
The MODE approach is consistent with research on awareness and automaticity, but is 
particularly relevant to socially controversial attitudes, such as those pertaining to racial 
stereotypes. Implicit-explicit correlations tend to be particularly low for racial attitudes (Blair, 
2002); the MODE model can explain this in terms of the increased levels of deliberation 
required to make behavioural decisions in sensitive contexts, which then influences the 
outcomes of explicit measures. For uncontroversial domains, less deliberation is required, 
which leads to greater correspondence between measures (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). 
The question therefore is not where there is a relationship between implicit and explicit 
attitudes and what this means for the theory of implicit cognition; rather, there is a need to 
understand the contexts and people where such a relationship is present or absent, and why 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
The model rejects the notion that implicit attitudes are more “real”, i.e., that they are a 
more reliable index of beliefs which people hold as objectively true. Rather, implicit and explicit 
attitudes are better predictors of different behaviours, in different contexts. Specifically, self-
reported attitudes are better predictors of behaviour which is deliberate and controlled, while 
implicit attitudes are better predictors of behaviour which is spontaneous or impulsive 
(Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Haeffel et al., 2007). The focus of the MODE model is 
rooted in social psychology; as a consequence, research based within its framework has often 
been focused on the issue of racial prejudice and related behaviour. Research in implicit 
attitudes towards minority ethnic groups suggests that explicit attitudes tend to predict 
deliberate verbal behaviour in interactions. By contrast, implicit attitudes tend to predict 31 
 
nonverbal behaviour, which is less consciously controllable, including observer ratings of 
friendliness within the interaction (Dovidio et al., 2002; Stangor et al., 1991). Implicit measures 
may therefore be more relevant for understanding behaviour in contexts where the person is 
less able, or less motivated, to control it.  
 
4.2. THE ASSOCIATIVE-PROPOSITIONAL EVALUATION (APE) 
MODEL 
 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen have proposed the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) as a re-interpretation of dual-process approaches, such 
as the Reflective-Impulsive model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), on the basis of empirical findings. 
The basic approach is similar: cognition is separated into processes which are mostly automatic, 
and those which are mostly controlled; these processes are understood to be qualitatively 
different. The model is aimed at qualifying the differences between these processes in light of 
empirical findings, and explaining what elicits change in each type of process. An additional 
concern is explaining the typically low correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes 
(Hofmann et al., 2005), which are discussed in terms of reconciling cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1962). 
Within the APE model, cognitive processes are defined as either associative, thought to 
be the consequence of automatic activation of associations in memory, or propositional, which 
consist of the conscious validation of associative information. Associative processes are not all-
or-nothing; different associations can be made depending on context or motivation. After the 
initial association is consciously acknowledged, it is translated into a propositional statement 
(e.g., ‘I like it’/’I don’t like it’), which can then be assessed for logical consistency. Attitudinal 
change is thought to be mediated by different mechanisms, depending on the process. 
Associative processes are likely to change if a novel affective reaction occurs, given that it is also 
endorsed by propositional reasoning. Propositional processes are changed by encountering 
new, persuasive information which is at odds with old information. 32 
 
A discrepancy between an associative and a propositional process creates a state of 
dissonance, which we are motivated to reconcile, either by discounting the affective (implicit) 
response or by modifying the propositional assessment. This is supported by research which 
suggests that higher levels of elaboration during an explicit attitude measure tends to decrease 
the implicit-explicit correlation (Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001). Presumably, 
when we spend more time trying to rationalise our beliefs, we are either trying to quell an 
instinctive response we believe to be incorrect, or trying to come to a satisfactory explanation 
why our instinctive response is the correct one despite appearances. This does not imply that 
we can effectively regulate our associative processes; in fact, quite the opposite, as evidenced 
by the relatively modest success of ‘faking’ studies (see p.23) 
Although the APE model is structurally similar to dual-process theories, it also rejects 
qualifying features which are inconsistent with research evidence. For instance, associative 
processes are not classified as non-conscious, as people are capable of accurately identifying 
their affective responses to attitude objects. The model also accepts the view that automatic 
associations require little or no effort for retrieval, and are, by definition, not controllable. 
However, the authors argue that implicit associations are not always automatic because they 
can be activated intentionally, such as when a person does a memory search for information 
which can bias the affective response. This is not a convincing argument against the automatic 
nature of implicit attitudes because while the memory search itself does indeed require effort, 
it can be argued that the resulting activation of associations is still automatic. In fact, conscious 
‘control’ of automatic attitudes can be better explained by the contextual effects on parallel 
distributed processing (see the Iterative Reprocessing model for more on this, p.36). 
Although the model is mostly consistent with empirical evidence, the claim that 
associative processes change through novel, explicitly endorsed affective associations, is 
inconsistent with studies which have found that implicit attitudes can be affected through 
conditioning procedures, without the need for endorsement (Olson & Fazio, 2001). Kruglanski 
and Dechesne (2006) argue that the APE model is too categorical in its distinction between 33 
 
implicit and explicit attitudes, and that evidence supports a continuum model where attitudes 
vary in the degree of automaticity and resource demands. The authors argue that attitude 
construction is mediated by a single computational process comprised of conditional (‘if... 
then’) rule generation. 
Nevertheless, the APE model is probably the most consistent consolidation of recent 
research into a coherent theoretical account. Studies based on APE model principles have been 
carried out in areas such as prejudice reduction (Sritharan & Gawronski, 2010), self-anchoring 
(Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007) and self-esteem (Grumm, Nestler, & von Collani, 
2009). The APE principles allow for the formulation of research within a ready theoretical 
framework, without derailing the discussion into a semantic analysis of the underlying 
assumptions. However, the model is heavily feature- rather than process-based and therefore 
would be less useful in research specifically concerned with the mechanisms underlying attitude 
formation and its behavioural outcomes. 
 
4.3. RELATIONAL ELABORATION AND COHERENCE (REC) MODEL 
 
Relational frame theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) is an approach to 
understanding human language and higher cognition in terms of arbitrary relational responses. 
According to the theory, we understand the world through relative relationships, such as 
feature similarity, location within a hierarchy, cause and effect or functional difference. The 
relationships are arbitrary in the sense that they are culturally determined and learned socially 
(Chase & Danforth, 1991); a child is rewarded for making responses consistent with 
contextually controlled relations termed ‘relational frames’. A basic example of a relational 
frame is hearing the sentence “this is an apple” when being given an apple, forming the 
relational link between the word “apple” and the concept of apples, on the basis of contextual 
cues such as the speaker’s behaviour and words like “this” and “is” (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-34 
 
Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000). Later on, similar relational links will be formed between apples and 
their attributes, such as sweetness. 
The REC model (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010) is an extension 
of relational frame theory. Within this model, attitudes constitute a network of relational 
associations; these may be constructed automatically or consciously, depending on context, 
motivation and processing goals. The REC model assumes that a single process underlies 
attitude formation and, as such, is not a dual-process model. Both implicit and explicit attitudes 
are seen as relational associations, but retrieved under different circumstances. Brief, 
automatic responses reflect implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes are the consequences of 
deliberative processes where a person needs to produce a response which coheres with a set of 
other relational associations which are relevant to the context (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2011). Implicit and explicit attitudes will diverge when a person concludes that the initially 
generated automatic response is inconsistent with extended relational responses (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2010). Similar to the APE model, this model assumes that implicit attitudes are, to 
an extent, available to conscious introspection. It also stresses the importance of context and 
motivation in attitude retrieval (both implicit and explicit) and rejects the notion that implicit 
attitudes are more stable or reflect older associations. However, it does accept that implicit 
attitudes may reflect experience and therefore social norms which may or may not be endorsed 
by the person who holds them. 
It has been suggested that one of the benefits of the REC model is that it is compatible 
with emerging theoretical approaches which reject the assumption that attitudes constitute an 
associative memory framework. Hughes, Barnes-Holmes and De Houwer (2011) argue that 
implicit attitudes should not be limited in definition to concepts occurring in close temporal or 
spatial proximity, and that making this assumption limits the scope of the research field and the 
types of measures which can be used in implicit attitude measurement. According to the 
authors it is more parsimonious to assume that attitudes are constructed ‘on the spot’ as 
needed, rather than stored and retrieved from memory. In this approach, people’s behaviour 35 
 
constitutes a relationship between the environment and their response (Fox, 2006); this 
functional contextualism approach removes the need for hypothetical mechanisms which might 
underlie attitude retrieval. Within the REC model, attitudes are not viewed as conceptual 
entities which determine behaviour towards attitude objects; rather, they are the behaviour 
itself. 
While the functional contextualism account is intriguing as a philosophical interpretation 
of attitude formation, there is currently insufficient evidence to support it in the context of 
implicit attitude research. Studies in conditioning implicit attitudes through repeated paired 
exposure (Olson & Fazio, 2001; Baccus et al., 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Hollands et al., 2011) 
suggest that implicit attitudes are, in fact, stored in memory. Second, the claim that attitudes 
are constructed spontaneously within each new context requires a computational or 
neurobiological explanation of the processes involved. Finally, it is true that many attitude 
objects are evaluated relative to alternatives; for instance, as is the case with social comparison 
(Wills, 1981). However, even when such alternatives exist, people are capable of subjective 
judgments (and therefore single-category attitudes) as well as relational associations 
(VanderZee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1995). Relational frame theory and the REC model are 
therefore useful supplements to other integrative approaches, but are currently insufficiently 
detailed and insufficiently empirically supported to replace them. It is, however, useful for 
broadening the scope of what constitutes ‘implicit’ cognition and how it can be measured. 
 
4.4. THE ITERATIVE REPROCESSING (IR) MODEL 
 
The IR model was developed by Cunningham, Zelazo and colleagues (Cunningham, 
Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2010). 
The model is a computational one; it is informed by research in neuroscience, particularly on 
the development of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in childhood (Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 2008). 
Iterative reprocessing refers to the dynamic processing of cognitive information between 36 
 
higher-order and lower-order processes. Lower order processes are conceptually similar to 
automatic attitudes; they constitute a set of stable representations in memory, activated in 
response to encountering or imagining an attitude object. The activated attitude is then passed 
on to higher-order processes which can then incorporate additional variables such as goals or 
context into a more complex evaluation. The evaluation is then fed back to lower-order 
processes for a recalculation of the affective response. 
Higher-order and lower-order processes are thought to operate dynamically and in 
concert, with information being passed back and forth between the system networks. Top-
down processing then allows for evaluative processes to alter input weights between affective 
associations and the attitude object. The number of total iterations taking place depends on the 
complexity of the evaluation and its compatibility with the automatic affective response. 
Awareness and controllability of attitudes in this context is viewed on a continuum, with the 
first few iterations being entirely non-conscious and automatic, and becoming gradually more 
controlled and available to introspection with each subsequent iteration. 
The IR model is based on the assumption that brain systems are structured hierarchically 
(Bunge & Zelazo, 2006). The initial affective response is retrieved automatically; amygdala 
response can be detected within a few hundred milliseconds (Oya, Kawasaki, Howard, & 
Adolphs, 2002). Amygdala response is then relayed to the orbitofrontal cortex, which allows for 
a more a more nuanced analysis of expected rewards and punishments with the actual bodily 
state (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003). In many cases, where no conflict is 
detected, these iterations will be sufficient. However, if the input stimulus triggers an 
ambivalent response (strong positive and negative response activation), further iterations will 
take place in the lateral PFC (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006). Processing associated with the lateral PFC 
is higher-order rule-selection, which is then used for top-down modulation of the lower-order 
processes. From this perspective, lower-order processes are not simply single association paths; 
rather, they constitute complex networks of associations where relative connection weights are 
constantly updated. Stronger connection weights increase the likelihood of activation in the 37 
 
future. At the same time, some attitudes will remain relatively stable over the course of a 
person’s lifetime, while others will be constantly updated and re-processed. This approach is 
also consistent with parallel distributed processing models (Smith, 1996), which suggest that 
mental representations constitute a series of connections between concepts; these can operate 
in parallel, and activation strength can vary depending on context. 
The iterative-reprocessing approach is valuable from several perspectives. First of all, it 
makes the attempt to tie in cognitive theory of attitude formation with measurable 
neurophysical phenomena. Data from research in neuroscience supports a biological distinction 
between automatic, affective processes and conscious, deliberative ones. However, it appears 
that the two processes are best characterised as a dialogue, with information being passed back 
and forth on a continuum, rather than as two independent cognitive structures. Second, as with 
the APE model, it suggests that evaluative judgments (‘explicit attitudes’) are motivated by 
resolving ambivalence (Cunningham et al., 2007); in all other cases, parsimony and resource 
conservation takes precedence. However, the IR model does not adequately account for studies 
which suggest that we are, at least to some extent, aware of our implicit attitudes, even in the 
absence of conflict with explicit attitudes (e.g., Monteith et al., 2001). 
The principles of iterative-reprocessing are consistent with neurobiological data, 
although the majority of the studies have not been designed to test the model specifically. It is 
also necessary to test its applicability to experimental research contexts; its compatibility with 
implicit attitude measures currently in use and consistency with observable behaviour. The 
model also suggests that implicit cognition may be assessed through neuroimaging techniques; 
this may not be practical in most research contexts but could be intriguing as the purest form of 
indirect automatic attitude assessment. 
Overall, the IR model allows for considerable fluidity in the process of attitude formation 
and is consistent with the majority of the research-revised definitions of ‘implicitness.’ It 
supports the re-conceptualisation of dual-process models from categorical to continuous; 
implicit attitudes are therefore represented as being less available to introspection or more 38 
 
goal-independent than explicit processes. Attitudes can therefore travel along the continuum 
based on context demands, resource availability and motivation, which can explain the results 
of studies which have successfully manipulated implicit attitudes using these factors (Hermans, 
Crombez, & Eelen, 2000; Lowery et al., 2001; Hausmann & Ryan, 2004; Fiedler & Bluemke, 
2005; Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008). 
 
5. Summary 
 
Research from the past decade suggests that implicit and explicit cognition may not be as 
categorically segregated as has been implied by dual-process models. Implicit attitudes have 
been demonstrated to be, to an extent, available to introspection (Olson & Fazio, 2001; 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) and susceptible to the effects of context (Lowery et al., 2001; 
Mitchell et al., 2003) and motivation (Jordan et al., 2007; Hing et al., 2008). Integrative models 
of cognition take these findings into account to develop models which are concerned not only 
with the functional and conceptual differences between implicit and explicit attitudes, but also 
with their interaction and behavioural consequences. Contemporary 'dual-process' models tend 
to view implicit and explicit cognition on a continuum, with attitudes being more or less 
automatic or more or less deliberative depending on what is required for the specific context. 
The integrative models discussed in this section come from vastly different psychological 
perspectives and have very different goals. As such, they can be viewed as complimentary, 
rather than competitive. The MODE model is a continuum model, with attitudes classified on a 
spectrum from more automatic to more controlled. Attitudes become more controlled when a 
person is motivated to re-assess their automatic response for potential cost-and-benefit 
outcomes; however, most daily behaviour is viewed as more automatic than deliberative. The 
MODE model is most useful in the discussion of social behaviour. The APE model is conceptually 
closest to dual-process models, as it categorises implicit and explicit processes as qualitatively 
different. In this model, a discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitudes is thought to 39 
 
indicate a state of dissonance, where an automatic association is consciously rejected as invalid. 
The approach consolidates much of the recent empirical findings and is therefore useful as a 
foundation to further research. 
The REC model probably takes the most unconventional approach of the models 
discussed. It suggests that attitudes do not constitute stored associations in memory; rather, 
both implicit and explicit attitudes are behavioural expressions of the same relational network. 
However, at this stage the model is mostly conceptual and is in need of supporting research 
evidence. Finally, the IR model is aimed at qualifying the theoretical approach to dual-process 
cognition in neurobiological terms. Findings from fMRI studies appear to support the suggestion 
that attitudes are processed on a continuum, from the relatively automatic to the relatively 
controlled, and that different regions of the brain become increasingly involved as processing 
demand changes. 
 
6. A perfect model of implicit cognition? 
 
None of the models discussed in this section can be considered to be an exhaustive or 
definitive account of implicit and explicit cognition. In all likelihood, no such model will ever 
exist, because theoretical approaches need to be specific to the research area and the research 
aims. However, researchers do appear to be converging on the answers to the big questions: a) 
the definition of an implicit attitude, b) the interaction (if any) between implicit and explicit 
processes in attitude formation and c) the extent to which implicit attitudes are malleable and 
how they are shaped. 
Most recent approaches have moved away from a strictly dual-process approach to allow 
for ‘implicit-ness’ to be thought of in relative terms. Most models (with the exception of the 
REC model) tend to agree that implicit attitudes can be defined as associations in memory, 
activated automatically in response to an attitude object. Deliberative processes then take 
place when the automatic attitude is considered to be an invalid one, or inconsistent with 40 
 
current contextual information. Explicit processes only occur when there is sufficient 
motivation and sufficient cognitive resources available to enact them. Interaction between 
implicit and explicit processes therefore consists of both bottom-up and top-down regulation; 
awareness of affective responses (usually perceived as ‘gut feelings’) can affect how we 
verbalise our attitudes – at the same time, we can reject our emotional responses if we do not 
consider them to be valid or contextually appropriate. 
The models differ somewhat in how they explain the malleability of implicit attitudes, 
their susceptibility to the effects of context and motivation. However, the IR model’s 
computational account is consistent with most approaches as well as experimental research. 
Implicit attitudes do not merely consist of a single object-valence association; rather, they are 
comprised of an associative network where different associations hold different strength 
values, which determine probability of activation as well as activation within a specific context. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
De Houwer (2006) correctly notes that much of the research in implicit cognition fails to 
define what is meant by “implicit” or “explicit” cognition. Different theoretical models have 
ascribed different features to implicit attitudes. Empirical evidence suggests that implicit 
attitudes are best defined as associations in memory which are activated effortlessly and 
spontaneously upon encountering an attitude object. In the context of the definition of 
“attitude”, it is implied that these associations are presumed to be valenced – i.e., eliciting a 
positive or a negative response. 
Dual-process theories conceptualise implicit and explicit cognition as distinct processes. 
However, the more recent integrative models tend to agree that evidence suggests that 
cognition lies on a continuum, from the more implicit to the more explicit. From this 
perspective, implicit and explicit attitudes are different sides of the same coin; qualitatively 41 
 
different responses to the same attitude object which can nevertheless interact between each 
other. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to refine existing theoretical models of implicit 
cognition. The research presented here is grounded in the least controversial assumptions 
about the nature of implicit attitudes (specifically that their activation is automatic and 
effortless). There is no single theoretical model which is upheld as being unequivocally and 
completely accurate. The APE model is probably the most consistent with the empirical 
evidence pertaining to the features of implicit and explicit processes. The parallel distributed 
processing model of activation adapted by the IR model can explain implicit attitude activation, 
and their susceptibility to the effects of context. Finally, the REC model’s focus on the 
behavioural consequences of implicit cognition is important for the present research focus on 
behaviour. These different elements have been adapted in the present thesis during study 
design and the formulation of hypotheses, and also in the discussion and interpretation of 
results. 
This thesis was designed to address the role of implicit cognition in pathological eating 
behaviour. Four studies were conducted to assess implicit associations with the self and with 
food in women with concerns about their eating behaviour and their bodies. The theoretical 
context and research background of each study is discussed in detail in the introduction of each 
relevant chapter. Chapter II will introduce the different methodological approaches to 
measuring implicit attitudes and discuss their theoretical context and limitations. Chapters III, 
IV, V and VI will present empirical data and discuss the findings in the immediate context of 
each study’s hypotheses. Finally, Chapter VII will summarise the findings and discuss the results 
within the broader context of theoretical accounts of implicit cognition. 
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CHAPTER II 
Approaches to implicit attitude measurement 
 
 
So far, implicit attitudes have been discussed purely as conceptual entities. The research 
has been discussed on the assumption, for the sake of argument, that the measures used have 
yielded a perfect assessment of the participant’s automatic associations. Of course, this is 
unlikely to be the case. There are a variety of ways to assess implicit attitudes; some are more 
commonly used than others, some have been more heavily criticised than others, some are 
better suited to specific research purposes than others. In this section, some of the methods 
used in implicit attitude assessment are outlined and briefly discussed in terms of their 
application, strengths and limitations. 
This chapter is not an exhaustive discussion of implicit attitude measurement. The 
assessment of implicit attitudes is subject to an ongoing and multifaceted debate, from 
practical issues such as the relative merits of different scoring algorithms (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003) to more abstract issues, such as the nature of the processes which implicit 
measures assess and the potential influences of confounding variables (De Houwer, 2006; 
Gawronski, Peters, & LeBel, 2008). The purpose of the chapter is not to provide a complete 
account of all the controversies. Rather, it is to provide sufficient background on the context in 
which each measure was developed, a practical outline of the procedures used and an overview 
of its relative merits. This information is included to give background to discussion of 
methodological design and outcomes in the subsequent chapters.  
A note must also be made on terminology. As De Houwer (2006) points out, measures 
are frequently termed ‘implicit’ without specifying in which ways they are implicit. As seen in 
Chapter I, the “implicit-ness” of something is far from being an unequivocal, clearly defined 43 
 
attribute in the literature. Frequently, an “implicit” measure is simply “indirect”, in the sense 
that the participant is not overtly requested to give their opinion on an attitude object. 
Sometimes it refers to giving responses rapidly, which supposedly diminishes conscious 
elaboration. In this section, the term “implicit” is used to refer to implicit attitudes (automatic 
associations in memory) and implicit measures (procedures designed to assess automatic 
associations in memory). Whether or not implicit measures can be deemed to actually succeed 
in accurately measuring implicit attitudes is discussed separately for each type of measure. 
 
1. Indirect measures  
 
Although implicit attitudes can be broadly defined as implicit associations in memory, 
research in implicit attitudes is concerned specifically with associations between an attitude 
object and valence. An emotional response can constitute a behavioural expression of a 
valenced association, and is implicit in the sense that it is automatic, uncontrollable and 
efficient. Some studies have therefore adopted the assessment of physiological responses to 
attitude objects as an indirect measure of (implicit) attitudes. The “indirect” aspect of the 
measure refers to the fact that participants are not asked to overtly report their attitudes. The 
term “implicit” is implied; many physiological attitude measures were developed before implicit 
cognition featured in literature in the modern sense. Nonetheless, they fit the criteria for the 
assessment of how we define implicit attitudes today.   
Examples of physiological indirect measures include the electrical conductiveness of skin 
(Wesolowki & Deichman, 1980), pupil dilation (Hess, 1965), eyeblink response (Bradley, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1990) and heart rate (Marinelli & Kelz, 1973). Advanced information 
technology has allowed for more sophisticated measurements to be carried out, such as facial 
electromyography to measure muscle activation involved in smiling or frowning (Vanman, Saltz, 
Natahan, & Warren, 2004), fMRI to measure blood flow to specific brain regions (Hart et al., 
2000) and electroencephalography (He, Johnson, Dovidio, & McCarthy, 2009). 44 
 
Physiological measures have the advantage of being minimally susceptible to conscious 
control, and also lend themselves more easily to concealing the purpose of the measurement, 
which can also help circumvent the effects of conscious control and social desirability. However, 
it can be argued that traditional (computerised) implicit attitude measures already have these 
attributes to a satisfactory level. On the negative side, physiological measures are more time-
consuming and costly. It is also debatable whether a physiological response is a fair indicator of 
automatic associations. Physiological measurements are, in a sense, reverse-engineered from 
research which examines how we respond to stimuli of different valence. If we know that 
people, for example, tend to respond to negative stimuli with an uncontrollable blink response, 
or threatening ones with an elevated heart rate, then these tendencies can be adapted to 
indirectly assess attitudes. However, such responses are not uniquely indicators of stimulus 
valence and can therefore complicate the interpretation of results if they occur for other 
reasons. Further research is necessary to focus on how well physiological indicators predict 
behaviour, compared to computerised attitude measures. However, it must be noted that 
neuropsychological data is in any case important for understanding the biological processes 
underlying the theoretical constructs used in implicit cognition models. 
 
2. Priming tasks 
 
Priming tasks designed to measure implicit attitudes operate on the principle of response 
facilitation. Affective priming procedures are designed to assess which associations are 
automatically activated in response to an attitude object (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The affective 
priming procedure has been used in the assessment of, among other things, racial attitudes 
(Fazio, jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), gender stereotypes (Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001) and 
implicit self-esteem (Spalding & Hardin, 1999). 
During an affective priming task, a participant will be primed (briefly shown an image or 
word) with the target attitude object. The participant will then need to identify, as quickly as 45 
 
possible, whether the subsequent stimulus is positive or negative. The premise of the 
procedure is that if the participant holds a positive association with the attitude object their 
response to a subsequent stimulus will be facilitated if it is positive and inhibited if it is negative 
(and vice versa if the associations with the attitude object is negative). For example, a 
participant may be primed with a picture of a spider and then see the word “dangerous” 
(congruent trial) or the word “safe” (incongruent trial). Subsequently, the participant responds 
to indicate whether the word they see falls under the category “good” or “bad”. Assuming 
participants have negative automatic associations with spiders, we can expect them to perform 
quicker in the congruent trial (spider  dangerous/negative) compared to the incongruent trial 
(spider  safe/positive).  
An alternative approach to implicit attitude assessment using priming is the affect 
misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). The premise of the 
measure combines the effects of priming with people’s tendency to incorrectly attribute the 
source of their affect, or underestimate how much unrelated factors (such as the weather) can 
bias their attitudes (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). During an AMP procedure 
participants are shown a target prime: for example, an insect or David Cameron. Participants 
then see a neutral stimulus, such as a Chinese pictograph, and asked to rate how much they like 
or dislike it. The extent to which the prime affects the evaluation of the neutral stimulus is then 
arguably an index of the participant’s implicit attitude towards the primed object. This effect 
has been found even when participants are explicitly instructed to not allow their judgment of 
the neutral stimulus to be biased by the prime (Payne et al., 2005). However, the AMP is not as 
commonly used in implicit attitude research as affective priming, and recent research directions 
have tended to adapt it for the study of the consequences of affect on behaviour (e.g., 
Hofmann & Baumert, 2010). 
Affective priming is thought to operate on similar principles as semantic priming, through 
the effect of spreading activation. Exposure to the prime is thought to activate a node in an 
associative network, thereby facilitating access to related concepts or attitude objects (Bower, 46 
 
1991). This is conceptually consistent with the principles of the Iterative-Reprocessing model 
(Cunningham et al., 2007) and parallel distributed processing (Smith, 1996). Affective priming 
tasks do not appear to be susceptible to concurrent task interference, such as reciting digit 
spans (Hermans et al., 2000) or word memorisation (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992). 
This suggests that the mechanisms underlying the task place relatively low demand on cognitive 
resources and can therefore be considered efficient. Results from the manipulation of stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA; the time interval between prime presentation and the appearance of 
the target response stimulus) also support the hypothesis that affective priming tasks assess 
automatic associations. Significant priming effects emerge with SOA at 300ms, but not at 
1,000ms (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Hermans et al., 1994); this suggests that 
the effect is only significant when participants are not given the opportunity to consciously 
evaluate the priming stimuli (Klauer & Musch, 2008). Similar effects have been found in AMP 
studies, where the prime has been found to affect subsequent stimulus attitude when 
presented at 4ms, but not at 2,000ms (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). However, other studies have 
found that increasing SOA up to 1,500ms decreases, but does not entirely erase, the affect 
misattribution effect (Payne et al., 2005). In affective priming procedures, windows of response 
times for the target stimuli are also kept low, typically at 1.75sec (Fazio et al., 1995; Sherman, 
Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003). This is done to help minimise conscious elaboration at 
response stage. However, the time criterion for when cognition can be considered automatic 
and when it can be considered conscious, is at this stage somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that 
there is no consensus for where the cut-off for automatic processing should be. Future 
functional imaging research should help resolve this ambiguity and allow for universal 
standards to be established. 
It must be noted that test-retest reliability of affective priming has been found to be 
modest (.56 in one study; Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001), although it is debatable whether this 
reflects the quality of the measure or the relative instability of implicit attitudes. There is also 
some suggestion that affective priming is more susceptible to the effects of context than other 47 
 
measures. Sherman and colleagues (2003) found that, on completing an affective priming task, 
smokers had a positive implicit attitude towards smoking in response to stimuli which focused 
on the sensory experience of smoking, but not when the stimuli used were focused on branding 
and packaging. There was no such difference on equivalent IATs. Heavy smokers also had 
positive implicit associations with smoking on an affective priming task when deprived of 
nicotine, yet not when satiated. The trend was reversed for light smokers and was absent on 
the IAT. 
Some research findings suggest that affective priming paradigms are effective at 
assessing implicit attitudes even when the prime is presented subliminally (Klauer, Mierke, & 
Musch, 2003; Wentura, Kulfanek, & Greve, 2005). De Houwer (2006) argues that a subliminal 
affective priming task may be the best currently available option for implicit attitude 
measurement, as it minimises the opportunity for participants to consciously manipulate the 
measure. However, it also decreases the ecological validity of the measure. It can be argued 
that a typical affective priming measure assesses our automatic associations with an object, in 
the way that they would be activated under normal circumstances. Presenting primes at a non-
conscious level is inconsistent with the way in which we typically experience the world and 
therefore react to it. Nevertheless, non-conscious affective priming paradigms may be useful 
for research which has a particular interest in controlling for conscious manipulation or social 
desirability. 
 
3. Response compatibility tasks 
 
3.1. THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST (IAT) 
 
The IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is designed to measure relative association strengths 
between target concepts and valence. The measure is usually computerised, although a pen-
and-paper version has also been developed (Lemm, Lane, Sattler, Khan, & Nosek, 2008). 48 
 
Participants see a sequence of stimuli (words or pictures) and press one of two response keys to 
identify the category affiliation of each stimulus. The stimuli will belong to one of four 
categories: two target categories (contrasting attitude objects, such as flowers/insects, 
Coke/Pepsi, rock/pop, etc.) and two valence categories (indicators of evaluation, such as 
good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant, tasty/disgusting). The procedure contrasts participants’ 
performance speed on a congruent, compared with an incongruent trial. 
In a congruent trial block, participants use one key to respond to one of the target 
categories and all positive stimuli (e.g., rock and pleasant), and another key to respond to the 
other target category and all negative stimuli (e.g., pop and unpleasant). In an incongruent trial 
block, the valence categories are switched: in this example, one key will correspond to 
rock/unpleasant and pop/pleasant. Figure 1 illustrates an example of screen configuration 
during the IAT using a flower/insect IAT. Which pairing is assigned to which trial block is 
arbitrary, but irrelevant to the results as the order of presentation is normally counterbalanced 
between participants. Participants are given several practice trial blocks before each 
congruent/incongruent trial to help them habituate to the new pairing; however, these will 
typically be excluded from analyses. Participants are encouraged to respond as quickly as 
possible, but without making too many errors. Responses below or above certain response 
latencies (usually <300ms and >3,000ms) are typically discarded. The reason for this is because 
a very fast response is likely to have been made accidentally or in error, while a response which 
is too long is indicative of a deliberative, explicit response rather than a response made on the 
basis of implicit associations (Dasgupta, McGhee, & Greenwald, 2000). Finally, response times 
on error trials are meaningless to the assessment of an implicit attitude and for this reason are 
also excluded from analyses. 
Response latencies on the congruent and incongruent trial are then synthesised into a 
calculation of relative preference. Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003) recommend the IAT-D, 
an algorithm which calculates the difference between mean performance in the congruent and 
incongruent block and then divides it by the standard deviation of trials in both blocks. An IAT-D  49 
 
Figure 1 
The IAT procedure 
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Incongruent trial example 
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effect significantly and positively different from zero suggests that the participant responded 
quicker in the congruent trial (rock+/pop–), compared to the incongruent trial (rock–/pop+) 
(and vice versa for a significantly negative IAT-D effect). From this, it can be surmised that the 
participant found the congruent trial easier than the incongruent trial. The implication is that 
the participant holds more positive implicit associations with rock, relative to pop. 
 
Psychometric properties. The IAT-D effect size tends to vary dramatically 
depending on the subject area and the types of stimuli used. For instance, in Nosek, Greenwald 
and Banaji (2005), d values ranged from .34 on the Native/White stereotype IAT to 1.35 on the 
Young/Old attitude IAT. The same can be said for discriminant validity; correlations between 
the implicit attitudes as assessed by the IAT and explicit attitudes as assessed through self-
report; for instance, Nosek and Smyth (2007) found a correlation of r = .56 with explicit 
attitudes on the Creationism/Evolution IAT, but only r=.01 on the White/Asian IAT. One 
explanation is that either awareness, or explicit endorsement, of attitudes varies depending on 
the attitude domain. Social desirability and culture could also play a role, as a greater 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitudes can be expected if a person is motivated to 
re-assess their “gut feeling” when completing an explicit measure. This can be true for, for 
example, a non-racist person who is frequently exposed to racist media. Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwendner, Le and Schmitt (2005) point out that at approximately half of the variability in 
correlations can also be attributed to moderators such as response spontaneity on the explicit 
measures. Test-retest reliability of the IAT is variable depending on the stimuli used and the 
time elapsed between sessions. For example, Bosson, Swann and Pennebaker (2000) found a 
test-retest correlation of r = .69 for a one month elapsed period for a self-esteem IAT. In Egloff, 
Schwerdtfeger and Schmukle (2005), test-retest on an anxiety IAT over the period of a week 
yielded r = .58. Research which suggests that implicit attitudes can be changed relatively quickly 
(Olson & Fazio, 2001; Baccus et al., 2004) suggests that the arguably low stability could reflect 
natural variations in automatic associations. Contextual or individual differences between 51 
 
testing sessions could also be “at fault”. However, it could also be an indicator of 
methodological error. 
Predictive validity of the IAT has been found to be on average around r = .27 (Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). This was lower than the average predictive validity of 
self-report measures within the same studies (mean r = .36). However, implicit and explicit 
attitudes are typically used to predict different types of behaviour: the IAT has been found to be 
a better predictor of more impulsive, spontaneous or non-verbal behaviour, while explicit 
attitudes tend to be used in the prediction of more rational or controlled behaviour (Stangor et 
al., 1991; Dovidio et al., 2002). For instance, one study of attitudes towards people with AIDS 
found that IAT predicted automatic approach and avoidance behaviours, while explicit attitudes 
predicted self-reported behavioural intentions (Neumann, Hülsenbeck, & Seibt, 2004). In 
another study, Maison, Greenwald and Bruin (2004) found that implicit attitudes significantly 
predicted brand recognition of soft drinks in a blind taste test, while explicit attitudes did not.  
 
Theoretical approaches to the IAT. The differential task-switching (DTS) 
model of the IAT (Mierke & Klauer, 2001; Klauer & Mierke, 2005) suggests that relative 
response ease reflects executive function facilitation. Consider a situation in which the 
participant has performed significantly faster in the congruent, compared with the incongruent 
trial. According to the DTS model, this reflects differential task-switching demands within each 
trial type. If the participant closely associates rock music with positive features more closely 
than pop music, the congruent trial block task can be simplified to “left key for positive, right 
key for negative”: the categories assigned to each response key have something in common, 
which simplifies responding. Consider sorting a deck of cards into a pile of red suits and a pile of 
black suits: this is a relatively easy, quick task to perform. However, in the incongruent trial 
block, there is less common ground between the two stimulus types assigned to each key: in 
this example, like sorting cards into a pile of clubs and diamonds, and a pile of spades and 
hearts. This means that participants must switch between making target category responses 52 
 
and valence category responses in each trial. The demands of task-switching on response time 
has been demonstrated experimentally (Mierke & Klauer, 2001). The incongruent trial block is 
similar to sorting a deck of cards into one pile of hearts and clubs, and another pile of spades 
and diamonds: this is considerably more difficult (and slower) than simply sorting by colour. 
Despite studies which suggest that participants are, to an extent, aware of how their 
implicit attitudes bias their performance on the IAT (Monteith et al., 2001), the IAT can be 
considered an implicit measure in the sense of being a) indirect (participants are not overtly 
asked to express their opinion) and b) automatic. The assertion that the IAT assesses 
associations in memory is supported by classical conditioning studies, which have 
demonstrated that the IAT can detect new implicit associations which have been formed just 
minutes prior as part of the experimental design (Olson & Fazio, 2001; Baccus et al., 2004). The 
IAT response latency limit is intended to ensure that responses remain automatic. Dasgupta et 
al. (2000) argue that participants are unable to make consciously controlled decisions which 
could bias the outcome of the study, in such a short window of time. Discarding latencies above 
a certain cut-off also ensures that data which likely reflects deliberative processes is not 
included in the calculation of the IAT-D effect (De Houwer, 2006). However, it must be noted 
that current conventions with regards to acceptable response latencies are reasonable, but 
largely arbitrary. As more neuroimaging data becomes available we should be better able to 
differentiate between the temporal functionality of automatic and controlled processes, which 
will allow us to refine the testing parameters. 
 
Criticisms. The IAT has been criticised for its susceptibility to context and content, 
which can bias the output. For instance, the IAT has been demonstrated to measure general 
similarity between stimuli, such as the visual correspondence between a snake and a river, or 
between a pizza and a coin (De Houwer, Geldof, & De Bruycker, 2005). Familiarity has also been 
cited as a possible concern (Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003), yet its potentially 
confounding effects have not been supported experimentally (Dasgupta et al., 2000). Significant 53 
 
order effects for trial block presentation have also been found, which could be an indicator of 
practice effects (Bluemke & Friese, 2006). However, Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji (2005) argue 
that these factors can be methodologically controlled for, by ensuring stimulus similarity and/or 
familiarity is equal within each stimulus group, and by ensuring trial order is counterbalanced. 
It appears that the IAT reflects individual differences in ability, in addition to automatic 
associations: namely, the ability to make quick and accurate responses (McFarland & Crouch, 
2002). For instance, Hummert, Garstka, O'Brien, Greenwald and Mellott (2002) found that older 
participants performed overall slower on the IAT, which is consistent with cognitive decline as a 
consequence of ageing. However, the effect of individual differences in skill can be minimised, if 
not entirely eliminated, by using the IAT-D algorithm in analysis (Cai, Greenwald, & McFarland, 
2004). 
Another potentially biasing factor is feature relevance. De Houwer (2001) argues that 
stimuli sets used in the IAT tend to have a valence bias: for instance, the insect/flower IAT will 
usually use pleasant flowers and unpleasant insects. Whether this is problematic depends on 
whether one subscribes to the feature-relevant or feature-irrelevant explanation of the IAT 
effect. Feature-relevant approaches (such as the DTS) assume that the IAT measures 
associations between categories. In this case, the valence of individual stimuli is not relevant 
because participants make their responses on the basis of their parent categories. Feature-
irrelevant approaches suggest that, actually, the IAT effect reflects mean association strengths 
for the stimuli in each category. While category content has indeed been demonstrated to 
affect IAT effect outcome (De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003), it is important to consider 
this criticism in the context of research goals. If we are interested in assessing implicit attitudes 
towards insects, relative to flowers, it is important that the stimuli sets used are familiar, 
common and representative within each category. Using a more diversified set may be more 
egalitarian, but will yield results which are less applicable to participants’ actual experience and 
behaviour. However, the problem of conflating relevant and irrelevant features must still be 
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Related to the issue of feature relevance is figure-ground asymmetry, or salience 
asymmetry. Rothermund and Wentura (Rothermund & Wentura, 2001; Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2004) suggest that participants may not necessarily complete the congruent IAT block 
in a binary way (e.g., “press A for positive things, press B for negative things”); rather they may 
make an active response when the stimulus is salient, and make the alternative response when 
it is not (e.g., “press B for salient things, otherwise press A”). Salience can refer to stimuli which 
arouse attention, are uncommon or unfamiliar. The IAT effect may therefore reflect 
participants’ tendency to group things on the basis of salience, rather than just associations in 
memory.  This interpretation is consistent with the effects of similarity (Dasgupta et al., 2003; 
De Houwer et al., 2005), but is potentially more problematic because negative evaluative 
associations are salient by default and therefore cannot be controlled for during stimulus 
selection. 
Empirical support for the salience problem has been found using category combinations 
which have similar salience, but no prior associations. For example, Rothermund and Wentura 
(2004, experiment 1b) found a significant IAT effect by using old and young names (names 
stereotypically associated with old and young people and bearing negative and positive 
connotations, respectively) and neutral words and non-words (random strings of letters). 
Participants found the congruent trial block “young/word & old/non-word” easier to complete 
than the incongruent “young/non-word & old/word”. As there is no logical similarity between 
the categories in the congruent block, the IAT effect can most likely be attributed to salience. 
Houben and Wiers (2006a) suggest that salience asymmetry can partially explain some counter-
intuitive findings in implicit attitude research, such as alcohol drinkers’ tendency to have 
negative implicit associations with alcohol, despite explicitly reporting a positive attitude 
(Houben & Wiers, 2006b). In their study (2006a) the negative implicit associations with alcohol 
were found to decrease when alcohol salience was manipulated through stimulus familiarity. 
However, the manipulation failed to reverse the effect, which suggests that the influence of 
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The developers of the IAT have responded to the salience asymmetry concern 
(Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, & Klauer, 2005) and agree that evidence suggests that it affects the 
IAT effect; however, they note that the extent to which this is a problem is uncertain. The 
authors argue that there are fundamental differences between the studies in their theoretical 
approach: Rothermund and Wentura (2001) attribute the IAT effect to strategic encoding 
(based on theories of spreading activation and semantic networks) while Greenwald and 
colleagues argue that it is an assessment of relative association strengths. Rothermund, 
Wentura and De Houwer (2005) had further responded to these comments, but the discussion 
has not yielded a satisfactory resolution, either conceptually or methodologically. The problem 
of salience should therefore be considered as a potential confound when using the IAT in 
research. 
One possible solution to the problem of salience is the single-block, or single-category, 
IAT (SC-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Rothermund, 2008). The 
SC-IAT follows the same procedure as the conventional IAT, but only one target category is 
present in any experimental block. For example, in one block participants will use the left key to 
respond to positive words and flower names, and the right key to negative words only. In 
another block, the left key will correspond to positive words only, and the right key to negative 
words and flower names. The single-target IAT (ST-IAT; Bluemke & Friese, 2008) is a variation 
on the SC-IAT, which includes several attitude objects in a series of independent SC-IAT trials, 
thus allowing for the efficient assessment of domains with several representatives (such as 
political parties). The SC-IAT appears to have acceptable internal consistency (mean r = .62) 
(Bohner, Siebler, González, Haye, & Schmidt, 2008). Similarly, the ST-IAT has been found to 
have satisfactory reliability (mean α = .71) and test-retest reliability (mean r = .83) (Bluemke & 
Friese, 2008). Arguably, a unilateral assessment removes confounds such as familiarity and 
salience because the target stimuli are not contrasted against an alternative. However, this 
approach may also be less valid for hypotheses which are specifically interested in relative 
implicit attitudes for different concepts. 56 
 
 
Conclusion. The IAT is perhaps the most widely known and commonly used measure 
of implicit associations. It is also the most extensively criticised, which may be a consequence of 
exposure and interest, rather than objective quality. It is debatable whether the most salient 
limitations (context susceptibility, sensitivity to individual differences and salience asymmetry) 
can be controlled for with subtle alterations to the stimuli or procedure, or, if they cannot, 
whether they can have a significant impact on the observed results. The IAT has an overall 
satisfactory psychometric profile, but there are significant variations observed depending on 
the specific research area. Single-category variations on the IAT appear to circumvent some of 
the concerns, but may not always be appropriate depending on the research question. 
 
3.2. IMPLICIT RELATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE (IRAP) 
 
Similar to the IAT, the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) is a response-compatibility task, 
in the sense that it assesses interference from stimuli which are compatible or incompatible 
with the required response. In contrast to the REP, the IRAP introduces response latency 
restrictions to the procedure. Participants see pairs of stimuli (e.g., “love” and “pleasant”) and 
are asked to give a relational response (e.g., “similar” or “opposite”). On congruent trials, the 
required response is consistent: love + pleasant  similar. On incongruent trials, it is 
inconsistent: love + pleasant  opposite. The limit for response latency on each trial is typically 
2,000ms; this cut-off has yielded results suggestive of stronger implicit prejudice compared to 
responses made up to 3,000ms (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010). 
Response latencies for each participant are then typically log-transformed into a D-IRAP value, 
similar to the IAT-D: mean response latencies are averaged within each block type, the means 
subtracted and divided by the standard deviation within all blocks (e.g., Nicholson & Barnes-
Holmes, 2012). 57 
 
The IRAP has been successfully adapted to the assessment of food attitudes in 
vegetarians and meat eaters (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010), 
spider fear (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012) and cultural bias (Power, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart and Boles (2010) 
conceptualise the IRAP from a similar theoretical perspective as the APE model (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2007): implicit attitudes reflect social experience, and may or may not be 
consciously endorsed as valid. The distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes in the 
context of the IRAP can therefore be defined as the extent of conscious elaboration following 
the initial response. As such, the IRAP was designed as a multi-process (rather than a dual-
process) measure (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). However, these interpretations reflect a 
theoretical approach rather than any specific aspect of IRAP methodology. 
It must be emphasised that while the IRAP and the IAT can be described in deceptively 
similar ways, they have been designed from different theoretical perspectives and are 
technically designed to measure different things: relational associations between concepts 
(IRAP) and relative association strengths between concepts (IAT). Nevertheless, the measures 
are sufficiently similar to result in moderately strong correlations: r = .54 in one study (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2010). 
 
Psychometric properties. Although the IRAP is a relatively new measure, 
psychometric assessment supports its use in implicit research. Internal consistency appears to 
be satisfactory: split-half correlations were r = .58 in one study (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). 
Similar to other implicit measures, the IRAP is typically not significantly correlated with explicit 
attitudes (Power et al., 2009). Predictive validity of the measure varies depending on the 
research area. In a study of weight bias, the IRAP predicted behavioural intentions towards 
overweight people marginally better than the IAT, R2 change =.057 (Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2009); this suggests that the IRAP may be beneficial for certain types of research 
questions. By contrast, in a study of implicit food attitudes, the IAT and the IRAP increased the 58 
 
predictive validity of a regression model by 13% and 14%, respectively (Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010). 
Research into IRAP’s susceptibility to faking suggests that it may perform better than the 
IAT; participants were unable to fake their responses either intuitively, or with the knowledge 
of a specific strategy (McKenna et al., 2007). However, the suggested strategy may have been 
too difficult; only two of the 12 participants reported being able to use it successfully. 
 
Conclusion. The IRAP was developed on the basis of the REC model, which is 
concerned with cognitive interpretation of language. As discussed in Chapter I, theoretical 
interpretations of the measure suggest that implicit attitudes may not be the result of semantic 
network activation and are instead constructed on-line as required (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
De Houwer, 2011). While this account is arguably more controversial than associative memory 
theories, the IRAP does not appear to deviate significantly from the IAT in terms of 
psychometric validity or the result patterns it obtains. However, it can be argued that the IRAP 
is more reliant on articulation and introspection than other implicit attitude assessment 
approaches. The REC model is specifically concerned with relational links in language as a path 
to understanding language comprehension. The IRAP therefore somewhat deviates from 
models which construe implicit attitudes as automatic affective responses to target concepts.  
 
3.3. EXTRINSIC AFFECTIVE SIMON TASK (EAST) 
 
De Houwer (2003) describes the EAST as a “modified version” of the IAT. Like the IAT, it 
is a response-compatibility task, where participants’ relative response times are contrasted to 
assess the strength of associations between different concepts. It is therefore implicit in the 
sense of being indirect and time-constrained, but is not non-conscious, unlike subliminal 
priming paradigms. The EAST is based on the Affective Simon Task (AST) (De Houwer & Eelen, 
1998). The Simon paradigm (Simon & Rudell, 1967) refers to quicker response times when the 59 
 
stimulus and response correspond, compared to when they do not (e.g., De Jong, Liang, & 
Lauber, 1994). In the AST, participants are asked to make a response (usually verbal) to the 
stimuli they see: e.g., “good” for names of flowers and “bad” for names of insects. The response 
associations are then reversed, and relative response times are calculated for each block. In 
contrast to the AST, participants completing the EAST will additionally make their responses to 
task-irrelevant features of the stimuli, such as their colour. For example, participants are 
instructed to classify adjectives (presented in a white font) on the basis of their valence: e.g., 
press Q for good words and P for bad words. Nouns, on the other hand, are classified on the 
basis of their colour: e.g., press Q for blue words and P for green words. The consistent 
categorisation of the white valence words conditions positive or negative associations with 
each response key; the strength of positive or negative associations with the nouns can be 
calculated from the response times made when the noun is presented in blue (Q: “good” key 
response) or green (P: “bad” key response). 
The term “extrinsic” in the EAST refers to the fact that the response keys have no 
intrinsic valence: P or Q are not “good” or “bad”. However, they acquire those associations as a 
consequence of performing the task. De Houwer (2003) argues that the task-switching 
“strategy” thought to be employed by people completing the IAT is problematic, because they 
are not directly engaged in making the desired associations. By contrast, the EAST allows for 
response-time comparison within the same task: target words can be presented in either colour 
during the same trial block, therefore changing their key assignment. The way in which the 
EAST is structured also does not require target stimulus pairs: i.e., it can be used to assess 
implicit associations between flowers and “positive” or “negative”. This is in contrast to the IAT, 
which can only assess associations with flowers relative to insects. 
Single-category implicit measures can be useful for certain types of research. The EAST 
has been commonly used in studies focused on associations in semantic networks, rather than 
valenced associations (i.e., implicit attitudes). For instance, research has been done in spider 
phobia, to assess associations between ambiguous spider/human stimuli and threat (Ellwart, 60 
 
Becker, & Rinck, 2005). Vancleef, Gilissen and de Jong (2007) have assessed people’s 
associations between illness and anxiety, and health protective behaviour. De Jong, Wiers, van 
de Braak and Huijding (2007) have also argued that the EAST paradigm has helped disambiguate 
research in implicit attitudes towards alcohol and alcohol abuse. Assessing attitudes towards 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages in separate blocks suggests that alcohol attitudes in 
problem drinkers are ambivalent and not, as previously thought, negative. However, from a 
conceptual standpoint, the IAT is likely to be a better methodological choice for research which 
is specifically concerned with contrasting two attitude objects. 
 
Psychometric properties. The EAST has been criticised for its poor predictive 
validity and internal consistency. De Houwer and De Bruycker (2007) found that while IAT-
assessed attitudes towards beer and sprouts significantly predicted self-reported consumption 
behaviour, EAST scores did not. In a subsequent study of attitudes towards different sexual 
orientations, split-half reliabilities of the IAT were found at .83; for the EAST they were .02. 
Teige, Schnabel, Banse and Asendorpf (2004) took similar issues with the measure’s reliability. 
Participants’ self-associations with personality traits (shyness and angriness) were assessed 
using the IAT and the EAST. While the mean internal consistency of the IAT was found at α=.76; 
for the EAST it was α<.24. The IATs were also moderately correlated with the relevant self-
reported personality measures only, indicating good discriminant validity. By contrast, the 
EASTs were not correlated with any of the relevant self-report measures. 
It must be noted that a lack of correspondence between implicit attitudes, as assessed 
by the EAST, and self-reported traits or behaviour is not necessarily problematic. Self report 
requires introspection and accuracy, and the motivation to respond honestly when this may be 
at odds with social desirability. By contrast, implicit attitudes are thought to be more closely 
associated with behaviour which is less conscious and more spontaneous (e.g., Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). Additionally, some research does lend 
credibility to the EAST as predictive measure: Vermeulen, Corneille and Luminet (2007) found 61 
 
that faster response times on positively-valenced words were negatively associated with 
expressions of negative affect (e.g., depression, anxiety, alexithymia). While this is not strictly 
speaking the intended application of the EAST, it does support a potential for its application in 
research. 
The same can be said for convergent validity: for instance, De Houwer and De Bruycker 
(2007) have found a very low correlation between the IAT and the EAST (r= –.10). This may be 
problematic for some multi-method experimental designs but is not altogether surprising, as 
the two paradigms are designed to assess different types of cognitive processes: the IAT for 
relative associations, the EAST for individual ones. 
 
Conclusion. The EAST falls under the broader category of response-compatibility 
tasks. Unlike the IAT, it can be adapted to assess associations with single stimulus categories 
and does not require task-switching on the part of the participant, which can be useful in some 
experimental paradigms. However, its psychometric properties, both in terms of predictive 
validity and internal consistency, appear to fall short of the IAT. The EAST may therefore be 
useful in research where a single-category attitude assessment is required, but the IAT is 
otherwise preferable due to its superior psychometric attributes.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Various approaches to implicit attitude measurement have been developed, even before 
the concept of dual-process cognition was articulated in the literature. Measures of 
physiological or emotional response have been used to indirectly assess valenced reactions to 
target stimuli. However, it cannot be said with certainty whether these indirect measures 
specifically measure automatic associations between concepts, or tap into physiological 
responses to other stimuli. Affective priming procedures are effective and are consistent with 
some theoretical approaches, such as the IR model. Non-conscious priming procedures have 62 
 
been proposed as the least biased form of assessment, but their ecological validity is 
debateable. 
Response-compatibility tasks, including the IAT, IRAP and the EAST, are most common in 
recent research. The IAT is the most commonly used and, perhaps as a consequence, the most 
frequently criticised. The severity of its limitations are debatable: many can be controlled for 
with careful material development and the extent of the role which others play is unclear. For 
the moment, the psychometric properties, versatility, and wide use of the IAT suggest it to be 
the most obvious choice for research in which a dual-category paradigm is theoretically 
acceptable. The psychometric properties of the IRAP, a relatively new measure, are similar to 
the IAT. However, the model is based in language comprehension theory, which suggests that it 
may not always be appropriate in research more concerned with affective or intuitive 
associations. Finally, the EAST may be an acceptable single-category alternative to the IAT, 
however research into its psychometric properties suggest that it may be less robust. 
The measures discussed here all have relative merits and limitations. They vary in the 
definition of “implicitness” which they employ, from indirect assessment to automatic 
association. While psychometric properties can be directly contrasted as an index of quality, the 
theoretical background of each measure suggests that some may be more appropriate to 
different research questions than others. The IAT has been used for studies in the current 
thesis. Although its psychometric properties and widespread use (helpful for the contrasting of 
results and awareness of limitations) have played a role in that decision, individual reasons for 
method and stimulus selection are discussed in the Method section of each individual study. 
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CHAPTER III 
Study 1: Implicit self-esteem and eating disorder pathology 
 
 
Over the years, a great deal of research attention has been given to the role of self-
esteem in eating behaviour. It has been incorporated into theoretical models of eating 
disorders and plays a significant role in treatment approaches. More recently, however, some 
studies with a focus on the potential importance of implicit self-esteem in eating behaviour 
have emerged. The present chapter assesses the role of implicit self-esteem, and its 
relationship to explicit self-esteem, in elevated eating disorder (ED) pathology. First, key 
concepts from explicit self-esteem literature will be briefly introduced, following by a more in-
depth discussion of self-esteem in eating disorder pathology (both explicit and implicit). The 
hypotheses and methods used in Study 1 will then be outlined and explained, followed by a 
summary of the results and a discussion of the findings. A broader theoretical discussion of the 
study outcomes for this and all other empirical chapters can be found in Chapter VII. 
 
1. High and low self-esteem 
 
Self-esteem refers to a person’s attitude towards themselves: their evaluation of their 
own self-worth. It is typically measured via self-report: participants complete a questionnaire or 
series of questionnaires pertaining to their self-evaluation. For example, the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), possibly the most widely used self-esteem measure, 
uses questions pertaining to subjective assessment (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself”), as well as elements of social comparison (e.g., “I am able to do things as well as most 
other people”). Some measures have been developed to assess self-esteem from a more 
objective perspective: for example the Texas Social Behavior Inventory (Helmreich & Stapp, 64 
 
1974) assesses self-competence relative to others. However, these types of measures assess 
self-awareness of one’s self-esteem rather than self-esteem itself (Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 
1973); fundamentally, self-esteem is defined as a subjective evaluation. 
In Western societies, including the United Kingdom (UK), self-esteem tends to be high: 
i.e., most people will evaluate themselves more positively than negatively (Bagley & Mallick, 
2001; Roth, Decker, Herzberg, & Brähler, 2008). Of course, everyone is prone to self-criticism 
and insecurity, but individualist societies tend to produce people who believe themselves to be 
overall good (Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2003). High self-esteem is typically correlated 
with life satisfaction (r = .47) – however, this relationship is moderated by the individualism of 
the person’s culture (Diener & Diener, 1995). For the sake of parsimony, the discussion from 
here on will focus on self-esteem research pertaining to individualist, Western cultures such as 
the UK and the United States (US). 
Research consistently demonstrates that high self-esteem is associated with 
psychological and social benefits. People with high self-esteem tend to have more adaptive 
psychological traits, such as resilience, which can lead to a better ability to cope with 
depression and stress (Dumont & Provst, 1999). They tend to be more confident in their 
abilities and their likeability (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995) and experience personal failure less 
severely (Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen, & Zander, 1957). Of course, high self-esteem and 
the “benefits” of having high self-esteem are symbiotic: positive experiences improve 
subjective evaluation, and positive self-evaluation in turn promotes socially desirable 
behaviour, which is likely to generate more positive experiences.  
It must be said that high self-esteem is not, in all cases, an asset. While high self-esteem 
normally contributes to more confident task performance, under conditions of evaluative ego 
threat (i.e., feedback which can challenge positive self-evaluation) it can lead to the 
overestimation of one’s abilities and behaviour which is inappropriate to the level of ability 
(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993). This can sometimes manifest as violent behaviour 
(Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). It must also be noted that not all high self-esteem is 65 
 
“genuine”. Models of defensive self-esteem (e.g., Schneider & Turket, 1975) suggest that 
apparently high self-esteem in some people may be the consequence of self-enhancement 
techniques designed to buffer the adverse consequences of ego threat. High self-esteem in 
these cases manifests as grandiosity, narcissism, and an overvaluation of social desirability 
(Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). 
By contrast, low self-esteem is associated with lower confidence, less subjective clarity, 
and less certainty (Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). As a result, people with low 
self-esteem tend to be more susceptible to the influence of others (Cohen, 1959), which can 
have a negative impact on social relationships. People with low self-esteem also tend to have a 
more internal locus of control, particularly with regards to negative feedback. For example, 
Fitch (1970) found that, following failure feedback, people with low self-esteem had a much 
stronger tendency than those with high self-esteem to attribute that failure to internal causes. 
Furthermore, people’s expectations about future performance tend to be predicated on their 
chronic self-evaluation, rather than current performance feedback (McFarlin & Blascovich, 
1981). Therefore, even experiences inconsistent with a negative self-evaluation may not be 
enough to improve it. 
Reasons for having low self-esteem can be both internal and external. External reasons 
include social rejection and social stigma. For example: people diagnosed with a mental illness 
are seven to nine times more likely to have low self-esteem if they feel that they are being 
stigmatised because of their illness, compared to those who do not (Link, Struening, Neese-
Todd, Asmussen, & Phelan, 2001). Internal reasons (feelings of inadequacy, failure, or 
incompetence) often arise as a self-perpetuating cycle of low self-esteem and its consequences. 
For instance, the propensity for self-directed blame following failure can contribute to 
overemphasis of one’s negative traits. Baumeister and Tice (1985) argue that while people with 
high self-esteem are motivated by improving their strengths, people with low self-esteem are 
focused on remedying their perceived flaws. This negative focus serves to perpetuate negative 
self-evaluations. Low self-esteem can also be difficult to overcome because of its relationship 66 
 
with depression. For example, Rosenberg, Schooler and Schoenbach (1989) found, in a study of 
adolescent boys, that while self-esteem had an effect on depression (r = –.21), depression also 
had an effect on self-esteem (r = –.27). This can become a self-perpetuating cycle which is 
difficult to break. 
It thus seems we have a strong need to feel good about ourselves. Explanations for this 
apparent need have included the hedonic benefits of feeling good about oneself (Leary & 
MacDonald, 2003), the enhanced motivational resources which high self-esteem can offer 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988), and its usefulness as a monitoring tool in achieving one’s goals (Deci & 
Ryan, 1995). However, the two most comprehensive theories addressing why we need positive 
self-esteem are a) Terror Management Theory (TMT) and b) the Sociometer theory.  
 
1.1. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY 
 
Anthropologist Ernest Becker (1962; 1973) can be credited with writing the works which 
would eventually become the foundations of TMT. He believed self-esteem to be the 
fundamental human motivation as our main defence against anxiety, and the ultimate anxiety 
to be death. This approach was adapted into a formal psychological theory by Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski and Solomon (1986). TMT proposes that the inevitability of death is terrifying; over 
time, we have developed several strategies of managing that terror. As a result, cultural values 
often reflect the need to give symbolic meaning to a person’s life, through accomplishments, 
social input and social connections (Palgi & Abramovitch, 1984). Through these values, we can 
attain symbolic immortality through our contributions (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). TMT posits that self-esteem reflects our need to receive confirmation 
that we are valuable and meaningful in order to mitigate that fear. Although TMT has been 
criticised for its establishment within the literature as an evolutionary theory (Kirkpatrick & 
Navarrette, 2006) and the assumption that mortality salience is common (Paulhus & Trapnell, 
1997), a significant amount of self-esteem research continues to be conducted within the 67 
 
context of TMT, including healthcare (Johnstone, 2012), political attitudes (Weise, Arciszewski, 
Verlhiac, & Pyszczynski, 2012) and interpersonal relationships (Van Tongeren, Green, Davis, 
Worthington, & Reid, 2013). 
However, empirical data fails to support the use of TMT concepts for understanding the 
function of implicit self-esteem in the context of disordered eating behaviour. Some studies 
indeed suggest that implicit self-esteem can increase in response to ego threat, such as social 
rejection (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007) or performance anxiety (Komori & Murata, 2008). 
These findings do not appear to generalise to cognitions related to disordered eating. Studies 
have repeatedly failed to demonstrate an increase in implicit self-esteem following body 
salience tasks, which would be expected to be more uncomfortable and more self-esteem 
threatening to someone with higher ED pathology. Hoffmeister et al. (2010) found that while a 
body salience task increased implicit self-esteem in the low-restraint group, it was unaffected in 
high-restraint participants. Svaldi et al. (2012) also found that a positive self-esteem 
manipulation increased implicit self-esteem, for people both high and low in body 
dissatisfaction – while a negative self-esteem manipulation decreased it. In a clinical study by 
Vanderlinden et al. (2009), participants in the clinical ED group increased in implicit self-esteem 
following a positive feedback, but had no response to negative feedback. It therefore seems 
unlikely that high implicit self-esteem in people with elevated ED pathology is the manifestation 
of threat defence. 
 
 
1.2. SOCIOMETER THEORY 
 
An alternative to TMT, the sociometer theory (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary & Baumeister, 
2000) reconceptualises self-esteem as a tool. This theory suggests that we are motivated to 
maintain or increase our social value and that our self-esteem decreases when we receive cues 
(e.g., rejection or shaming) which suggest that we are not doing this successfully. Canadian 
anthropologist Jerome H. Barkow was among the first to suggest that self-esteem may be a 68 
 
monitoring mechanism for the construction of social hierarchies (Barkow, 1980). Sociometer 
theory proposes that subjective feelings of self-worth are closely linked to others’ attitudes and 
behaviour towards ourselves, which allows us to regulate our behaviour accordingly (Leary, 
2004). 
There is both observational and experimental data which support the sociometer theory. 
People with low self-esteem (either chronic or experimentally induced) act more cautiously in 
situations where social ostracism is likely than those with high self-esteem (Anthony, Wood, & 
Holmes, 2007 in Leary, 2005; Leary, Rice, & Schreindorfer, 2005). Neurocognitive data also 
suggests that response to negative social feedback is processed in the medial prefrontal cortex, 
which is associated with self-referential processing (Lieberman, 2010). This suggests that 
negative social feedback engaged cognitive structures involved in self-reflection, which is 
consistent with the sociometer theory. However, the theory has not been supported 
unequivocally. Some findings suggest that negative feedback can lead to an increase in 
aggression, which is not conductive to social acceptance (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 
2001). Pruessner, Hellhammer and Kirschbaum (1999) also point out that self-esteem is also 
responsive to non-social events, such as trying to solve a set of difficult maths problems. 
Both TMT and Sociometer theories have evidence in their favour, but both have also 
been criticised for empirical inconsistencies and conceptual lapses. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to provide a comprehensive account of the relative merits of each theory. However, 
Sociometer theory has the most relevance to the present research due to its focus on social 
comparison, which plays a more significant role in eating behaviour and eating disorder 
pathology than mortality salience. Research suggests that even when accounting for self-
esteem and objective body size, the extent to which people compare themselves with others 
can predict the extent of their body dissatisfaction and eating disorder symptoms (Stromer & 
Thompson, 1996). Studies conducted on the effect of media on body dissatisfaction suggest 
that viewing attractive body images has an immediate, negative effect on the body image of 
people who have internalised the thin ideal (i.e., those who endorse thinness as a desirable 69 
 
characteristic) (Cattarin, Thompson, Thomas, & Williams, 2000). Social comparison has been 
found to be the mediating factor in the effect of media images of attractive bodies has on the 
viewer’s body dissatisfaction (Tiggemann & McGill, 2004). Even at clinical levels of disordered 
eating, symptom severity is positively associated with levels of unfavourable social comparison. 
(Troop, Allan, Treasure, & Katzman, 2003). On the other hand, while TMT may play a role in ED 
pathology, the elevated mortality rate associated with it does not support the role of an acute 
fear of death as the primary motivating factor. Anorexia Nervosa has a weighted mortality rate 
of 5.10, with about 1/5th the consequence of suicide (Arcelus, Mitchell, Wales, & Nielsen, 2011) 
– i.e., five times higher than in the general population. This is in contrast to, for example, the 
weighted mortality rate in schizophrenia (3.29) and the general mortality rate for all psychiatric 
disorders (1.56) (Joukamaa et al., 2001). At the very least this suggests that mortality salience 
alone is not sufficient for recovery. The Sociometer theory will therefore predominantly be 
used for the design and interpretation of research in this Thesis. The next section will outline 
the role of self-esteem in eating behaviour and the overvaluation of shape and weight in the 
evaluation of self-worth. 
 
 
2. Self-esteem in eating behaviour and eating 
disorders 
 
Two of the most extensively researched eating disorders are Anorexia Nervosa (AN) and 
Bulimia Nervosa (BN). AN is characterised by excessive dieting which leads to a low weight, a 
pathological fear of weight gain and an excessive influence of shape or weight on self-
evaluation. BN is characterised by frequent episodes of binge-eating (uncontrollably consuming 
large amounts of food), followed by compensatory behaviours such as vomiting or fasting in 
order to avoid weight gain. People who exhibit clinically significant pathology but do not satisfy 
inclusion criteria for AN or BN have been commonly diagnosed with Eating Disorder Not 70 
 
Otherwise Specified (EDNOS). The revisions made for the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) have also introduced Binge Eating Disorder (BED), which was previously 
diagnosed under the EDNOS label, and is characterised by uncontrollable over-eating. In the UK, 
the annual incidence of EDs (between the ages of 10 and 49) is approximately 37 per 100,000 
people (Micali, Hagberg, & Treasure, 2013)..  
Although low self-esteem is common in both disorders, it is thought to play a different 
role in AN compared to BN. Fairburn, Shafran and Cooper (1998), in their cognitive behavioural 
model of AN, argue that people with AN use self-starvation as an expression of self-control, 
from which they derive feelings of accomplishment. In a stepwise regression model of traits 
predictive of AN symptom severity, self-control accounted for 19% of the variance (Birgegard, 
Björck, Norring, Sohlberg, & Clinton, 2009). Marilyn Lawrence wrote: “Anorexics are attempting 
to solve the problem of their own powerlessness [...] The struggle takes the form of an effort to 
transcend the body which debases them, and to achieve self-respect through self-denial.” 
(Lawrence, 1979, p.93) The paradox is that people with AN are able to maintain very rigid 
control over their eating, and yet perceive their own self-control as poor (Horesh, Zalsman, & 
Apter, 2000). Perfectionism is also thought to contribute to the pathology: people with AN tend 
to score significantly higher on measures of perfectionism than healthy controls, with the score 
positively correlated with symptom severity (Halmi et al., 2000) and negatively with treatment 
outcome (Sutandar-Pinnock, Woodside, Carter, Olmsted, & Kaplan, 2003). Excessively high 
standards can exacerbate the anorexic behaviour and have a negative effect on self-esteem. 
However, it must be noted that low self-esteem in AN may be partially attributable to 
depression, which is highly comorbid: in one longitudinal study, 68% of women diagnosed with 
AN had also been diagnosed with a major depressive disorder (Halmi et al., 1991). Once 
depression is controlled for, differences in self-esteem between people with AN and restrained 
eaters (people who voluntarily restrict their diet) are significantly reduced (although they still 
remain lower than healthy controls) (Wilksch & Wade, 2004). 71 
 
In BN, low self-esteem is theorised to contribute to the binge-purge cycle. Low self-
esteem (Laessle, Tuschl, Waadt, & Pirke, 1989) and elevated perfectionism (Vohs, Bardone, 
Joiner, & Abramson, 1999) are both typical of BN. Bardone, Vohs, Abramson, Heatherton, & 
Joiner (2000) found that BN was best predicted by a combination of high perfectionism, body 
dissatisfaction, and low self-esteem. Vohs et al. (1999) theorise that the binge-purge cycle can 
arise as a consequence of holding oneself to very high standards (e.g., low target weight), but 
lacking the confidence that they can be achieved. Repeated self-control failures (binges) serve 
to negatively affect self-esteem and therefore exacerbate the symptoms. This explanation was 
adapted from the diathesis-stress model of depression, which proposes that perfectionism and 
life stress interact to predict depressive pathology (Hewitt & Dyck, 1986). Impulsivity also plays 
a role in bulimic behaviour, as people with BN tend to be more impulsive than those with AN or 
healthy controls (Díaz-Marsá, Carrasco, & Sáiz, 2000), which can leave them more susceptible to 
engage in the binge-purge cycle. 
Restrained eaters (REs), defined as people who deliberately attempt to restrict their diet 
(either in the types or quantity of food) with the intention of weight loss, often exhibit similar 
behavioural and cognitive patterns as those with eating disorders. Similar to BN, restrained 
eaters are often unable to consistently sustain the restraint, which leads to overeating – often 
triggered by the experience of negative emotions (Cools, Schotte, & McNally, 1992; Polivy & 
Herman, 1999). REs also report lower self-esteem than unrestrained eaters (unREs) (Wilksch & 
Wade, 2004). REs with low self-esteem are more prone to abstinence violation, or the ‘what the 
hell’ effect (Herman & Mack, 1975), where a single lapse in restraint leads to overeating (Polivy, 
Heatherton, & Herman, 1988) – which is behaviourally similar to the way binges are thought to 
be triggered in BN. Low self-esteem is also associated with other precursors of clinically 
disordered eating behaviour, such as body dissatisfaction (Tiggemann, 2005). It must be noted 
that low self-esteem does not, by itself, predict restrained eating; rather, body dissatisfaction 
predicts both restraint and low self-esteem (Johnson & Wardle, 2005). 
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2.1. SHAPE- AND WEIGHT-BASED SELF-ESTEEM 
 
While low self-esteem is common in both EDs and in dietary restraint, they are not 
exclusively associated. However, what does appear to be specifically important in ED pathology 
is Shape- and Weight-Based Self-esteem (SAWBS) (Geller et al., 1998). SAWBS refers to the 
over-valuation of one’s shape and weight in assessing one’s self-worth and is typically assessed 
using the SAWBS Inventory (Geller, Johnston, & Madsen, 1997; Geller et al., 1998). Participants 
are asked to select personal attributes which have affected how they felt about themselves 
over the past four weeks. They are then asked to order-rank these attributes in order of 
importance and assign them a relative importance value. The relative importance of shape and 
weight is designated the SAWBS score. The inventory reliably discriminates between people 
with EDs, those with other psychiatric disorders, and healthy controls – both adults and 
children/adolescents with an ED consistently score higher (Geller et al., 1998; Serpell, 
Neiderman, Roberts, & Lask, 2007). Clinical research in AN populations indicates that a 
decrease in weight is correlated with an increase in self-esteem (Brockmeyer et al., 2012). 
Conversely, SAWBS significantly decreases as a consequence of treatment (Geller, Zaitsoff, & 
Srikameswaran, 2005). One study has found that this decrease can be qualified by a shift in self-
esteem source: outpatients enrolled in a treatment programme decreased their reliance on 
shape and weight as a source of self-esteem, but increased their reliance on personal 
relationships (Geller, Cassin, Brown, & Srikameswaran, 2009) 
In non-clinical samples, girls who evaluate their self-worth primarily on the basis of their 
body shape and weight have also been found to score higher on measures of anorexic and 
bulimic cognitions than girls who do not (Geller, Srikameswaran, Cockell, & Zaitsoff, 2000). 
Higher SAWBS scores have also been found to mediate the correlation between self-esteem 
and dietary restraint (Wade & Lowes, 2002): that is, low self-esteem is positively associated 
with ED pathology, but only if feelings of low self-worth are associated with an over-valuation 
of shape and weight. Although no studies have directly addressed this, it can be hypothesised 
that an over-emphasis on shape and weight in the evaluation of self-worth typically precipitates 73 
 
restrained eating behaviour and ED pathology. This hypothesis is consistent with both the DSM 
criteria for both AN and BN and with Bardone et al.’s (2000) prospective research which found 
that low self-esteem is one of the factors in the cognitive profile predictive of future bulimic 
symptomatology. 
 
3. Implicit self-esteem 
 
If explicit self-esteem can be characterised as an attitude towards the self, implicit self-
esteem could therefore be defined as automatic, valenced associations with the self. 
Buhrmeister, Blanton and Swann (2011, p.366) summarise it as “a global self-evaluation that 
people are unable or unwilling to report”. Explicit self-esteem is typically assessed globally – as 
an overall self-evaluation – however, it is sometimes measured in terms of a self-evaluation in 
specific domains, such as academic competence (Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, & 
Rosenberg, 1995) or, in the case of SAWBS, shape and weight. Implicit measures of self-esteem 
also typically assess global associations, such as those between “me” and “good”. However, the 
flexibility of implicit assessment does lend itself to more specific assessment, such as the 
associations between “me” and “intelligent”. In contrast to explicit self-esteem, where several 
theoretical models have been developed to explain its importance and function, no 
comprehensive theoretical framework of implicit self-esteem yet exists. However, several early 
hypotheses have been proposed. These will be discussed primarily in the context of research in 
restrained eating behaviour and ED pathology. 
Chapter I has already discussed the relationship of implicit and explicit attitudes to 
behaviour: explicit attitudes tend to be associated with conscious and controlled behaviour, 
while implicit attitudes predict behaviour which is more spontaneous and automatic. Studies in 
implicit self-esteem tend to yield findings which are consistent with this distinction. For 
example, implicit self-esteem has been found to predict non-verbal behaviour in romantic 
interaction (Peterson & DeHart, 2013), and behaviour indicative of anxiety in a self-relevant 74 
 
interview (Spalding & Hardin, 1999). These findings suggest that it is possible for self-esteem to 
have a quantifiable effect on behaviour. Given the relevance of impulsive behaviour in BN 
(Claes, Nederkoorn, Vandereycken, Guerrieri, & Vertommen, 2006), binge eating (Kane, Loxton, 
Staiger, & Dawe, 2004) and restrained eating (Nederkoorn, Van Eijs, & Jansen, 2004), it is 
possible that implicit self-esteem can play a role in at least some aspects of disordered eating 
behaviour. 
 
3.1. IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM ASSESSMENT 
 
The two most common measures used in implicit self-esteem assessment are the Name 
Letter Test (NLT; Nuttin, 1985) and the IAT – the latter of which was used in the assessment of 
implicit self-esteem in the present study. The NLT takes a somewhat different approach to 
implicit measures based on response times: participants are asked to rate the letters of the 
alphabet for likeability. The ‘name letter effect’ (NLE) refers to people’s tendency to rate their 
own initials higher than average (Nuttin, 1987). This approach can arguably be anchored within 
the theoretical concept of ‘implicit egotism’ (Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002). Implicit 
egotism refers to the unconscious over-valuation of objects and concepts associated with the 
self. Therefore, the higher a person’s implicit self-esteem, the stronger a NLE they should 
exhibit. The NLT is an implicit measure by virtue of being indirect: participants are not asked to 
consciously evaluate their self-worth, nor are they likely to be aware of the bias in their ratings. 
By contrast, the IAT takes the conventional approach of contrasting relative performance 
times on congruent blocks (in which one response key is used for, for example, “Me” and 
“Positive” and another for “Not Me” and “Negative”) and incongruent blocks (in this example, 
one key for “Me” and “Negative”; another for “Me” and “Positive”). The IAT has been criticised 
in the assessment of implicit self-esteem because self-esteem is, ostensibly, a unipolar 
construct rather than a relative one: i.e., one’s attitude towards oneself (Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005). However, assessing automatic associations towards the self relative to others is 
consistent with both the Sociometer theory of self-esteem and with social comparison theory 75 
 
(Martinot & Redersdorff, 2006; Buunk & Gibbons, 2007), both of which assert that our self-
evaluations are made with reference to other people. Some unipolar measures of implicit 
attitudes including the EAST (De Houwer, 2003) and affective priming (Wentura et al., 2005) 
have been adapted for the assessment of implicit self-esteem, but these have been used less 
commonly and therefore have less available data to assess generalizability and psychometric 
properties. The majority of research relies on IAT for implicit self-esteem assessment. 
  Karpinski (2004) also conducted a series of studies to demonstrate that the content of 
the comparison category can influence the outcome of the self-esteem IAT. In Study 1, self-
esteem scores were lower when “Self” was contrasted with a “known” group of friends or 
relatives, compared to when it comprised of unspecified “Others”. However, IAT-D values were 
positive in both conditions, indicating overall positive implicit self-esteem. In Study 2, “Self” was 
assessed against a strongly positive (Santa Claus), strongly negative (Hitler), and a neutral 
(unspecified “Other”) comparison category. Similarly to the outcomes of Study 1, implicit self-
esteem was lower in comparison to Santa than “Other”; however, there were no differences 
between the “Other” and the Hitler IAT. These findings suggest that the stimuli selected for the 
“Other” category can significantly bias the IAT outcome. However, this is an argument for 
careful stimulus selection, rather than the disuse of the IAT in implicit self-esteem 
measurement. The author recommends either the use of a neutral “Not Self” category, or the 
use of “familiar, not self-identified, and neither strongly liked or disliked” stimuli (Karpinski, 
2004, p.30) to contrast with the “Self” category. This is again consistent with both the 
Sociometer and Social Comparison theories, according to which self-esteem is constructed 
relative to a perceived external standard. In accordance with this, a “Not Me” category has 
been used in the IAT in the present study. 
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3.2. NORMATIVE IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM 
 
Similarly to explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem in individualist, Western cultures 
(including the UK and the US) tends to be high. The NLE has been consistently robust in cross-
cultural studies, including the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland and Hungary 
(Nuttin, 1987). However, the key difference is that people appear to hold positive implicit 
associations with the self, even in cultural contexts where high explicit self-esteem is not 
normative (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). An example of this is Japan – in a study of the Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Japanese participants scored on average just 25.50, 
compared to the overall sample’s mean of 30.85 (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). This can be attributed 
to a difference in self-construal: while Westerners typically view themselves as independent 
individuals, Japanese culture emphasises the individual’s value in the context of his or her 
community (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Despite 
this, a significant NLE has been found in Japanese participant samples (Kitayama & Rarasawa, 
1997) suggesting that implicit SE is high. One study which assessed implicit self-esteem using 
the IAT actually found that Japanese participants had a higher implicit self-esteem than 
American and Chinese participants (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). These findings suggest that despite 
the fact that explicit self-esteem is constructed within the boundaries of cultural norms, 
positive implicit associations with the self typically persist regardless. 
 
3.3. DO WE NEED POSITIVE IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM? 
 
No formal theoretical models have yet been developed to address the function (if any) of 
positive implicit self-esteem. Some tentative hypotheses have been put forward, and theories 
of explicit self-esteem (TMT and Sociometer) could theoretically be extended to the implicit – 
some tentative suggestions have been made in the Discussion section of this chapter. However, 
the apparent universality of positive implicit self-esteem is consistent with hypotheses of 77 
 
implicit attitude development. Assuming that implicit attitudes are formed through the 
repeated presentation of stimulus pairs (e.g., snake-dangerous), then implicit self-esteem will 
also develop through experiences with self-relevant cues (e.g., me-good). Most people could 
reasonably be expected to experience a greater amount of positive or neutral self-relevant cues 
(through praise from parents, academic achievement, social acceptance, or milestones of 
personal development) than negative ones (through social ostracism, abuse, or delayed 
personal development). No systematic study has yet addressed this hypothesis, but one study 
did find that implicit self-esteem was higher in young adults who reported that their parents 
were more nurturing to them as children (DeHart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006). Baccus et al. 
(2004) and Dijksterhuis (2004) also found that implicit self-esteem can be increased through a 
classical conditioning paradigm, similarly to implicit attitudes towards cartoon monsters (Olson 
& Fazio, 2001) and healthy food (Hollands et al., 2011). These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that positive implicit self-esteem is likely to be the consequence of repeated 
matches between the self and positive valence. Personal experiences might therefore be 
expected to affect both implicit and explicit self-esteem similarly: positive self-relevant 
experiences would enhance explicit self-esteem through rational analysis of the outcome, while 
repeated positive experiences would reinforce positive implicit associations with the self (and 
vice versa for negative ones). However, research suggests that implicit and explicit self-esteem 
do not always correspond. In fact, studies with ED participants consistently suggest that, 
despite low explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem appears high. 
Hetts and Pelham (2001) propose several possible explanations for what implicit self-
esteem actually is, which can help explain its apparent universal positivity. One explanation, 
consistent with Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation theory, is that implicit self-esteem acts as a 
buffer against stress: a shield against ego threat. Two other explanations are derived from 
functional accounts of explicit self-esteem: Terror Management and Sociometer theories. 
Consistently with TMT, implicit self-esteem may act as defence against the anxiety we 
experience as a result of our consciousness of our own mortality. With regards to Sociometer 78 
 
theory, implicit self-esteem could act as a chronically accessible evaluation of the self, which 
can then be used in the interpretation of others’ social behaviour and subsequently our 
behavioural response to it. This assertion is supported by research which supports implicit self-
esteem compensation following ego threat, including threats to gender identity, race, and 
social rejection (Rudman et al., 2007). If one is to assume that the implicit and explicit self-
esteem are different processes, and therefore serve different functions, then it could be argued 
that implicit self-esteem works to monitor the social environment on an automatic, non-
conscious level which serves to free up cognitive resources from performing the same work 
consciously. Finally, the authors propose a hypothesis derived from attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1977). Research by DeHart and colleagues (DeHart, Pelham, & Murray, 2004) found that people 
whose parents had divorced had lower implicit self-esteem than those whose parents hadn’t. If 
implicit self-esteem does indeed develop prior to conscious self-conceptualizations, then it 
could constitute an “internal working model” (Hetts & Pelham, 2001, p.115) of the infant’s 
relationship to herself and to her caregiver(s). Koole et al. (2001) also take the position that the 
earliest developments of an infant’s self-concept is most likely to be automated, and implicit 
self-esteem is therefore best conceptualised as a consolidation of the associations between 
self-relevant cognition and affective associations. These associations become integrated into 
the person’s “automatic self”, which is a non-conscious but chronically accessible self-
representation. By contrast, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) view implicit self-esteem as simply an 
attitude towards the self, an “introspectively unidentified […] effect of the self-attitude on 
evaluation of self-associated and self-disassociated objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p.11) 
and therefore no different to any other implicit attitude construct. It must be noted that, at 
present time, there is insufficient empirical evidence to significantly favour one of these 
accounts above all others. However, for the purpose of the present study, which seeks to 
examine the role of implicit self-esteem in ED pathology, it is the function and behavioural 
consequences of implicit self-esteem which are of primary relevance and interest.  
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3.4. IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM IN EATING DISORDERS 
 
Several studies have assessed implicit and explicit self-esteem in clinical ED populations. 
Cockerham, Stopa, Bell and Gregg (2009) asked female participants in a mixed BN/binge eating 
disorder sample and healthy female controls to complete explicit measures of self-esteem as 
well as a self-esteem IAT. Participants in the clinical group scored significantly lower than 
healthy controls on the explicit self-esteem measure, even after controlling for depression. 
However, the clinical group scored significantly higher on the self-esteem IAT (M=.87), 
indicating stronger positive associations with the self compared to controls (M=.59).  
Vanderlinden et al. (2009) found a pattern of results similar to Cockerham et al. (2009). 
The authors used an EAST paradigm (see p.60) to assess implicit self-esteem in a mixed AN/BN 
sample compared to healthy controls. Again, the clinical group reported significantly lower 
explicit self-esteem than the controls. Although a marginal group x stimulus valence interaction 
was found, further analyses within each group found no significant effect of valence in either. 
This suggests that there were no significant differences in implicit self-esteem between the 
groups. It is worth noting that the study also assessed implicit self-esteem change following 
feedback. Participants were given mock results (either positive or negative) on an intelligence 
test with self-esteem assessed before and after. Analyses of both the implicit and explicit 
measures found a main effect of feedback in the ED group only: both implicit and explicit self-
esteem was found to increase in response to positive feedback and decrease in response to 
negative feedback. Such an effect was absent in the control group. It is unclear whether these 
findings indicate that implicit self-esteem was more responsive to feedback in the clinical 
group, or whether implicit self-esteem instability could have contributed to the development of 
ED pathology. 
Self-esteem discrepancy has also been found in non-clinical participant samples. 
Hoffmeister, Teige-Mocigemba, Blechert, Klauer and Tuschen-Caffier (2010) assessed self-
esteem in restrained and unrestrained eaters using an IAT paradigm, and found that, like ED 
patients, REs scored lower on explicit self-esteem than unRE, whilst the two groups did not 80 
 
differ in implicit self-esteem. The study also assessed changes in self-esteem following a body 
salience task (in which participants were asked to examine their own bodies in a mirror). 
Implicit self-esteem was found to increase following the task, but only in the unRE group. This 
contrasts with Vanderlinden et al.’s findings (2009), but the tasks used (intelligence test 
feedback vs. body salience) are quite different. It could be argued that both could be associated 
with feelings of insecurity, anxiety and ego threat, but these were not assessed in participants 
in either study. However, both studies suggest that while implicit self-esteem does not differ 
between clinical/RE groups and healthy/unRE controls, there do appear to be individual 
differences in how it changes in response to external threat. 
Implicit attitude measures have also been used to assess the possibility of implicit 
SAWBS. Blechert, Ansorge, Beckmann and Tuschen-Caffier (2010) carried out an affective 
priming study using shape and weight sentences as primes and adjectives related to self-esteem 
as target stimuli. Participants diagnosed with an ED (and in particular those with BN) had 
significantly stronger associations between shape and weight concerns and congruent 
interpersonal adjectives (e.g., “When I lose weight I feel...” + “Liked”, or “When I stop dieting I 
feel...” + “Incompetent”). A significant effect was also found for REs, but it was less pronounced 
than in the two ED groups. These findings suggest that the associations between self-worth and 
body and shape are internalised to the extent of forming automatic associations in people with 
EDs, and, to some extent, in REs. In the context of implicit attitude theories which espouse 
spreading activation (such as the REC model), ED pathology could strengthen associations 
between self-worth and body image (and vice versa). These associations may weaken after 
undergoing treatment in favour of enhancing connections between self-worth and other 
attributes (e.g., social relationships). While these hypotheses are consistent with their 
theoretical context, longitudinal research would be necessary to test potential change in 
implicit associations over the course of the illness and treatment. 
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3.5. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS 
 
There are currently several hypothesis which have been proposed to explain the 
apparent self-esteem discrepancy in clinical or sub-clinical ED pathology. Cockerham et al. 
(2009) suggest that discrepant self-esteem (where explicit self-esteem is low but implicit self-
esteem is high) is fragile, which could be indicative of “psychological distress” (p.271) and may 
be a risk factor for developing ED pathology. This is consistent with Rydell, McConnell and 
Mackie (2008), who found that greater discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitudes also 
lead to greater dissonance-based discomfort. More relevant to disordered eating, discrepant 
self-esteem has been found in people with depression (De Raedt, Schacht, Dranck, & De 
Houwer, 2006; Schröder-Abé, Rudolph, & Schütz, 2007) and in those with elevated 
perfectionism (Zeigler-Hill & Terry, 2007). Both are frequently co-morbid with ED symptoms, 
both at clinical and sub-clinical levels (Halmi, Casper, Eckert, Goldberg, & Davis, 1979; Joiner Jr, 
Heatherton, Rudd, & Schmidt, 1997). 
Alternatively, Zeigler-Hill and Terry (2007) suggest that people who report a pattern of 
low explicit but high implicit self-esteem can be characterised as possessing a “glimmer of 
hope” (p.140). The authors propose that the discrepancy creates an ambivalence in the 
person’s feelings of self-worth; the automatic positive attitude can potentially affect cognition 
and behaviour despite the negative explicit self-evaluation. This hypothesis has been supported 
in a study by Spencer, Jordan, Logel and Zanna (2005), who found that perseverance on a task 
was correlated with implicit, but not explicit self-esteem. The research evidence appears to 
converge; self-esteem discrepancy may be associated with a range of pathologies co-morbid 
with ED symptoms. However, no study has yet addressed these together with ED symptoms. 
The next steps should therefore be aimed at modeling the relationship, if any, between 
perfectionism, perseverance/persistence, depression, ED pathology and implicit and explicit 
self-esteem. 
It must be noted that the findings have not been unequivocal. Fronza, Galimberti, Fadda, 
Fanini and Bellodi (2011) assessed implicit and explicit self-esteem using the IAT in a mixed 82 
 
AN/BN/BED sample and in healthy controls. In contrast to previous findings, the authors found 
that those in the clinical sample had significantly lower implicit self-esteem compared to 
healthy controls. However, the study was never published as a full article (only as a conference 
abstract), therefore it is unclear how methodology or analysis could have affected the outcome. 
Additionally, a study by Svaldi, Zimmermann and Naumann (2012) found that participants who 
reported low body dissatisfaction also reported lower implicit self-esteem than those with high 
body dissatisfaction. However, while body dissatisfaction can be consistent with disordered 
eating behaviour, it is can also exist without it. This study is therefore not necessarily 
inconsistent with previously discussed studies.  
It is also worth noting that studies in ED pathology and implicit self-esteem typically do 
not report the IAT-D value. The calculation of the IAT-D reflects the relative association 
strength: e.g., an IAT-D value above zero indicates stronger associations between self-positive 
than self-negative (and vice versa for values below zero). However, many studies (Cockerham, 
Stopa, Bell, & Gregg, 2009; Hoffmeister, Teige-Mocigemba, Blechert, Klauer, & Tuschen-Caffier, 
2010) report only analyses pertaining to group differences. While this is helpful when 
contrasting high- and low-pathology participants, there is a difference between implicit self-
esteem which is lower in one group than another, and implicit self-esteem which is low – that 
is, where an IAT-D is significantly different from zero in a direction which suggests stronger 
negative associations with the self. 
The research picture which emerges is therefore as follows: people with elevated ED 
pathology tend to report lower explicit self-esteem than healthy controls, but report high 
implicit self esteem; it is unclear what role this discrepancy plays in the development or 
maintenance of ED pathology, or how it is related to other traits associated with ED pathology 
(such as perfectionism). The present study was designed as a first step towards resolving these 
questions.  
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4. Research aims and hypotheses 
 
  Hypothesis 1: Elevated ED pathology will be associated with decreased explicit, but not 
implicit, self-esteem. Although research in both implicit cognition and self-esteem is 
extensive, only a handful of studies have been carried out to address both in the 
context of ED pathology. Only one study has addressed discrepant self-esteem in a 
non-clinical population (Hoffmeister et al., 2010) – the present study is designed to 
address self-esteem discrepancy in elevated, but sub-clinical levels of disordered 
eating. The hypothesis was based on clinical study outcomes (Vanderlinden et al., 2009; 
Cockerham et al., 2009). While it is possible that these findings will not generalise to 
sub-clinical levels of pathology, it is sensible to suggest a consistent result of patterns. 
It is therefore anticipated that participants with elevated ED pathology will have lower 
explicit self-esteem than the non-elevated group’s, but that the groups will not differ 
significantly in their implicit self-esteem. 
  Hypothesis 2: Implicit and explicit self-esteem discrepancy will be better predictors of 
ED pathology than explicit self-esteem alone. Cockerham et al. (2009) and Zeigler-Hill 
and Terry (2007) have suggested that self-esteem discrepancy may be negatively 
associated with psychological well-being. Hypothesis 2 is therefore concerned with the 
predictive validity of self-esteem discrepancy for ED pathology. This will be assessed 
using multiple regression models including both variables, and, alternatively, the 
calculation of a “self-esteem discrepancy” value used in the assessment of covariance 
with ED pathology. 
  Hypothesis 3: (If Hypothesis 2 is supported) Perfectionism will act as a moderator 
between discrepant self-esteem (low explicit, high implicit) and ED pathology. A small 
number of studies have suggested that discrepant self-esteem may be associated with 
both elevated perfectionism (Zeigler-Hill & Terry, 2007) and elevated ED pathology 
(Cockerham et al., 2009; Vanderlinden et al., 2009; Hoffmeister et al., 2010). If both 84 
 
findings are replicated, a structural equation model could be developed to arrive at a 
better understanding of how the variables are related.  
 
5. Method 
 
5.1. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were recruited using a university subject pool. Participants consisted of 79 
women, predominantly undergraduate students and university staff. Men were not included to 
avoid confounding the data with gender differences in attitudes and aetiology: non-eating-
disordered men typically exhibit significantly less weight and shape concern than women (Rozin 
& Fallon, 1988), are less likely to engage in dietary restraint (Brand, Rothblum, & Solomon, 
1992), and tend to report slightly higher self-esteem than women (Kling, Hyde, Showers, & 
Buswell, 1999). The relative limitations of this sampling strategy are discussed under the 
Limitations section. 
Ten participants were excluded for failing to reach the minimum required accuracy rate 
on the implicit self-esteem measure (see: Measures). The final sample therefore included 69 
women, which is comparable to a sample of 71 used in the Hoffmeister et al. (2010) study with 
a similar design. Mean age was 22.43 (SD=4.64) and mean BMI was 21.60 (SD=3.36). 
Participants were predominantly white (50.7%) and British (46.4%). Six (8.7%) participants 
reported being formally diagnosed with an eating disorder (1 AN, 1 BN, 1 mixed AN/BN, 1 
EDNOS,1 other, and 1 participant who did not respond). Participants’ first language was 
inferred from their self-reported nationality during data analysis, resulting in approximately 39 
native speakers and 30 non-native speakers. 
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5.2. MEASURES 
 
The Self-Esteem Implicit Association Test (SE-IAT). The IAT was 
selected as an assessment of implicit self-esteem, in favour of, for example, the NLT or the 
EAST. The SE-IAT is conceptually consistent with research pertaining to the sociometer theory, 
and also with explicit self-esteem measures: all conceptualise self-esteem as a construct 
relative to the perception of others. The SE-IAT assesses relative association strengths between 
Me/Not Me and Positive/Negative – as such, it is a measure of positive associations with the 
self, relative to positive associations outside of the self.  
The IAT procedure was adapted from other IAT studies on implicit self-esteem (Farnham, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The target words in the Me category 
were me, myself, my, mine, own and I. In the Not Me category were they, them, he, other, she 
and others. Valence words in the Positive category were good, capable, competent, successful, 
valuable and worthy. In the Negative category the words were wrong, weak, stupid, 
inadequate, worthless and inferior. Stimuli in the Me and Not Me categories did not significantly 
differ by word length, t(10)=-1.07, p=.308. The same was true for stimuli in the Positive and 
Negative categories, t(10)=.255, p=.588. 
The procedure consisted of three practice blocks, one experimental block, three more 
practice blocks and one more experimental block. In each block participants saw category labels 
in the top left and top right corners of the screen. Stimulus words appeared in the centre of the 
screen; participants were required to press the Z key if the word’s corresponding category 
appeared on the left, or the M key if the category appeared on the right. The order of the two 
halves of the procedure was counter-balanced between participants, however a “congruent 
first” order is described here as an example for clarity. 
In the first practice block, participants saw (and categorised) either Me and Not Me 
words. In the second practice block, participants saw Positive and Negative words. In the third 
practice block participants saw all four categories: Positive and Me category labels appeared 86 
 
together in one corner of the screen, Negative and Not Me together in another corner – this is a 
“congruent” block. The fourth block was experimental (i.e., response data was recorded) and 
identical to block three. The fifth block was identical to the first. In the sixth practice block 
participants saw Positive and Negative words, but with response key assignment switched from 
block two. In the seventh practice block participants used one key to respond to Me and 
Negative words, and another to respond to Not Me and Positive words. The final, eighth, 
experimental block was identical to the seventh – with response data recorded. The purpose of 
the practice blocks was to habituate participants to key assignment in each experimental block 
to minimise learning error. Table 1 contains all the stimulus and key assignments. The stimuli 
were presented in a 15px black Verdana font on a Radeon HD, 32-bit colour, 96DPI display with 
a screen resolution of 1024x768px. 
The IAT-D effect was calculated in accordance with recommendations by (Greenwald et 
al., 2003). First, trials on which participants used an incorrect response key were coded as 
errors. Second, trials on which participants responded faster than 300ms or longer than 
3,000ms were also coded as errors – the former suggests a trigger response, the latter a 
distraction. Participants who made errors on 20% or more trials (N=10) were excluded from the 
analysis. The IAT-D was then calculated for each participant by dividing the mean difference 
between the congruent and incongruent block response latencies by the standard deviation of 
latencies in both blocks. The calculation was performed to ensure that a score above zero 
indicates stronger positive self-associations, and a score below zero indicates stronger negative 
self-associations. 87 
 
 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). The RSE is a global measure of self-esteem 
consisting of ten items scored on a 4-point Likert scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly 
agree). Items include “I am able to do things as well as most people” and “On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself”. The scale has good psychometric properties; internal consistency has 
been found to range between α=.77 and .88, and discriminant validity assessments indicate 
that the scale is not correlated with measures of academic competence, locus of control, or 
demographic variables such as age or gender (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). It has been 
recommended in the assessment of self-esteem in eating disorder research (Griffiths et al., 
1999).  
 
Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q). The EDE-Q (Fairburn & Beglin, 1994) 
was used as a measure of ED pathology, and therefore the independent variable. It is a 36-item 
questionnaire adaptation of the Eating Disorders Examination (EDE; Cooper & Fairburn, 1987), a 
structured interview used in clinical ED diagnosis. The EDE-Q has satisfactory concurrent and 
criterion validity (correlations with the EDE subscales range from r=.68 to .84), and has been 
Table 1 
Self-esteem Implicit Association Test procedure 
 
Block  Block type  Categories on the 
left (Z key) 
Categories on the 
right (M key) 
Data 
recorded? 
# Trials 
1  Practice  Me 
- 
Not Me 
- 
No  15 
2  Practice  - 
Positive 
- 
Negative 
No  15 
3  Practice  Me 
Positive 
Not Me 
Negative 
No  15 
4  Experimental 
(Congruent) 
Me 
Positive 
Not Me 
Negative 
Yes  40 
5  Practice  Me 
- 
Not Me 
- 
No  15 
6  Practice  - 
Negative 
- 
Positive 
No  15 
7  Practice  Me 
Negative 
Not Me 
Positive 
No  15 
8  Experimental 
(Incongruent) 
Me 
Negative 
Not Me 
Positive 
Yes  40 88 
 
shown to reliably differentiate between clinical and non-clinical levels of disordered eating 
(Mond, Hay, Rodgers, Owen, & Beumont, 2004). Internal consistency for the overall scale has 
been found at α=.90, with subscale values ranging from α=.70 (Restraint) to .83 (Shape concern) 
(Peterson et al., 2007)2. The scale is scored on the basis of behaviour and thought frequency 
over the last 28 days and comprises of four sub-scales relating to different facets of ED 
pathology: dietary restraint, weight concern, shape concern and eating concern. Restraint 
refers to the extent to which respondents attempt to consciously limit their dietary intake (e.g., 
“Have you been deliberately trying to limit the amount of food you eat to influence your shape 
or weight?”). The other subscales reflect, respectively, preoccupation with weight (e.g., “Have 
you had a strong desire to lose weight?”), body shape (“Has your shape influenced how you 
think about yourself as a person?”) and food and eating (“Have you been afraid of losing control 
over eating?”). 
 
The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS). The MPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991) was 
used for the assessment of perfectionism in the sample, for the purpose of addressing 
Hypothesis 2. The MPS is a 45-item, 7-point Likert scale designed to measure three facets of 
perfectionism: self-oriented, other-oriented and socially prescribed. Items include “I strive to be 
as perfect as I can be” and “I find it difficult to meet others’ expectations of me”. The measure 
has been found to have good stability and concurrent validity (Hewitt, Flett, Turnbull-Donovan, 
& Mikail, 1991). Internal consistency ranged between α=.82 and .87 for the subscales, and the 
measure was not correlated with an assessment of social desirability, indicating good 
discriminant validity (Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Assessments of concurrent validity also suggest that 
the MPS was moderately correlated with measures of self-attitudes (including self-criticism and 
high self-standards), with r values ranging from .47 to .76 (Hewitt et al., 1991). 
 
                                                             
2 The factor structure of the EDE-Q is discussed in Chapter IV (Section 1.2, p. 118) 89 
 
Demographic questionnaire. This included questions about participants’ age, ethnicity, 
nationality and ED history, if any. Participants’ weight and height were measured using scales 
accurate to 0.05kg and a portable stadiometer and used to calculate BMI as part of the 
demographic data.  
 
5.3. PROCEDURE 
 
Data was collected in a private room with the female experimenter present for the 
duration of the study. Study procedure was explained to participants at the beginning and 
informed consent obtained. The order of the three elements of the study (implicit measure, 
explicit measures and height and weight measurements) were counterbalanced across 
participants. For the IAT, participants were given instruction to use corresponding keys to 
categorise the words which appeared in the centre of the screen, and asked to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible. Each session lasted approximately 30 minutes, at the end of 
which each participant was remunerated £3, or a course credit equivalent, and debriefed. 
Missing data predominantly consisted of item nonresponse, and was assumed to be 
“missing at random” (MAR) – i.e., as a result of human error, rather than deliberate omission. 
Mean imputation (Schafer & Graham, 2002) was used in order to complete the data sets: a sub-
scale (or total scale, where unavailable) mean for the participant was calculated, and used to 
substitute the missing value. Mean imputation ensures minimal impact on correlation and 
regression analyses, and is arguably the closest interpretation of the implied response. This 
approach was used in Study 1, and in subsequent studies, unless otherwise stated. Missing data 
was only possible for questionnaire-based measures, but not the computerised measures. None 
of the participants exercised their right to refuse height or weight measurements. 
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Normal distribution. In the present study, as well as in all subsequent studies, data was 
checked for normal distribution using the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, and Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance. Quantile-Quartile plots and Stem-and-Leaf plots were eyeballed for 
expected data distribution. Unless otherwise noted, the tests yielded non-significant results, 
indicating that data is normally distributed. If non-normal distributions were found, a log-
transformation was applied to the values. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
Task order (i.e., the order of implicit, explicit and weight/height measurements) did not 
have a significant influence on any of the other measures. Native and non-native speakers also 
did not differ in their scores on any of the measures. Participants scored an average of 21.15 
(SD=6.13) on the RSES, which falls within a normative range (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). RSES 
reliability in this sample was satisfactory at α=.896. Participants scored 1.86 (SD=1.30) on the 
EDE-Q. Mean scores for the restraint, weight, eating and shape subscales were 1.59 (SD=1.47), 
2.29 (SD=1.63), 1.07 (SD=1.17) and 2.50 (SD=1.50), respectively. These values are somewhat 
higher than the normative sample data obtained by Mond, Hay, Rodgers and Owen (2004), in 
which female participants scored, on average, 1.29 on the restraint, 1.64 on the weight, 0.59 on 
the eating, and 2.16 on the shape concern subscale. Global EDE-Q score (1.42) was significantly 
lower than in the present sample, t(262)=2.821, p=.005, which indicates elevated levels of ED 
pathology in the current study sample. However, participants in the Mond et al. (2004) study 
were also older (mean age 35.3) and, on average, slightly overweight (mean BMI 25.2). 
Reliability for the EDE-Q in the current sample was found to be satisfactory, at α=.931. 91 
 
Participants scored 46.23 (SD=4.00) on the MPS; reliability was found to be relatively 
low, at α=.671. Finally, mean IAT-D score was .50 (SD=.41) across the full sample (N=69) and 
was significantly different from zero, t(68)=10.13, p=.000. This indicates that participants 
performed significantly quicker in the congruent, compared to the incongruent, IAT trial block – 
which suggests stronger positive than negative, automatic associations with the self. A 
correlation matrix of these variables is found in Table 2. EDE-Q scores were significantly, 
negatively correlated with both the RSES, and the IAT-D. This suggests that higher ED pathology 
was associated with both lower explicit and implicit self-esteem. Surprisingly, EDE-Q was not 
significantly correlated with MPS (p=.611). 
   
Table 2 
Study 1 correlations 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
1. RSES  1         
2. MPS  .061  1       
3. EDE-Q total  -.647**  .062  1     
4. IAT-D  .280*  -.279*  -.321**  1   
5. BMI  -.116  .076  .250  -.202  1 
Correlations marked * are significant at the .05 level 
Correlations marked ** are significant at the .01 level 92 
 
 
6.2. HYPOTHESIS 1 
 
The first aim was to replicate previous findings which suggest that higher levels of ED 
pathology are associated with low explicit (RSES), but not lower implicit (IAT) self-esteem. In an 
analysis procedure consistent with Cockerham et al (2009) and Hoffmeister et al. (2010), 
participants were categorised into high- and low-pathology groups using a median split 
procedure. Participants who scored below the EDE-Q median (1.76) were categorised as “Low 
EDE-Q” (N=34), and those who scored above were categorised as “High EDE-Q” (N=34). An 
independent samples t-test found significant group differences on the RSES score t(66)=-4.144, 
p=.000, 95% CIs [-8.237, -2.880]. A Shapiro-Wilk test with RSES score as the dependent variable 
and pathology group as factor was not significant, p=.281, indicating normal distribution for this 
measure. Participants in the High EDE-Q group scored significantly lower on the RSES (M=18.32) 
compared to the Low EDE-Q group (M=23.88). Contrary to hypothesis, a similar pattern was 
found on the implicit measure using an independent-samples t-test: participants in the High 
EDE-Q group scored significantly lower on the IAT-D (M=.377) compared to those in the Low 
EDE-Q group (M=.614), t(66)=-2.462, p=.016, 95% CIs [-.428, -.044]. This suggests that 
participants with elevated EDE-Q scores reported both lower explicit and lower implicit self-
esteem. 
Mean IAT-D values were also tested for difference from zero in each group using a one-
sample t-test; the calculation of the IAT-D suggests values above zero to be indicative of faster 
performance in the congruent block (positive self-associations) and values below zero to be 
indicative of faster performance in the incongruent block (negative self-associations). 
Participants in the low EDE-Q group scored significantly above zero on the IAT-D, t(33)=9.066, 
p=.000, d=3.156. Likewise, IAT-D in the High EDE-Q group was also greater than zero 
t(33)=5.530, p=.000, d=1.925. This indicates that participants in both groups performed quicker 93 
 
in the congruent trial of the SE-IAT, which suggests that both groups held stronger positive 
automatic associations with the self than negative. 
Although comparisons between groups were only partially consistent with the 
hypothesis (i.e., the predicted difference in explicit self-esteem was found, but the differences 
in implicit self-esteem were unexpected), a repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out to 
assess a possible interaction between ED pathology and self-esteem. EDE-Q group (Low vs. 
High) was used as the independent variable, while IAT-D and RSES were used as outcome 
variables for implicit and explicit self-esteem, respectively. Consistently with previous results, a 
main effect of self-esteem was found, F(1,66)=962.220, p<.000, η2
p=.936. The interaction was 
also found to be significant, F(1,66)=16.045, p<.000, η2
p=.196. These findings suggest that 
despite the fact that participants both high and low in ED pathology held overall positive 
automatic associations with the self, the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem 
was indeed greater in participants with elevated pathology. Self-esteem discrepancy and ED 
pathology was then assessed systematically for Hypothesis 2. 
 
6.3. HYPOTHESIS 2 
 
The aim was to determine whether discrepant self-esteem (i.e., low explicit, high 
implicit) was a better predictor of ED symptomatology than low explicit self-esteem alone. First, 
a hierarchical regression model was run to determine whether both variables (RSE and IAT-D) 
explained more variance in Global EDE-Q scores than the RSES alone. The first model was 
significant, indicating that RSES significantly predicts EDE-Q, F(1,68)=48.228, p=.000, R2=.419, β= 
-.647. The second model, incorporating both factors as independent variables, was also 
significant: F(2,68)=25.891, p=.000, R2=.440. However, R2 change for the second model ( .021) 
failed to reach significance, p=.120. This suggests that implicit self-esteem may not contribute 
significant regression value to the model. However, the hypothesis was also specifically made 
with regards to self-esteem discrepancy, and a multiple regression model does not account for 94 
 
an interaction between the variables entered into the model. For this reason, a second 
regression analysis was carried out. 
First, a “self-esteem discrepancy (SED)” value was calculated. The RSES and IAT-D scores 
were standardised and their values subtracted: i.e., (z-IAT-D) – (z-RSES). As a result, a larger SED 
indicates a greater discrepancy between a participant’s implicit and explicit self-esteem. A 
regression model was then conducted using SED as the predictor and EDE-Q as the outcome 
variable.  A hierarchical stepwise regression was used with Global EDE-Q as the dependent 
variable, and SED, IAT-D and RSES as independent variables. The steps were as follows: 1) 
predicting Global EDE-Q from RSES, 2) predicting Global EDE-Q from RSES and IAT-D, and 3) 
predicting Global EDE-Q from SED. The overall regression model was significant, F(1,67)=48.228, 
p<.000, R2=.419. However, only the RSES variable reached significance, β=-.137, p<.000 and was 
therefore included in the model. Neither the SED not the IAT-D significantly predicted the EDE-
Q score, β=-.182 and -.151, respectively, p>.1. These results suggest that self-esteem 
discrepancy did not predict ED pathology better than RSES alone.  
 
6.4. HYPOTHESIS 3 
 
The third hypothesis was concerned with fitting the key variables (self-esteem 
discrepancy, ED pathology and perfectionism) to a structural equation model. However, this 
hypothesis was predicated on the assumption that perfectionism was correlated with both ED 
pathology and self-esteem discrepancy. In fact, EDE-Q was not correlated with the MPS, r=.062, 
p=.611, nor with any of its subscales. Participants in the High EDE-Q group did not score higher 
on the MPS compared to the Low EDE-Q group, F(1,66)=.415, p=.522. Similarly, no differences 
were found on the Self, Other or Social sub-scales. As a consequence, it was not possible to 
construct a model. However, it is worth noting that MPS was significantly correlated with the 
IAT-D, r=-.279, p=.020, which suggests that higher perfectionism was associated with lower 
implicit self-esteem in this sample. 95 
 
As noted previously, the MPS is comprised of three subscales, designed to assess self-
oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed perfectionism. Although it was not possible to 
address Hypothesis 3 in the intended way, some post-hoc analyses were carried out in order to 
assess any relationship between implicit self-esteem and the different facets of the MPS. No 
significant differences were found between high- and low-pathology groups on the Self, 
F(1,68)=.057, p=.812, Other, F(1,68)=.742, p=.392, or Social, F(1,68)=.143, p=.707, subscales of 
the MPS. Correlations between the MPS subscales and self-esteem measures were also carried 
out, but found no significant relationships between either a) the MPS subscales and the RSES 
(all ps >.1), or b) the MPS subscales and the IAT-D (all ps >.1). These results suggest that there 
was no significant relationship between either measure of self-esteem and the facets of the 
MPS. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
7.1. RESULTS OVERVIEW 
 
Study 1 was designed to replicate and extend findings which suggest that elevated ED 
symptomatology is associated with lower explicit, but not implicit self-esteem (Cockerham et 
al., 2009; Vanderlinden et al., 2009; Hoffmeister et al., 2010). Only one of these studies 
(Hoffmeister et al., 2010) had been carried out in a non-clinical population, and included 
restrained eaters only – by contrast, the present study assessed participants with overall 
elevated pathology, including concerns with restraint, eating, weight and shape. The analyses 
carried out in previous studies were limited to the assessment of group differences rather than 
the interaction of implicit and explicit self-esteem, or self-esteem discrepancy as a predictor of 
ED pathology. The present study was designed to replicate previous findings as well as address 
both of the latter questions. 96 
 
Overall, the results support the presence of a self-esteem discrepancy (low explicit, high 
implicit) in individuals with elevated ED pathology, but suggest that the discrepancy did not 
predict ED pathology better than explicit self-esteem alone. The study did not wholly replicate 
the findings from the only other non-clinical study in this area, by Hoffmeister et al. (2010), who 
found differences in explicit, but not implicit self-esteem between participants high or low in 
dietary restraint. By contrast, in the present study, participants with elevated ED pathology 
reported lower RSES and IAT-D scores than those with lower pathology levels; this suggests that 
both explicit and implicit self-esteem were associated with higher ED concerns. However, a 
follow-up repeated-measures ANOVA did indeed find a significant interaction between the self-
esteem measures (RSES and IAT-D) and ED pathology levels, which lends further support to the 
role of discrepant self-esteem in ED pathology. Hypothesis 1 was therefore confirmed. 
Hypothesis 2, pertaining to predicting ED pathology from both implicit and explicit self-
esteem was not confirmed. Several multiple regressions were carried out, using both implicit 
and explicit self-esteem measures, and a value calculated to reflect their relative discrepancy. 
However, in all cases, the inclusion of implicit self-esteem did not explain pathology to a greater 
degree than the explicit self-esteem alone. The null findings may be attributed to the approach 
used in calculating SED, as there is currently no accepted way of calculating self-esteem 
discrepancy. However, the approach taken here was deemed to be sensible and consistent with 
the conceptual context of the research questions.   
Finally, Hypothesis 3 could not be fully addressed, as it was predicated on the 
assumption that ED pathology would be correlated with perfectionism, which was not the case. 
While such a finding is unusual, it is not unique; for instance, Wood, Waller, Miller and Slade 
(1992) found no correlation between perfectionism and elevated ED pathology. In contrast to 
findings by Schröder-Abé et al. (2007) and Zeigler-Hill and Terry (2007), who argue that 
discrepant self-esteem is associated with several maladaptive psychological traits, including 
perfectionism and aggression, self-esteem discrepancy in the current sample was associated 
with lower perfectionism. Following a discussion of methodological limitations, these findings 97 
 
will now be discussed in the context of previous research and the function of implicit self-
esteem in the context of broader self-esteem theories. Further research directions will also be 
proposed. 
 
7.2. LIMITATIONS 
 
Data for the current study was collected using an opportunistic sample consisting mostly 
of undergraduate students: young, slim, educated women. For this reason, the generalisability 
of the findings is somewhat limited. However, it is worth noting that young, slim women are 
also at greater risk for developing disordered eating behaviours compared to other 
demographic groups (Hudson, Hiripi, Pope Jr, & Kessler, 2007), and therefore more relevant to 
the current research area.  
Second, only one implicit measure of self-esteem was used, the IAT. The reasons for 
selecting the IAT in favour of other available measures was explained in the methodology 
section. However, the choice to use only one measure was mostly a choice made out of 
practical research constraints. Future studies should ideally include a variety of implicit 
measures in order to assess both relative and non-relative self-associations. 
The stimuli used in the IAT can also be criticised in light of Karpiski’s (2004) research with 
regards to the role of the “Other” category and its potential skewing effect on the measure’s 
outcome. The IAT used for the assessment of implicit self-esteem in the present study were 
designed with the criticism in mind, and using the recommendation that a “neutral” reference 
category is used. However, it is still debatable which “Other” group is most relevant in implicit 
self-esteem research, particularly within the context of ED pathology. Different results with 
regards to the self-esteem discrepancy could be anticipated using an IAT which contrasts 
attitude towards the self compared to, for example, one’s social group (peers, friends, and/or 
family), or “idealised” images of beauty in the media. Research suggests that both same-sex 
peers and media representations are used in social comparison, which is also correlated with 
body dissatisfaction (Jones, 2001). Further research using different “Other” categories (e.g., 98 
 
using peers or subjective shape/weight “ideals”) could contribute to a better understanding of 
the role of implicit self-esteem in ED pathology. However, studies which use these types of 
“non-neutral” categories should also take into account the potential mediating effect of Shape 
and Weight Based Self-Esteem (SAWBS) and include it in the assessment. 
As outlined previously, it was not possible to assess the role of perfectionism in the 
association between discrepant self-esteem and ED pathology because no correlation was 
found between the MPS and the EDE-Q. While this was unexpected, it could suggest that the 
MPS is not the most suitable measure of perfectionism to use for this type of research. The MPS 
assesses other-directed perfectionism as well as the inwardly-directed type, which is not 
necessarily implicated in disordered eating behaviours (Franco-Paredes, Mancilla-Díaz, 
Vázquez-Arévalo, López-Aguilar, & lvarez-Rayón G., 2005). Alternative measures such as the 
Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990) should 
be considered for future studies.  
Finally, the SED calculation used was developed specifically for the purpose of this study 
and has not yet been applied broadly. Further research is needed to evaluate other alternatives 
to representing self-esteem discrepancy quantitatively, while taking into account measurement 
error, individual variability and generalizability to different explicit and implicit self-esteem 
measures. 
 
7.3. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF SELF-ESTEEM DISCREPANCY 
 
Overall, the findings of the present study support the assertion that greater discrepancy 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem is indeed associated with elevated ED pathology, even 
at a sub-clinical level. Additionally, this study is the first to suggest that self-esteem discrepancy 
is associated with a general cluster of ED symptoms. Further research directions could address 
specific facets of ED symptomatology by assessing implicit and explicit self-esteem in 
participants recruited specifically on the basis of elevated shape or weight concerns. Research 99 
 
by Svaldi et al. (2012), who found consistent decreases in implicit self-esteem in people 
reporting high body image concerns, suggests that such distinctions may exist. 
The results of the current study lend further support to the apparent “universality” of 
positive implicit self-esteem (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Even in the high EDE-Q group the IAT-D 
effect was still significantly above zero, despite significantly lower explicit self-esteem. In 
Cockerham et al. (2009) and Vanderlinden et al. (2009), participants in the clinical ED groups 
reported significantly worse self-esteem than healthy controls, and yet their implicit self-
esteem – the automatic associations they had with the concept of “self” – were just as positive. 
It is not clear why this should be. Although no comprehensive theoretical models concerning 
the role of implicit and explicit self-esteem have been developed, several hypotheses have been 
put forth. These will now be discussed in the context of the current study’s findings. 
 
Theories of implicit self-esteem. Various explanations of implicit self-esteem 
have been proposed, although there is currently no consensus with regards to which approach 
is the most likely and/or consistent with available data. Some of the explanations of the nature 
and function of implicit self-esteem which have been suggested include a) a stress buffer 
(derived from self-affirmation theory), b) defence against mortality salience (from TMT), and c) 
chronically accessible evaluation of the self (from Sociometer theory). In the context of implicit 
self-esteem acting as a buffer or threat defence mechanism (whether against stress or the 
anxiety of mortality salience), implicit self-esteem can be conceptualised as non-conscious 
efforts to protect the ego against thoughts of death (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). 
The results of the present study support the apparent “resilience” of implicit self-esteem, as it 
was found to be high even in participants struggling with elevated levels of ED pathology and 
lowered explicit self-esteem. However, this conceptualisation is inconsistent with the literature 
in implicit attitude research. Chapter I discussed the process through which implicit attitudes 
are hypothesised to form: repeated presentation of a target and a valence stimulus in close 
spatial or temporal proximity (e.g., snake-bad). This is supported by classical conditioning 100 
 
studies, in which implicit associations have been found to form or change over the course of a 
single experimental session (Olson & Fazio, 2001; Baccus et al., 2004). Implicit attitudes are 
therefore unlikely to act as a mechanism of ego protection, as they are no more resilient or 
stable than explicit ones. 
The current study was formulated within the framework of Sociometer theory, based on 
research which suggests that social comparison plays a significant role in self-esteem 
development, particularly with regards to SAWBS. Participants with elevated ED pathology were 
found to have lower explicit and implicit self-esteem, compared to those with few ED 
symptoms. This suggests that implicit self-esteem may also be susceptible to the negative 
effects of ED pathology, including body dissatisfaction and concerns over food and eating. 
However, further research using different implicit self-esteem assessments (e.g., unipolar 
measures, or IAT categories designed to more closely reflect real-life comparisons) is necessary 
to ascertain the extent to which social comparison affects implicit self-esteem within the 
context of ED pathology. Two specific explanations for the discrepancy between implicit and 
explicit self-esteem in EDs and ED pathology have been previously proposed: a “Glimmer of 
Hope” hypothesis, and an account of psychological distress. The “Glimmer of Hope” account of 
self-esteem discrepancy was put forward by Spencer et al. (2005) and Zeigler-Hill and Terry 
(2007), suggesting that people who retain high implicit self-esteem despite reporting low 
explicit self-esteem retain a certain unconscious optimism about their self-worth, which can 
motivate them to behave more proactively. On the one hand, this appears inconsistent with the 
present findings. The “glimmer of hope” hypothesis suggests that discrepant self-esteem would 
have positive behavioural outcomes, while in the present sample it was associated with more 
maladaptive behaviours and beliefs. On the other hand, research in implicit attitude change 
supports the “glimmer of hope” hypothesis; if the IAT reflects relative associations with the self, 
participants in the current sample appear to have retained positive self-associations despite 
their explicit beliefs about their bodies, eating habits or their objective self-worth. In an odd 
way, dietary restraint behaviour could be understood as “optimistic” in the sense that it is 101 
 
proactive. People who engage in dietary restraint behaviours, even if they are not sustainable 
or healthy, seem to retain an underlying belief in their ability to change. This can be 
conceptualised as cognitive dissonance between implicit and explicit self-esteem, which could 
then motivate certain types of eating behaviours (Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2008). 
However, the current body of research is insufficient to either support or reject this hypothesis; 
further assessments of implicit and explicit self-esteem interaction with ED symptoms should be 
carried out in people with low implicit/high explicit self-esteem, to determine its potential 
associations with different types of behaviour. An alternative hypothesis of self-esteem 
discrepancy has been made by Cockerham et al. (2009), who proposed that self-esteem 
discrepancy is fragile and could be indicative of “psychological distress”, which could then be a 
risk factor in developing ED symptoms. However, in the present sample, discrepancy between 
RSES and IAT-D failed to significantly predict EDE-Q scores in a regression model, which does 
not appear to support this assertion. Alternatively, psychological distress could be manifest only 
at higher levels of such discrepancy, or in clinical contexts; further research is necessary to 
address these possibilities. 
The hypothesis also implies that self-esteem discrepancy is associated with other 
negative psychological outcomes besides disordered eating. Indeed, studies have linked self-
esteem discrepancy to perfectionism (Zeigler-Hill & Terry, 2007) and to depression (De Raedt et 
al., 2006). It could be proposed that self-esteem discrepancy is significant in ED pathology only 
when it is comorbid with other such “psychological distress” markers. However, findings from 
the current study have not supported this interpretation; self-esteem discrepancy was 
negatively correlated with MPS scores, which would suggest that greater discrepancy was 
actually associated with lower perfectionism. However, MPS also was not significantly 
associated with EDE-Q, RSES or BMI, which suggests that it had limited relevance to ED 
pathology in the current sample. 
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7.4. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS. 
 
The implications of current findings (and other research in self-esteem discrepancy) 
should be considered for their potential contributions to theoretical knowledge, but also for 
any practical implications for disordered eating interventions possible at a sub-clinical level. 
Sub-clinical levels of pathology, are known risks for the development of disordered eating 
(Jacobi, Hayward, de Zwaan, Kraemer, & Agras, 2004; Striegel-Moore, Silberstein, & Rodin, 
1986). Present findings suggest that discrepant self-esteem is associated with pathology even at 
a sub-clinical level. It is possible that self-esteem discrepancy may precipitate the development 
of ED symptoms. This question could be addressed using a longitudinal design, by measuring 
both implicit and explicit self-esteem in an at risk sample to contrast self-esteem changes in 
people who go on to develop an ED, compared to those who do not. If such differences exist, 
self-esteem discrepancy could potentially be used in screening for people at risk for developing 
an eating disorder. The advantage of implicit measures is that they are difficult to consciously 
influence (as discussed in Chapter I); this can minimise the effects of social desirability. 
However, the current study suggests that self-esteem discrepancy may not have a significant 
effect on ED pathology at sub-clinical levels, hence it may not be an ideal target for predicting 
ED risk. As such, other screening tools such as the SCOFF questionnaire (Morgan, Reid, & Lacey, 
1999) or even the EDE-Q (Mond et al., 2004) are considerably more diagnostically useful in 
practice, at least until more convincing evidence with regards to the role of implicit self-esteem 
emerges. 
 
7.5. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
 
Several possible avenues for further research have already been outlined, including 
longitudinal studies to address the development of pathology and self-esteem discrepancy over 
time, and further research into the "glimmer of hope" hypothesis. More studies are necessary 
both from clinical and non-clinical populations to understand the relevance of self-esteem 103 
 
discrepancy to behaviour. Clinical studies which have been conducted tend to recruit 
participants with diverse diagnoses into a generalised “clinical” group, which can complicate 
interpretation of the results, if implicit self-esteem is implicated in specific types of behaviour 
(such as restraint). 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The current study has successfully replicated previous findings which suggest that 
elevated ED pathology is associated with self-esteem discrepancy. The new findings which 
emerged suggest that this relationship is generalizable to a) sub-clinical levels of pathology, and 
b) a broader range of cognitions and behaviours beyond dietary restraint alone. However, the 
hypothesis that self-esteem discrepancy would act as a better predictor of pathology than 
explicit self-esteem alone was not supported. As a result, the current study has found further 
evidence to support the theoretical role of implicit self-esteem in ED pathology, but suggests 
that the discrepancy may have limited practical value at sub-clinical levels of pathology. The 
findings do not appear to lend themselves to explanation through explicit self-esteem theories, 
and the suggestion that self-esteem discrepancy may play a key role in ED pathology is not 
likely to be upheld. The most likely explanation of the results is consistent with Rydell et al. 
(2008), who suggest that self-esteem discrepancy creates a dissonance-based discomfort. 
Although some further research directions are possible, there is no well-defined research path 
to be taken based on the results of this study. As a result, the remainder of this Thesis is 
predominantly focused on the assessment of implicit attitudes towards food and their effect on 
eating behaviour. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Study 2: Implicit attitudes towards food and ego depletion 
 
The results of Study 1 suggested that a discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-
esteem was present in a sub-clinical sample of women with elevated levels of ED 
symptomatology. However, this discrepancy was not found to contribute significantly to 
explaining variance in pathology. As a result, research into the role of implicit self-esteem was 
abandoned in favour of exploring other implicit attitudes which could potentially contribute to 
ED symptomatology and eating behaviour. Study 2 was focused on taking the first steps in 
exploring the role of implicit attitudes towards food. 
Although some research has already addressed individual differences in implicit food 
attitudes in restrained eaters and in clinical populations, few studies have directly addressed 
the effect which they may have on eating behaviour and on ED pathology. The present study is 
grounded in research (previously discussed in Chapter I) which suggests that implicit attitudes 
may drive behaviour which is more impulsive and less consciously controlled – in contrast to 
explicit attitudes, which are more closely associated with rational, consciously controlled 
behaviour. Consistently with this assertion, implicit attitudes towards food may be expected to 
drive eating behaviour which is more impulsive, or automatic. An example of a state in which 
behaviour can be expected to be less consciously controllable is ego depletion: a state of 
diminished self-control capacity following periods of self-restraint, such as dietary restraint. 
Study 2 was therefore designed to assess the hypotheses that people with elevated ED 
pathology may a) act on positive implicit attitudes towards high-fat, high-calorie foods in a state 
of ego depletion, and/or b) are more susceptible to ego depletion following periods of dietary 
restraint, which could partially explain why dietary restriction is frequently unsuccessful. 
This chapter will begin with a clarification of terminology used within the research field, 
including differences between “restriction”, “restraint”, and “dieting”. Research in explicit food 105 
 
attitudes and their role in ED pathology will then be introduced, following on with the concept 
of ego depletion and its role in eating behaviour, and a summary of existing research in implicit 
food attitudes in the context of disordered eating. The methods and outcomes of Study 2 will 
then be discussed. A pilot study designed subsequently to Study 2 in order to address some of 
the methodological issues will also be outlined. 
 
1. The evolution of Restraint Theory: Restriction, 
restraint and dieting. 
 
The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the difficulties involved in defining and 
assessing different aspects of dietary restraint. The term “restrained eater” can have variable 
definitions and behavioural outcomes, depending on the types of assessment used. Some 
confusion also exists about the distinction between “restriction” and “restraint”, and also the 
differences between “restrained eaters” and “dieters”. The evolution of restraint theory will 
briefly be outlined, followed by an introduction to the most common measures of restraint and 
restriction, and a discussion of the differences between the three terms. 
 
1.1. RESTRAINT THEORY AND THE RESTRAINT SCALE 
 
As research into obesity and eating behaviour began gaining more research attention 
from a psychological point of view in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, Nisbett (1972) proposed the 
“set point” theory. Set point theory postulated that the number of fat cells in the body is greatly 
variable: people with more fat cells will be naturally prone to a higher “set point” weight than 
people with fewer fat cells. Because the number of fat cells in the body is mostly invariable and 
adiposity is a function of fat cell size rather than count (Goss, 1966), having more fat cells 
makes maintaining a lower body weight proportionately more difficult. Thus, individuals = with 
high set points who attempt to use dieting to maintain a lower body weight (to meet societal 
expectations of thinness, for example) will be prone to overeating: obese individuals have been 106 
 
found to have up to three times more fat cells (hyperplasia) than people of a normal weight 
(Knittle & Hirsch, 1968). Nisbett also drew on animal models of hypothalamic lesions and their 
consequence for overeating to implicate the role of the hypothalamus in set point regulation 
(Hoebel & Teitelbaum, 1966; Powley & Keesey, 1970), and used the data to suggest that the 
hypothalamus “defends” an individual weight set point based on hereditary traits and formative 
nutritional experiences in childhood. A subsequent body of research has supported the role of 
the hypothalamus in weight regulation (Horvath, 2005), particularly its role in the regulation of 
leptin – a hormone responsible for the regulation of satiety.   
Herman and Mack (1975) argued that the assumption that eating behaviour corresponds 
to two distinct weight categories (overweight and normal weight) is incorrect. In fact, people 
who have a high set point but artificially maintain a low body weight would be characterised by 
frequent attempts to lose or maintain a low weight as well as behavioural patterns not 
dissimilar to overweight people who nevertheless maintain a weight lower than their natural 
set point. There is little research to conclude how much higher a “set point” would be in this 
instance: i.e., are such individuals are able to maintain a weight only several pounds, or several 
stone, lower? To address the hypothesis of chronic (attempted) weight management, the 
researchers constructed a 5-item “restraint questionnaire”, which assessed preoccupation with 
food and dieting (e.g., “Do you give too much time and thought to food?”), and weight 
fluctuation (e.g., “What is your maximum weight gain within a week?”). Participants scoring 
high on this “restraint” measure were found to eat more ice cream following a milkshake 
preload (in a “taste test” study), compared to participants who scored low. It was concluded 
that degree of restraint was a better predictor of eating behaviour in the milkshake paradigm 
than participants’ actual weight. 
In response to the findings, Herman and Polivy (1975) developed the Restraint Scale (RS). 
It was developed within the context of restraint theory, which proposed boundaries of 
“hunger” and “satiety” between which was a zone of biological indifference. As restrained 
eaters were initially believed to be attempting to maintain their weight well below their set 107 
 
point, the zone of biological indifference was believed to be larger than in unrestrained eaters.  
Restrained eaters were also thought to impose an artificial “diet” boundary between hunger 
and satiety. When the initial restraint scale was developed, restraint was defined as the 
intention to diet in order to achieve or maintain a desired weight (Herman & Mack, 1975) and 
individuals who scored highly were considered “restrained eaters.” However, examination of 
the 10 items of the RS reveals that it is not simply a measure of dieting; the 10 items assess 
dietary restriction (e.g., “How often are you dieting?”) and overeating tendencies (e.g., “Do you 
eat sensibly in front of others and splurge alone?”), as well as weight fluctuation (e.g., “In a 
typical week, how much does your weight fluctuate?”). Herman and Polivy’s underlying 
assumption was that “restrained eaters” are unsuccessful at dietary restraint, maintaining it 
until it fails and the diet boundary is breached – which then leads to a period of overeating 
(relative to the person’s subjective dietary needs; not necessarily with regards to an objective 
metric of caloric intake needs). So, for Polivy and Herman, “restrained eaters” was synonymous 
with “failed restrained eaters”; the concept of a “successful” restrained eater was typically 
discussed in hypothetical terms, rather than something that exists. If the set point theory was 
correct, a successful restrained eater would need to override their physiological controls with 
cognitive ones; the trouble is that in doing so they became vulnerable to uninhibited overeating 
as the “cost” of this control (Polivy & Herman, 1985).  
The Restraint Scale. A confirmatory factor analysis subsequently conducted on 
the RS (Allison, Kalinsky, & Gorman, 1992) indicates that the scale measures two distinct 
constructs: weight fluctuation and concern for dieting. This is problematic because the scale 
was designed as a unifactorial measure. A two-factor solution means that the scale does not 
differentiate between restriction and disinhibited eating – the latter of which may actually be 
what predicts counter-regulatory eating behaviour (Stunkard & Messick, 1985; Westenhoefer, 
1991; Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008). Ogden (1993) also argues that the 
scale conflates attempted (or intended) dieting, and actual successful restraint. Two of the RS 
items pertaining to weight fluctuation were found to account for 70% of the variance in scores 108 
 
(Drewnowski, Riskey, & Desor, 1982), which would suggest that “restrained eaters” identified 
with the RS are likely to be people who repeatedly lower their weight, but are unable to 
maintain the change in the long term. People identified as “restrained eaters” using the RS are 
therefore people who exhibit all the traits assumed by Restraint Theory: including not only the 
restriction of food intake, but also dietary restraint failure and subsequent weight fluctuation. 
This is supported by the finding that people who report that a high proportion of their weight 
loss attempts fail also score high on the RS (Ogden, 1993).  Heatherton, Herman, Polivy, King 
and McGree (1988) argue that a two-factor solution to a single scale is not necessarily 
problematic, so long as both factors pertain to different aspects of the same concept. Whether 
or not failure (e.g., weight fluctuation) is a “necessary” aspect of restraint is debateable; thus, 
the multifactorial structure of the RS is a limitation. Studies which use the RS to assess 
“restraint” are therefore technically assessing participants’ tendency to engage in repeated 
cycles of dietary restraint for weight loss, followed by failure and weight gain. However, other 
measures have since been developed with the intention of assessing restraint behaviour in its 
“pure” form, without interfering factors such as weight fluctuation or disinhibition. 
 
1.2. OTHER MEASURES OF RESTRAINED EATING 
 
Given the difficulties raised with the RS, other scales were developed in the attempt to 
assess restrained eating in a “purer” form, without including factors such as weight fluctuation. 
Notably, this includes the Three Factor Eating Questionnaire (TFEQ; Stunkard & Messick, 1985) 
and the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (van Strien, Frijters, Bergers, & Defares, 1986). 
The TFEQ was designed to assess three distinct factors: 1) cognitive restraint of eating, 2) 
disinhibition, and 3) (susceptibility to) hunger. It must be noted, however, that the authors do 
not give a specific definition for what they consider to be “cognitive restraint”; however, the 
items (e.g., “Life is too short to worry about dieting” and “I consciously hold back at meals in 
order not to gain weight”) mostly pertain to the respondent’s attitudes towards weight loss and 109 
 
dieting, and the tendency to exercise conscious control over their eating behaviour (the 
questions in this sub-scale were shown to reliably load on a single factor by Stunkard and 
Messick in the original paper). The scale was initially designed to assess eating behaviours and 
cognition in overweight individuals. The cognitive restraint subscale (TFEQ-CR) was found to be 
negatively correlated with BMI in a sample of obese individuals (Cappelleri et al., 2009), and the 
disinhibition scale (TFEQ-D) reliably differentiated between obese and non-obese women 
(Lindroos et al., 1997). This is in contrast to the RS, which is positively correlated with BMI 
(Tiggemann, 1994) but cannot be used to reliably discriminate obese participants from normal 
weight, as 90% of the former and 30% of the latter could be classified as “restrained” 
(Drewnowski et al., 1982). However, the TFEQ has also been found to reliably discriminate 
between different dietary behaviours in normal weight samples (de Lauzon et al., 2004): e.g., 
higher scores on both the Restraint subscale and the Disinhibition subscale were positively 
correlated with actual caloric (energy) intake, and participants who scored higher on the 
Emotional subscale also reported greater snacking frequency.  
The DEBQ is a 33-item questionnaire which consists of three sub-scales:1) restrained 
eating (deliberately limiting food intake with the intention of weight loss), 2) emotional eating 
(eating in response to negative emotional states or mood) and 3) external eating (the extent to 
which eating behaviour is triggered by external cues). Overall, the measure was found to have 
good discriminant validity (Wardle, 1987) and internal consistency (Halvarsson & Sjödén, 1998). 
(Laessle, Tuschl, Kotthaus, and Prike (1989) found stronger correlations between the RS and the 
DEBQ (r=.59) than between the RS and the TFEQ (r=.35), which suggests that the array of 
behaviours and cognitions assessed by the DEBQ may be closer to the RS’s assessment of 
restriction and weight fluctuation than the TFEQ. 
Heatherton, Herman, Polivy, King, and McGree (1988) argued for the distinction between 
“restraint” and “restriction”. The RS is designed to assess broader cognitive aspects of restraint, 
as well as its consequences, such as weight fluctuation. By contrast, the DEBQ-R and TFEQ-CR 
are intended as a narrower assessment of the “restriction” aspect of restraint: i.e., intended or 110 
 
actual limiting of food intake for the purpose of weight loss. For example, “When I have eaten 
my quota of calories, I am usually good about not eating any more” (TFEQ-CR), or “Do you 
deliberately eat foods which are slimming?” (DEBQ-R). The scales are significantly correlated 
with each other (r=.66, Laessle et al., 1989). However, this could partially be due to the fact that 
both were loosely modelled on Pudel’s Latent Obesity Scale (Pudel, Metzdorff, & Oetting, 
1975), which was designed to assess obese-like eating behaviours in normal weight individuals. 
Unlike the RS, “restrained eaters” identified using the DEBQ-R or the TFEQ-CR do not 
show the same counter-regulatory behaviour following a caloric preload, or manipulation of 
negative affect (Lowe, 1993; Stroebe, 2008). Also unlike the RS, factor analyses found that while 
RS loaded on all three restraint factors (overeating, dieting, and body dissatisfaction), the DEBQ 
and TFEQ Restraint subscales loaded on the dieting factor only (van Strien, Herman, Engels, 
Larsen, & van Leeuwe, 2007): i.e., an exploratory factor analysis yielded a single-factor solution 
for the DEBQ and TFEQ, and a three-factor solution for the RS. Laessle et al. (1989) similarly 
found that while the RS was an appropriate measure of the “disinhibition” and “weight 
fluctuation” aspects of restrained eating, the TFEQ-CR and DEBQ-R were more suitable for 
assessment of the restriction of caloric intake.  
However, the assumption that elevated scores on the TFEQ-CR and DEBQ-R are 
associated with a smaller caloric intake do not appear to be supported by evidence. Laessle et 
al. (1989) did find a significant correlation between TFEQ-CR and DEBQ-R scores, and self-
reported caloric intake over a 7-day period. No such correlation was found with scores on the 
RS. By contrast, Stice and colleagues carried out a series of studies (Stice, Fisher, & Lowe, 2004; 
Stice, Cooper, Schoeller, Tappe, & Lowe, 2007; Stice, Sysko, Roberto, & Allison, 2010) in which 
participants’ food intake was assessed using doubly labelled water, allowing for a more 
accurate assessment of metabolic rate and thus caloric intake. Neither TFEQ-CR nor DEBQ-R 
scores were correlated with actual caloric intake, either under laboratory, or naturalistic 
conditions. This was true for both short-term observation (e.g., one meal) and medium-to-long 
term (e.g., 2 weeks). The authors propose that the scales measure caloric restriction relative to 111 
 
the individual’s subjective needs, rather than restriction in absolute terms. This is consistent 
with the “set point” theory presented by Nisbett (1972); people who score high on the TFEQ-CR 
or DEBQ-R can be assumed to exercise restraint over their eating, yet because their satiety 
boundary is high, Stice et al. (2007) argue, they do not appear to be consuming fewer calories 
compared to unrestrained eaters. This is corroborated by findings which suggest that restrained 
eaters consume more calories than the unrestrained, yet do not subjectively feel that they have 
(Jansen, 1996). Lowe and Levine (Lowe & Levine, 2005) also argue that homeostatic 
mechanisms underlie hedonic craving, as well as physiological hunger, which makes deprivation 
(or restriction of) palatable food as subjectively “real” as the deprivation of hunger. 
The Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q), developed from the Eating 
Disorder Examination (Cooper & Fairburn, 1987), is another measure which includes a 
“restraint” subscale. The measure was developed within the context of the “transdiagnostic” 
model of eating disorders (Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003) The Fairburn et al. model was 
developed as cognitive behavioural theory, in which the symptoms and behaviours associated 
with BN interact with its cognitive aspects, which together act as an obstacle to change and/or 
treatment. However, the authors define “dietary restraint” as “persistent attempts to restrict 
food intake” (Fairburn et al., 2003; p.510). This is a conflation of cognitive and behavioural 
restraint with caloric restriction. The term “dietary restraint” (or “restraint”) is therefore used 
throughout to refer to, for example, periods of deprivation within the BN binge-purge cycle. 
This conflation is problematic, as it has contributed to the blending of the two terms and their 
interchangeable use in literature. For instance, in Hoiles, Egan and Kane’s (2012) assessment of 
the model’s validity, “restraint” is implied to be both the mechanism through which weight loss 
is achieved, and the behaviour which perpetuates the ED symptomatology – both of which can 
be more accurately described as caloric restriction. As a consequence of the interchangeable 
terminology used in the model, subsequent measures developed along side it also suffer from 
similar conflations. 112 
 
The EDE-Q was adapted from the Eating Disorders Examination (Cooper & Fairburn, 
1987), a semi-structured interview used to aid clinical eating disorder diagnosis. The EDE-Q is a 
36-item questionnaire is scored on the basis of behaviour and thought frequency over the last 
28 days and comprises of four sub-scales relating to different facets of ED pathology: dietary 
restraint, weight concern, shape concern and eating concern. The restraint subscale consists of 
five questions which pertain to both attempted restraint (e.g., “Have you tried to avoid eating 
any foods which you like in order to influence your shape or weight?”), and actual restraint 
behaviour (“Have you gone for long periods of time without eating anything in order to 
influence your shape or weight?”). A factor analysis carried out in a predominantly bulimic 
female population supports the intended factor structure of the restraint subscale: all items 
were found to load on a single factor (Peterson et al., 2007). Another study which carried out an 
exploratory factor analysis using a mixed ED sample (AN, BN, BED and EDNOS) found that all 
five of the Restraint items loaded on a single factor, but that the factor also included two items 
from the Eating Concern subscale and one from the Weight and Shape subscales (Aardoom, 
Dingemans, Landt, & Van Furth, 2012). Similar findings were made in a clinical study which 
found that four of the five Restraint items loaded on one factor, but also included three items 
from other subscales (Machado et al., In Press). In a study of healthy female athletes, three 
items from the Restraint subscale were found to comprise a single factor; another factor 
consisted of mostly Eating Concern subscale items, and a third of a mix of Shape and Weight 
Concern items (Darcy, Hardy, Crosby, Lock, & Peebles, 2013). White, Haycraft, Goodwin and 
Meyer (2014) also found a three-factor solution to the EDE-Q in a study of healthy adolescents, 
one of which included four of the Restraint sub-scale items, and one item from the Shape 
Concern sub-scale. Overall, factor analyses suggest that the factorial structure of the EDE-Q-R is 
mostly, but not completely, consistent with its intended design as a measure of restriction only. 
Lowe and Thomas (2009) argue that the EDE-Q-R is not suitable for the assessment of 
restraint in a non-clinical population, as it was intended for diagnostic use. However, using the 
sub-scale has been used to assess elevated, but pre-clinical, levels of attempted restraint. For 113 
 
example, Delinsky and Wilson (2008) used the EDE-Q-R to assess changes in ED pathology 
following weight gain in women in their first year of college. Ross and Wade (2004) also used 
the scale in the assessment of dietary restraint in university students to test the cognitive 
model of bulimia nervosa in a non-clinical sample. However, the factor structure of the sub-
scale in a non-clinical sample appears to be multifactorial: an exploratory factor analysis yielded 
a two-factor solution: dietary restriction (accounting for 36% of the variance) and dietary 
restraint (accounting for 25%) (Dakanalis et al., in press); however, only the restriction factor 
was found to be relevant, which suggests that it is more important in the context of ED 
symptomatology, compared to restraint. Nevertheless, researchers should bear in mind that 
the EDE-Q-R and the DEBQ/TFEQ were developed for different research purposes and therefore 
assess different types of restraint: specifically, the EDE-Q-R assesses the types of cognitive and 
behavioural restriction which are common in clinical ED contexts. 
 
1.3. “DIETERS” VS. “RESTRAINED EATERS” AND DIETING SUCCESS 
 
Lowe (1993) argues that the terms “restrained eating” and “dieting” are often used 
interchangeably in literature, which should not be the case. While the term “dieting” refers 
specifically to restricting food intake for the purpose of weight loss, “restrained eating” is a 
broader term which encompasses any type of attempted or actual restriction, either for the 
purpose of weight loss (Lowe, 2002), or prevention of weight gain (Laessle, Tuschl, Kotthaus, & 
Prike, 1989). To wit, only 37% of restrained eaters (identified using the RS) reported dieting to 
lose weight at the time of data collection in a study by Lowe, Whitlow and Bellwoar (1991). 
Lowe and Timko (2004a) have highlighted some of the problems with the way the term “dieter” 
and “diet” have been used in literature: often the term is not defined, and can be used to refer 
to both people who are dieting to lose weight, and those who are trying to avoid weight gain. 
Furthermore, “dieting” must be contextualised within the physical and psychological well-being 
of an individual. For example, dieting will have different implications for someone who is 114 
 
overweight or obese and dieting for health reasons, compared to someone who is verging on 
being underweight and is using diet modification as an expression of self-control. 
Theoretical differences between “dieters” and “restrained eaters” were associated with 
behavioural differences in a study by Lowe and Timko (2004b). In this study, restrained dieters 
and restrained non-dieters were identified using a median split of scores on the RS and their 
responses to a question about whether they were “currently dieting to lose weight”. “Restraint” 
in this sense refers to a trait, while “dieting” is a state at the time of the study. Restrained 
dieters (people who scored above the median on the RS, and reported current dieting) and 
restrained non-dieters (people who scored above the median on the RS but were not dieting) 
were compared on different measures of restraint, as well as past weight history. Restrained 
dieters scored higher on both the TFEQ-CR and the RS, compared to restrained non-dieters, and 
also had more past cycles of weight loss and gain. In another study, dieters also responded 
differently to a caloric preload. While “restrained eaters” as identified by the RS exhibit 
counter-regulatory eating behaviour following a high-calorie preload (Ruderman & Christensen, 
1983), restrained dieters were actually found to eat less following the preload (Lowe, Whitlow, 
& Bellwoar, 1991). 
Dieters can additionally be qualified on the basis of their success (or lack thereof). In the 
Lowe and Timko (2004b) study, restrained dieters exhibited traits indicating “unsuccessful” 
dieting: i.e., elevated scores on the RS (indicating unsuccessful restraint), as well as more 
weight loss cycles (the number of times they have lost different amounts of weight). Ogden 
(1993) used self-reported diet status (“Do you attempt to lose weight?”) and self-reported diet 
success (“Do you regard yourself as a successful dieter?”) to categorise dieters as either 
successful (success score higher than number of weight loss attempts), reasonable (success 
score equal to number of weight loss attempts), or failed (success score lower than number of 
weight loss attempts). In contrast to Lowe and Timko’s (2004b) study, “dieting” in this case 
refers to a trait tendency to engage in dieting, rather than to a behavioural state at the time of 
the study. Failed dieters scored higher on the RS than the successful. This finding is consistent 115 
 
with Heatherton et al. (1988), as people who score high on the RS can also be expected to have 
a propensity for disinhibition, and thus be less successful at dieting. Failed dieters also scored 
higher on the DEBQ-R – which suggests that they engage in higher levels of dietary restriction. 
Together, these findings suggest that unsuccessful dieters spend more time on attempted 
weight loss cycles, exert more mental and physical energy on restricting their food intake, and 
consequently experience greater degrees of failure, which is reflected in their high RS scores. 
Diet success therefore cannot be entirely attributed to effort or aptitude, but rather in terms of 
the biological, psychological and emotional response to food and the restriction of food. 
Successful dieters, by definition, find restraint manageable (in contrast to the unsuccessful): 
similarly to the restrained dieters in Lowe et al.’s (1991) study, successful dieters who have lost 
a significant amount of weight and maintained the loss over a long period of time also do not 
show counter-regulation tendencies following a calorie preload (Lowe & Kleinfield, 1988). This 
interpretation is also consistent with set-point theory: a person with a higher set point will find 
it significantly more difficult to maintain the body weight of a person with a low set point, 
despite the fact that their weights may be identical. This is consistent with more recent data 
from biological research (Shiiya et al., 2002), which found differences in ghrelin concentrations 
(the hormone implicated in satiety regulation) between normal weight, obese and anorectic 
participants. Concentration levels were, respectively, lower and higher in obese and anorectic 
participants, compared to those of a normal weight. This suggests that there may be significant 
differences in people’s experience of hunger, which can also affect their experience of dietary 
restraint. 
Haynos, Field, Wilfley and Tanofsky-Kraff (In Press) developed a new classification 
paradigm to identify different aspects (behavioural and psychological) of dieting, and how they 
interact to predict behavioural outcomes. According to the model, effective dieting is the 
product of a) a positive psychological approach to dieting (focus on specific goals, emphasis on 
health rather than appearance, and flexibility) and b) high behavioural commitment (reducing 
portion size, limiting “unhealthy” foods in diet, increasing consumption of “healthy” foods). By 116 
 
contrast, ineffective dieting consists of a) negative psychological aspects (emphasis on 
appearance, losing motivation in the face of short-term failure, minimal emphasis on specific 
goals) and b) low behavioural commitment (making changes which are too small to produce an 
effect, attempting “fad” diets, and/or making diet changes which do not contribute to an 
overall caloric deficit). The model also includes Paradoxical dieting (negative psychological and 
low behavioural commitment) and Driven dieting (negative psychological and high behavioural 
commitment). The model makes an effort to systematically categorise different approaches to 
dieting, which can be helpful in the discussion of different “schools of thought” among people 
who self-identify as “dieters”. However, the model is a promising development within the 
research area, but requires extensive empirical support and replication before it can be 
accepted as grounded in observable cognitive and behavioural phenomena. 
 
1.4. CONCLUSION 
 
There is currently some confusion in the literature with regards to the terminology used 
in the assessment of restrained eating, dietary restriction, and dieting. Some authors may use 
the terms interchangeably, while others do not; the same terminology may also be used in 
different ways in different studies. Research in different populations (e.g., normal weight vs. 
obese participants, clinical samples vs. pre-clinical “ED-like” symptomatology) also suggests that 
the terminology used can mean different things in different contexts: for example, caloric 
restriction will have different psychological implications for someone with AN compared to a 
psychologically healthy, overweight individual (Lowe & Timko, 2004a). The term “restrained 
eater” can mean different things, depending on the methodology used in assessment. The 
Restraint Scale is the broadest assessment of a “restrained eater”, encompassing a variety of 
cognitive and behavioural factors, including intended or actual restriction of food intake and 
weight fluctuation. It also assumes that restrained eaters are, by definition, unsuccessful in 
their restraint. The DEBQ-R and TFEQ-CR are aimed at assessing a more specific aspect of 117 
 
restraint: dietary restriction. This refers to the intended or actual limiting of a person’s food 
intake. Despite the fact that people scoring high on the RS and the DEBQ-R/TFEQ-CR would 
both be referred to as “restrained eaters” in literature, the psychological implications of this 
term will be different, and the individuals will have different behavioural responses to caloric 
preloads or mood manipulation. Finally, “dieters” are typically assessed via self-reported dieting 
at the time of study (although occasionally according to their trait tendency to diet, as in 
Ogden’s (1993) study), and are actively engaged in dietary restriction with the purpose 
(whether successful or not) of weight loss. Although this category of participants is often used 
interchangeably with restrained eaters, people who score high in restraint may not be dieting at 
all times – although people who colloquially self-identify as “dieters” are most likely to be 
classified as “restrained eaters”. 
The complications in the research stem from the fact that not only are definitions for the 
relevant terminology not standardised, but also because terms like “restrained eater” can refer 
to scores on self-report measures, theoretical cognitive or behavioural features, or actual 
behavioural outcomes following experimental manipulation. A more stringent standardisation 
of terminology in this research area is needed, however in the meantime it is necessary to 
clarify which definition is used in each specific context. In summary, the following definitions 
will be used throughout this thesis: 
  Restriction refers to the deliberate limiting of food intake, either in net calories 
or food types or amounts, with the intention of weight loss, or avoidance of 
weight gain. 
  Restraint encompasses the cognitive and behavioural features of people who 
are trying to lose weight or avoid weight gain, which can include attempted 
(whether successful or not) restriction, attitudes towards food and eating and 
actual eating behaviour in the context of weight loss/gain avoidance. 118 
 
  Dieting is a specific, temporary modification of eating behaviour with the 
intention of weight loss, or avoiding weight gain, regardless of whether or not it 
is successful. 
The definition of a “restrained eater” is somewhat variable, as it depends on which scale 
is used to assess it. Restraint can be considered a trait feature, as someone high on restraint 
may or may not be actively engaging in restriction or dieting at any time. By contrast, dieting is 
a state; thus a dieter is necessarily engaging in restraint, while someone scoring high on 
restraint may or may not be dieting.  
 
2. Explicit food attitudes and eating disorder 
pathology 
 
Eating is a complex behaviour to study. It is driven both by homeostatic functions and by 
higher-order psychological processes. Feelings of hunger and satiety are regulated by hormonal 
expression, including leptin (Farooqui & O'Rahilly, 2009) and ghrelin (Murphy, Dhillo, & Bloom, 
2006). We experience basic hedonic pleasure from the taste of food and the feeling of satiety. 
Moreover, food is intimately linked to social and cultural meanings (Rozin, 2005), and to 
emotions (Macht, 2008). 
The taste of food is ultimately the strongest contributing factor to whether or not we like 
a particular food, more so than factors such as healthiness or nutritional content (Aikman, Min, 
& Graham, 2006). This is particularly true of young women (Roinnen, Lähteenmäki, & Tuorila, 
1999). Additionally, people are fairly similar in the types of tastes they tend to prefer. Infants 
start with an innate predisposition for liking sweet and salty tastes and rejecting bitter or sour 
ones (Birch, 1999). These preferences persist into adulthood; Drewnowski and Greenwood 
(1983) found that participants’ hedonic response increased consistently with both the sugar 
and the fat content of food. However, while the subjective pleasure derived from sugar is not 
related to being overweight (Drewnowski, Halmi, Pierce, Gibbs, & Smith, 1987), people who are 119 
 
obese prefer foods which are significantly higher in fat (>34%) compared to the preferences of 
those of a normal weight (20%) (Drewnowski, Brunzell, Sandle, Iverius, & Greenwood, 1985).  
Dissatisfaction with one’s shape or weight is very often the precursor of dieting 
behaviour (Dunkley, Wertheim, & Paxton, 2001; Johnson & Wardle, 2005). In some cases, it is 
also a precursor to disordered eating (Stice & Shaw, 2002). Dietary restriction and/or dieting is 
not necessarily pathological in and of itself, but longitudinal research suggests that it predicts 
more serious problems associated with EDs such as depression (Stice, Hayward, Cameron, 
Killen, & Taylor, 2000) and low self-esteem (Furnham, Badmin, & Sneade, 2002). Frequently, 
people engage in restrained eating in an attempt to feel better about their bodies or improve 
self-worth; unfortunately, research suggests that this approach is commonly unsuccessful. 
Dietary restriction is the most prevalent strategy adopted by people who want to lose 
weight: around 90% will either decrease their caloric intake, or restrict the types of food they 
eat in the attempt to influence their shape or weight (Serdula et al., 1999).Elevated restriction 
is particularly common in groups who have an elevated risk for developing ED pathology: for 
example, English adolescent girls report a mean score of 2.52 out of 5 on the Restraint scale of 
the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (DEBQ; van Strien et al., 1986) compared to the score 
of 1.94 reported by adolescent boys. People who choose restriction as their weight loss strategy 
typically avoid food which is high in fat and/or sugar (Tuschl, Laessle, Platte, & Pirke, 1990). This 
approach is seemingly logically sound: caloric intake and body mass are highly correlated 
(Albanes, 1987). Unfortunately, a reduction in different food types does not always imply a 
reduction in overall caloric intake, as people may “compensate” by increasing intake of other 
foods. Dietary restriction is rarely a successful weight loss strategy: in a meta-review of weight 
loss studies in overweight and obese participants, average weight loss after 12 months was 
typically just 4.6kg, which further decreased to 3.0kg at 48 months (Franz et al., 2007). In 
clinical obesity intervention trials, 12-month drop-out rates are commonly as high as 77% 
(Inelmen et al., 2005), which suggests that people find sustained weight loss challenging. For 120 
 
the average person, dietary restriction appears to be simply too difficult to sustain in the long 
term (McGuire, Wing, Klem, Lang, & Hill, 1999). 
There are many reasons why attempts at weight loss might fail. Homeostatic regulation 
(Farooqui & O'Rahilly, 2009) and differences in individual biology (Murphy et al., 2006) both 
play a role.  The disinhibition effect (where restrained eaters overeat following a high-calorie 
preload) is also understood to play a role in restraint failure (Westenhoefer, Broeckmann, 
Münch, & Prudel, 1994) – to the extent that some researchers use the term “restrained eater” 
with the implication that restraint will eventually fail as a consequence of eating disinhibition 
(Heatherton, Herman, Polivy, King, & McGree, 1988). Overeating motivated by changes in mood 
– e.g., self-medicating a negative emotional state with the hedonic experience of high-fat, high-
sugar food – can also contribute to such failure (Ruderman, 1986; Herman & Polivy, 1980). In 
fact, cravings have been found to be closely associated to mood states such as boredom or 
anxiety (Hill & Weaver, 1991). And, of course, people (and women in particular) tend to crave 
the very foods they try to avoid: food which is high in fat and sugar (Yanovski, 2003; Burton, 
Smit, & Lightowler, 2007).  
Dietary restriction, by definition, changes eating behaviour. A dieter might choose a low-
calorie sweetener instead of sugar (Tuschl et al., 1990), or low-fat milk instead of cream 
(Rideout, McLean, & Barr, 2004). The decision to engage in a diet necessarily changes attitudes 
towards certain foods. For instance, women who report high levels of restraint indicate weight 
control as a stronger motivation for their food choices than price (Steptoe, Pollard, & Wardle, 
1995). Unfortunately, the new attitude (e.g., “Cake is inconsistent with my weight loss goal; 
cake is bad”) does not appear to replace the old one (e.g., “Cake is tasty; cake is good”). Rather, 
dieters become more ambivalent about foods which are high in fat, carbohydrates or sugar. 
Specifically, normal-weight restrained eaters increase their negative attitude towards foods 
which are high in fat, high-sugar foods, but do not decrease the accompanying positive attitude 
(Urland & Ito, 2005). This ambivalence can also be construed as ambivalence between the 
desire to lose weight and the desire to eat delicious food. This is referred to as the “goal 121 
 
conflict” model of diet failure (Stroebe et al., 2008): according to this model, such failure occurs 
when the goal of hedonic pleasure is more readily accessible than the weight loss goal. 
However, the key difference between the two is that the weight loss goal is a long-term one, 
requiring self-control and conscious decision-making, while the food goal is hedonic, short-term 
and more closely associated with impulsive or uncontrolled behaviour. 
Impulsive behaviour plays a significant role in dietary restraint. Nederkoorn, Van Eijs and 
Jansen (2004) found that restrained eaters were significantly worse at inhibiting their response 
towards food cues in a stop-signal task, compared to unrestrained controls. Participants who 
had elevated eating disinhibition in a study by Yeomans, Leitch and Mobini (2008) were also 
more likely to behave more impulsively in a gambling task. An extreme example of the role of 
impulsivity in restraint failure is bulimia nervosa, which is defined by periods of uninhibited 
binge-eating alternating with periods of dietary restraint (Welch & Fairburn, 1996). Leitch, 
Morgan and Yeomans (2013) addressed specific types of impulsivity with regards to dietary 
restraint. Three types of impulsivity were identified: a) impulsive choice (accepting immediate 
rewards over larger future payouts), b) impulsive action (failure to inhibit an inappropriate 
response) and c) reflection impulsivity (failure to evaluate or collect information before making 
a choice). The outcome of the study suggested that disinhibition (as measured by the 
Disinhibited Eating subscale of the TFEQ) was associated with reflection impulsivity, rather than 
impulsive choice or impulsive action. 
Although elevated impulsivity likely plays a role in disinhibited eating and diet failure, not 
all people with elevated ED pathology necessarily exhibit elevated trait impulsivity. However, 
the act of disinhibited eating can arguably be described as impulsive, as it conflicts with the 
long-term weight loss goal. The question is why restrained eaters appear to be more prone to 
such disinhibition than the unrestrained. One possible explanation is the phenomenon of ego 
depletion, according to which self-control is a limited resource. 122 
 
3. Ego depletion 
 
The term “ego depletion” refers to a state of diminished self-control capacity. It was 
coined in by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice (1998) who first suggested that self-
control is a limited resource. In the first study investigating this, participants were presented 
with a plate of cookies and a plate of radishes. Those in the control condition were asked to 
“taste test” the cookies and not touch the radishes. Those in the ego depletion condition were 
asked to “taste test” the radishes and not touch the cookies. The idea was that those in the 
depletion condition had to exert self-control to eat the unpleasant, bland radishes in favour of 
the tempting cookies (the researchers went so far as to bake cookies in the lab to fill it with 
their appetising aroma). Participants were then given an unsolvable (unbeknownst to them) 
geometric tracing task. Because persisting, as opposed to giving up, is effortful, this was 
classified as another self-control task. As a result of the manipulation, participants in the 
depletion condition persisted on the solution for around 11 minutes less than those in the 
control condition, who did not previously have to exert self-control. The authors suggested that 
those in the depletion condition had already exerted self-control during the cookie task, and 
therefore had less self-control to exert during the puzzle task. This approach is known as the 
“strength model” of self-control, according to which we can only exert self-control for so long 
until we “run out” of strength to do so. 
The ego depletion phenomenon has since been replicated extensively. The original 
Baumeister et al. (1998) series of experiments also demonstrated the effects of ego depletion 
following emotion suppression and making a counter-attitudinal speech. Muraven, Tice and 
Baumeister (1998) went on to demonstrate the consequences of emotion suppression on 
physical stamina, of thought suppression on performance while solving anagrams, and of 
thought suppression on emotion suppression. Wallace and Baumeister (2002) have similarly 
demonstrated that participants who performed the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), in which they 
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of the font, subsequently performed worse on a geometric figure-tracing task. The picture 
which emerged suggested that ego depletion can be generalised to different areas of self-
control. 
A meta-analysis by Hagger, Wood, Stiff and Chatzisarantis (2010) assessed 83 
experimental studies of the ego-depletion effect and computed a mean effect size value of 
d=0.62, which represents a medium-to-large effect size. The meta-analysis also identified 
significant moderating variables, including the type of depleting task used. Most commonly 
used tasks such as thought and emotion control yielded medium-to-large effect sizes (d=.62 and 
d=.63, respectively), although some were considerably lower (choice and volition paradigms 
yielded effect sizes of d=.22, on average). The authors conclude that the ego depletion effect is 
robust and consistent. However, it must be noted that some studies have failed to replicate the 
ego depletion effect. For example, Wright et al. (2008) found no effect of a letter-circling task 
(where participants must control the impulse to circle certain letters unless they also satisfy 
other conditions) on subsequent Stroop task performance. However, these studies are in the 
minority. 
 
3.1. EGO DEPLETION AND EATING BEHAVIOUR 
 
Most pertinent to the present research are ego depletion studies which have specifically 
been focused on food and eating behaviour. Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski (2007) asked 
participants to suppress outward displays of emotion while watching a disturbing video clip, 
then asked them to taste candy in an ostensibly unrelated task. In control participants (who 
were not asked to suppress emotion), candy consumption was correlated with explicit, but not 
implicit, candy attitudes. However, candy consumption in participants in the ego depletion was 
correlated with implicit candy attitudes only. These findings are consistent with research 
discussed in Chapter I, which suggests that impulsive behaviour is predicted by implicit, rather 
than explicit, attitudes. The pattern of results obtained by Hofmann et al. (2007) can therefore 124 
 
be explained as follows: participants who exert self-control in the first part of the experiment 
deplete the resources which would otherwise allow them to regulate their eating behaviour in a 
conscious, controlled manner. As a result, they are more likely to behave more impulsively, 
which means their eating behaviour is regulated by implicit, rather than explicit, attitudes. 
Similar findings have been found by Friese, Hofmann and Wänke (2008). In Experiment 1, 
female participants’ implicit attitudes towards fruit and chocolate were assessed using the IAT 
paradigm. Participants in the control condition were asked to memorise a one-digit number for 
the duration of the study. Those in the ego depletion condition were asked to memorise an 
eight-digit number. Subsequent food choices made at the end of the study were correlated with 
explicit food attitudes in the control condition, and with implicit attitudes in the ego depletion 
condition. Experiment 2 found a correlation between crisp consumption and implicit attitude 
towards crisps in participants who previously suppressed their emotions during an unpleasant 
video clip (ego depletion condition). Meanwhile crisp consumption in participants who did not 
suppress their emotions (control condition) was correlated with explicit crisp attitudes only. 
Experiment 3 found similar results in consumption of beer and beer attitudes. Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt (2008) also found that candy consumption was 
correlated with implicit candy attitudes in participants with a low working memory capacity, but 
not in those with high working memory capacity. This suggests that individual differences in the 
cognitive capacity available to carry out controlled processes can affect the extent to which 
explicit behaviour is typically associated with implicit versus explicit processes. 
A small number of studies have also addressed ego depletion directly in relationship to 
dietary restraint. Vohs and Heatherton (2000, Study 3) assessed the effects of ego depletion in 
a sample of “chronic dieters” (in actual fact restrained eaters, as identified by a score above 16 
on the RS). Participants in the depletion condition (suppressing emotion during an emotional 
film clip) subsequently ate more ice cream in a “taste-testing” task. The study therefore 
suggests that self-restraint may affect eating behaviour in dieters; however, no control group 
was included for comparison. Kahan, Polivy and Herman (2003) performed a similar study but 125 
 
included a control group: restrained and unrestrained eaters were assigned to either a 
depletion or a control condition, and then given a “taste-testing” task in which they were given 
the opportunity to eat cookies. Restrained eaters ate significantly more in the depletion 
condition compared to the control condition; however, condition did not affect intake in the 
unrestrained eaters. These results are encouraging, and consistent with the ego depletion 
paradigm. However, research has yet to address these findings in the context of implicit food 
attitudes and impulsive behaviour – which will be discussed in detail below. 
 
4. Implicit food attitudes 
 
4.1. IN RESTRAINED EATERS 
 
Research in implicit food attitudes has addressed both a) attitudes towards food 
(sometimes relative to pleasant non-food stimuli), and b) attitudes towards certain food types, 
relative to other food types. If ego depletion can partially account for disinhibited eating in 
dieters or restrained eaters, then we might expect to see no differences in implicit food 
attitudes between restrained and unrestrained participants. Specifically, we might expect both 
restrained and unrestrained eaters to hold positive implicit attitudes with high-fat, high-sugar, 
and/or high-carbohydrate foods. In line with this explanation, dietary restraint failure would 
occur when self-control resources are depleted by restraint, causing the person to behave more 
impulsively and indulge in foods with which they hold positive automatic associations. 
Unrestrained eaters do not engage in dietary restraint and therefore are less likely to be in a 
state of ego depletion which would result in this type of impulsive eating. The empirical 
evidence partially supports this explanation; however, the findings have not been unequivocal. 
Several studies which have contrasted restrained and unrestrained eaters found that 
both groups held positive implicit associations with food. Participants in a study by Veenstra 
and de Jong (2010) completed an Affective Simon Task to respond to high-fat and low-fat food 
images and “Tasty” or “Non-tasty” vocal responses. A “manikin” version of the task, in which 126 
 
participants moved a mannequin figure towards or away from stimuli, was also included as a 
measure of automatic approach or avoidance. Participants were classified as restrained or 
unrestrained eaters on the basis of scoring in the top or bottom quartile, respectively, of the 
Restraint Scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980). Both restrained and unrestrained eaters held more 
positive associations with high fat, compared to low fat, food. However, restrained eaters had 
stronger automatic approach tendencies for high fat foods3. These findings are apparently 
consistent with the ego depletion account of dietary restraint failure. Roefs, Herman, MacLeod, 
Smulders and Jansen (2005) found similar results. In Experiment 1, restrained and unrestrained 
female participants completed an Affective Priming Task using pictures of high-fat and low-fat 
food, and general positive and negative words. Both participant groups held stronger positive 
associations with high-fat food. In Experiment 2, restrained and unrestrained participants 
completed the EAST using high-fat and low-fat food words, and “Palatable” or “Unpalatable” 
words. No differences were found between groups; however, there was also no effect of fat 
content on response. Papies, Stroebe and Aarts (2009) found, using an Affective Priming Task, 
that unrestrained eaters held a stronger preference for high-fat, compared to low-fat food. 
Restrained eaters did not hold a preference for either food type, although associations in both 
groups were positive towards both food types. 
One study has carried out an experimental study of the effects of restraint on implicit 
attitudes. Hoefling and Strack (2008) contrasted implicit food associations using the EAST in 
fasting (for 15 hours) versus non-fasting, and in restrained versus unrestrained participants. A 
main effect of group was found; fasting participants held more positive associations with all 
food words compared to the non-fasting group. A marginally significant interaction between 
restraint status and calorie content was found; restrained participants held slightly stronger 
positive associations with high-calorie foods than the unrestrained. These findings suggest that 
the act of fasting may actually change the pattern of implicit food associations: i.e., inflate the 
positive associations with high-calorie foods. However, a longitudinal replication study with at 
                                                             
3 Automatic approach and avoidance in eating behaviour is discussed in detail in Chapter V. 127 
 
least two time points would be necessary to support this hypothesis (see Study 4). The 
ecological validity of the Hoefling and Strack (2008) study is somewhat limited because most 
restrained eaters do not tend to fast for extended periods of time, but rather change the 
amount or content of what they eat. Moreover, the fasting was motivated by study 
participation, rather than an internal weight loss goal. 
By contrast, research which has used the IAT has not supported a universal positive 
implicit attitude towards high-calorie foods. Maison, Greenwald and Bruin (2001) assessed 
positive and negative associations with high-calorie and low-calorie foods. A main effect of 
calorie content was found: participants held stronger positive associations with low-calorie, 
compared to high-calorie, foods. Although apparently some differences between restrained and 
unrestrained eaters were found, these were not reported. Regardless, if a preference for high-
calorie foods is not normative, then the ego depletion hypothesis cannot explain why dieters 
choose to binge on cake or crisps rather than, for example, celery. Similarly, Roefs and Jansen 
(2002) contrasted high-fat and low-fat food associations in obese versus normal weight 
participants using the IAT. Both groups held stronger negative associations with high-fat food. 
Although this may be interpreted as an absolute negative attitude, it is possible that including 
low-fat foods in the dataset increases the salience of health during assessment and decreases 
positive associations with high-fat foods. It is also worth noting that both of these studies used 
general “Positive” or “Negative” words for the valence category. The results can therefore be 
interpreted as participants’ associations between food and their global positive or negative 
value; this approach would be expected to yield different results patterns than studies which 
assess implicit associations between different food types and tastiness, or food and healthiness.  
While the findings may appear contradictory on the surface, a study by Houben, Roefs 
and Jansen (2010) has highlighted the importance of methodology in this type of research. 
Restrained eaters’ attitudes towards high-calorie and low-calorie foods were assessed in two 
studies: one using a standard “relative” IAT assessment, and the other using a non-relative, 
“single category” IAT variant. The single category variant is methodologically more similar to 128 
 
measures such as the AST and the EAST because they measure non-relative associations. The 
studies found that when the standard, relative IAT measure was used, there were no significant 
differences in implicit food attitudes between restrained and unrestrained eaters. However, 
when attitudes were assessed using the single-category variant, restrained eaters had stronger 
positive associations with high-fat foods, compared to the unrestrained. These findings may be 
explained by research on the effects of context in implicit attitude research, and by parallel 
distributed processing approaches to implicit cognition: including different food categories 
could have an effect on the types of associations which are activated (and therefore measured). 
In addition to the differences in relative versus non-relative assessment, the implications 
of using global or specific variables as the valence stimuli are also important. The role of 
ambivalence towards food in restrained eaters has already been discussed; people who 
consciously try to restrict their diet tend to have mixed feelings about high-fat or high-calorie 
foods (Urland & Ito, 2005). While it has not been addressed experimentally, it is not impossible 
that such ambivalence might also be reflected on an implicit level. In line with the spreading 
activation approach to implicit cognition (such as the REC model), “cake” may be associated 
with several concepts, including those with seemingly contradictory valences – such as “tasty” 
and “fattening”. The former is more likely to play a role in restraint failure, given that impulsive 
eating behaviour is thought to be driven by the anticipation of a hedonic reward. It can 
therefore be reasonably hypothesised that the strength of this association would also result in 
stronger craving and thus a lower rate of restraint success. Alternatively, perhaps there are 
individual differences in the experience of ego depletion which can lead to restraint failure in 
some people, but not others, despite similarities in their implicit attitudes towards food. 
 
4.2. IN EATING DISORDERS 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, very little research in implicit food attitudes has been carried out in 
clinical ED populations. One study by Roefs et al. (2005) found, using an Affective Priming Task 129 
 
(high-fat vs. low-fat foods, palatable vs. unpalatable), that healthy controls held stronger 
implicit positive associations with high-fat food, compared to low-fat food. Those diagnosed 
with AN or EDNOS, by contrast, did not have stronger associations with either food type. Given 
how “successful” people with AN are at dietary restriction, these findings – while very 
preliminary – are consistent with the ego depletion account of dietary restraint success. If those 
with AN do not have an implicit preference for high-fat foods then they will presumably 
experience a less strong impulse to indulge in them, even when in a state of ego depletion. This 
is consistent with self-report and biological data which suggests that taste is impaired to some 
extent in AN (Casper, Kirschner, Sandstead, Jacob, & Davis, 1980; Simon, Bellisle, Monneuse, 
Samuel-Lajeunesse, & Drewnowski, 1993). Of course, anhedonia in and of itself can explain why 
dietary restriction is relatively easier in AN, but if similar associations are present on an implicit 
level they can explain why people with AN continue to be successful even when their self-
control resources are depleted. 
By contrast, people with BN report an enhanced hedonic experience of food, particularly 
of sweetness (Drewnowski, 1987; Franko, Wolfe, & Jimerson, 1994). Again, this very likely plays 
a role in bingeing behaviour, but it is unclear whether positive implicit attitudes towards high-
calorie foods also contribute to restraint failure. Restrained eaters are behaviourally similar to 
those with BN in the sense that both repeatedly attempt, and fail, to restrict their dietary 
intake. The majority of research discussed above suggests that restrained and unrestrained 
eaters hold more positive associations with high-fat or high-calorie than with low-fat or low-
calorie foods. The ego depletion hypothesis, if it is supported, can partially explain why 
restriction often fails in both BN and restrained eaters: dietary restraint leads to ego depletion, 
which leads to more impulsive behaviour, driven by positive associations with “forbidden” 
foods. In AN, this behaviour is potentially curtailed by some extent by a lack of such positive 
associations. In BN, it is possible that such associations are enhanced. Alternatively, there may 
be differences in the extent to which dietary restraint contributes to a state of ego depletion in 
people with AN versus in those with BN. 130 
 
As discussed in section 1.4 of this chapter, the terms “restriction”, “restraint”, and 
“dieting” have different implications depending on the population in which they are discussed. 
For instance, caloric restriction in AN is a pathological and harmful behaviour, while this may 
not necessarily be the case for someone of who is overweight. Restraint as defined by Herman 
and Polivy (1980) is technically not “applicable” to AN, as anorectics are extremely successful at 
reducing their food intake. The present study, and subsequent studies in this Thesis, were all 
conducted on non-clinical participants who were, on average, of a normal weight. The 
terminology and discussion is therefore appropriate to those participant samples, and should 
not be extrapolated to clinical or obese samples. However, ED symptomatology is discussed in 
terms of sub-clinical, but elevated levels. High-pathology participants are typically more similar 
to the “unsuccessful” restriction associated with BN; however, Study 4 will also focus on 
“successful dieters”, whose behavioural features resemble the “success” of AN more closely 
than they do BN. Despite the fact that the outcomes of non-clinical studies cannot be 
generalised to clinical samples, EDs and ED studies are still discussed throughout, as it is helpful 
to consider the findings within a broader context of the full spectrum of ED pathology. 
 
5. The present study 
 
The present study was designed as an investigation of the role of implicit food attitudes 
in eating behaviour and sub-clinical ED symptomatology. Previous research carried out in 
restrained eaters suggests (albeit not unequivocally) that both restrained and unrestrained 
eaters hold positive associations with high-fat, compared to low-fat food (Roefs, Herman, 
MacLeod, Smulders, & Jansen, 2005; Roefs et al., 2005; Hoefling & Strack, 2008; Veenstra & de 
Jong, 2010; Houben, Roefs, & Jansen, 2010). Additionally, findings from studies in ego depletion 
suggest that when self-control resources are drained, people are more likely to behave 
consistently with their implicit, rather than their explicit, attitudes.  131 
 
The present study is aimed at linking these two bodies of research. By their definitions 
(as discussed earlier in this chapter), both dietary restriction and dietary restraint constitute 
acts of self-control: the former being an act of physical self-regulation, with the latter also 
including its cognitive aspects. The classic cookie/radish paradigm is an empirical demonstration 
of restriction resulting in ego depletion under laboratory conditions. However, it can also be 
hypothesised that people who chronically engage in dietary restriction and/or restraint will 
likewise be in a chronic state of elevated ego depletion. The current study therefore examines 
a) differences in implicit food attitudes in elevated ED pathology, and b) differences in the 
effects of restraint-based ego depletion. This study was designed for a sub-clinical population, 
but with the intention of adapting it to a clinical context in the future. 
 
5.1. RESEARCH AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
  Hypothesis 1: Both high- and low-pathology participants will hold positive implicit 
associations with high-fat food. The present study is unique in using the IAT to 
specifically assess implicit associations between food and palatability. This hypothesis 
is formulated to confirm that positive implicit associations with high-fat food are near-
universal in non-clinical samples, as the subsequent hypotheses are predicated on this 
assumption. Palatability was chosen as the valence variable in the IAT on the 
assumption that impulsive eating behaviour is driven by a short-term hedonic reward 
goal. The analyses pertaining to this hypothesis will also be repeated with the EDE-Q 
Restraint sub-scale as the dependent variable, in order to isolate any differences in 
implicit attitudes which may be specific to differences in dietary restriction/restraint.  132 
 
  Hypothesis 2: There will be no significant differences in implicit attitudes between high- 
and low-pathology participants. Research has previously examined implicit food 
attitude differences between restrained and unrestrained eaters (Papies, Stroebe, & 
Aarts, 2009; Veenstra & de Jong, 2010; Houben et al., 2010), obese and normal weight 
participants (Roefs & Jansen, 2002; Roefs et al., 2005) and in fasting and non-fasting 
participants (Hoefling & Strack, 2008). The present study is the first with a focus on the 
relationship between implicit attitudes and sub-clinical ED pathology. Analyses using 
the EDE-Q Restraint subscale will be conducted to eliminate the possibility that 
restriction and/or restraint affect implicit food attitudes. 
  Hypothesis 3: Participants scoring high on restriction and/or restraint will exhibit higher 
levels of disinhibition on an ego depletion task (i.e., will give up faster), following 
dietary restraint compared to those who score low. If Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
confirmed, Hypothesis 3 is designed to address whether chronically elevated 
restriction/restraint can affect the extent of ego depletion following a restriction 
episode. This hypothesis also extends to differences between high- and low-pathology 
participants, in line with the previous hypotheses. 
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6. Method 
 
6.1. PARTICIPANTS 
Thirty-nine female undergraduates took part in the study. Three participants failed to attend 
the second session and were therefore excluded from the analyses. Six participants failed to 
meet the minimum accuracy criterion on the IAT (>80%, see Study 1) and were therefore also 
excluded. Two more participants could not complete the IAT due to equipment failure. The final 
sample therefore consisted of 28 participants. Sample size calculations using a medium effect 
size (.40, based on results obtained in the following ego depletion studies: Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Friese et al., 2008; Hofmann et al., 2007) and assuming a 
repeated measures, within-between ANOVA, indicated a suggested sample size of N=20, which 
is lower than the actual sample size obtained. Participants’ mean age was 24.79 (SD=8.87) and 
mean BMI, calculated from self-reported height and weight, was 20.85 (SD=2.71), which is 
towards the lower end of the healthy weight range (BMI 18.5-25). 
Participants were categorised as high- or low-pathology via a median split on the basis of 
Global EDE-Q scores. The median-split approach was used because no formal conventions exist 
with regards to cut-off points on the EDE-Q for levels of pathology which is not clinically 
significant.  Median splits, as well as arbitrary cut-off points, have also been used in other 
studies within this research area using non-clinical participant samples (Hoefling & Strack, 2008; 
Roefs et al., 2005; Houben et al., 2010). Participants in the high-pathology group (N=14) scored 
an average of 2.22 (SD=.73) on the EDE-Q overall, while low-pathology participants (N=14) 
scored 0.57 (SD=.37), t(26)=7.471, p=.015. The clinically significant cut-off for the EDE-Q is 2.3 
(Mond et al., 2004); 42.9% of participants in the high-pathology group scored above this 
threshold, although none reported a formal ED diagnosis. High- and low-pathology participants 
did not differ in age, F(1,26)=.051, p=.824, or BMI, F(1,26)=.1.036, p=.318. They did, however, 
differ significantly on all four sub-scales of the EDE-Q (see Table 3). 
The aspects of the hypotheses specific to the Restraint subscale were similarly addressed 
using a median split, with participants scoring above the median (.80) classified as “high 134 
 
restraint” (N=17), and those scoring below as “low restraint” (N=11). These labels were selected 
for parsimony, although it must be reminded that the Restraint subscale of the EDE-Q may 
reflect aspects of both restriction and restraint. However, as the current study is interested in 
any dietary behaviour which constitutes self-control, it was not essential to use a “pure” 
measure of either restriction or restraint, as both restriction and restraint involve self control. 
The high- and low-restraint groups differed significantly in restraint, t(26)=5.281, p<.000, but 
not in age, t(26)=-.015, p=.988, or BMI, t(26)=21.753, p=.603. 
  
Table 3 
Subscale score differences on the EDE-Q1 by group 
 
  High Pathology 
(N=14) 
Low Pathology 
(N=14) 
F  η2
p 
         
EDE-Q Restraint  1.96 (1.05)  .51 (.69)  18.58  .417 
EDE-Q Weight concern  2.47 (1.17)  .66 (.68)  25.13  .491 
EDE-Q Shape concern  3.08 (.85)  .82 (.73)  20.66  .443 
EDE-Q Eating concern  1.38 (.84)  .29 (.31)  56.79  .686 
 
1 EDE-Q: Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire 
All between-group comparisons are significant at the .01 level 
 
 
6.2. QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
A battery of scales was administered to assess individual differences which may 
contribute to variance in puzzle task persistence. In addition, participants were asked to 
complete a demographic questionnaire and a hunger and craving scale designed to take into 
account of individual differences in hunger states at the time of data collection. Filler 
questionnaires were also used to ensure that participants were not distracted during the ego 
depletion procedure. 
Demographic questionnaire: Participants completed a demographic questionnaire to 
determine age, nationality, height and weight and time since last meal.  135 
 
PPPQ-22: The Persistence, Perseveration and Perfectionism Questionnaire (PPPQ; 
Serpell, Waller, Fearon, & Meyer, 2009) is a 22-item scale; persistence refers to the drive to 
achieve a specific goal, while perseveration is the tendency to follow set rules regardless of 
whether a goal is being achieved. The scale has acceptable internal consistency, test-retest 
reliability and discriminant validity (Serpell et al., 2009). Cronbach’s alphas have been in the 
range of .6-.7, indicating satisfactory internal consistency; no significant correlations between 
the scale and age or BMI lend further support for good discriminant validity (Waller et al., 
2012). The scale was included to exclude the possibility that individual differences in these 
traits could have confounded puzzle task performance. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the 
current sample was α=.844. 
UPPS-P and MPS: The Perseverance subscale of the Urgency, Premeditation, 
Perseverance and Sensation seeking Impulsivity Scale (UPPS-P; Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & 
Reynolds, 2005) and the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Hewitt et al., 1991) were 
used as filler questionnaires to ensure that participants spent enough time on the first half of 
the ego depletion procedure. 
EFAQ: Explicit food attitudes were assessed using an explicit food attitudes questionnaire 
(EFAQ). The scale was adapted for the purpose of this (and subsequent) studies and hence has 
not been fully validated. The aim was to “translate” the IAT, which was designed to measure 
strengths of associations between specific food stimuli and palatability, into an explicit 
measure. The EFAQ consisted of an assessment of subjective palatability, and of ambivalence 
towards ten different foods (five desserts and five vegetables).  Consistent with the approach 
used by Roefs and Jansen (2002), liking was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale. If the 
participant was familiar with the taste of the food, its liking was scored from 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 
(“Very much”). Cronbach’s alpha for the palatability half of the scale was α=.55. The scale 
included desserts and vegetables only, in order to maintain consistency with the IAT. The 
ambivalence scales were adapted from Urland and Ito (2005) and asked participants to 
separately rate how strongly they felt about the a) positive and b) the negative aspects of each 136 
 
food, from 1 (“No positive/negative attitude”) to 5 (“extremely positive/negative”). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the ambivalence half of the scale was α=.61. Arguably these levels of reliability are not 
satisfactory; however, it was necessary for the measure of explicit food attitudes to reflect the 
stimuli used in the IAT as well as the specific hypotheses of the current study, and no validated 
questionnaire is available for this purpose. Time constraints did not allow for the full 
development and validation of an explicit food attitudes scale for use in the study, although it is 
acknowledged that this would be useful in future research. 
Hunger and Craving Scale: At the end of each session participants also completed a 
Hunger and Craving Scale (HCS) in which they reported their craving for cookies and radishes on 
a 5-point Likert scale, hidden among filler items. 
Eating disorder pathology was assessed, as in Study 1, using the Eating Disorder 
Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994). Finally, filler questionnaires were 
included to ensure that participants spent enough time near tempting food to induce ego 
depletion. In a meta-analysis of ego depletion studies by Hagger, Wood, Stiff and Chatzisarantis 
(2010), in which participants completed filler tasks in the interim period between the first and 
second ego depletion task had one of the highest effect sizes: d=.071, on average. This 
approach was therefore selected as the most effective design. The filler questionnaires used 
were the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and the Rosenberg Self-
esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). Half of the questionnaires (selected at random) were 
administered during the first session, and the other half during the second. 
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6.3. IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST 
 
The IAT used and the procedure followed to administer it were identical to the ones used 
in Study 1, albeit using a different stimulus set. The food stimuli used were selected using a pilot 
questionnaire, which consisted of an expanded version of the EFAQ. Female volunteers on a 
social networking site (N=48) were asked to rate 13 desserts and 13 vegetables for a) familiarity 
and b) palatability. These groups were selected (as opposed to, for example, high-fat/low-fat, or 
healthy/unhealthy) because the rapid responses necessary during the IAT require categories 
which are simple and unambiguous. However, the final stimuli selected for each category also 
differed significantly in fat content; for the purposes of discussion, the categories “desserts” 
and “vegetables” can therefore also be framed as “high-fat” and “low-fat” foods, respectively. 
Foods with a familiarity rating below 80% in the pilot were excluded from consideration for the 
final IAT stimulus set. The remaining food words were rated by average palatability; the six 
highest-rated desserts and the six lowest-rated vegetables were then selected. This selection 
was made with the intention of assessing relative preference for hedonically pleasant desserts 
(incompatible with weight loss goal) and hedonically unpleasant vegetables (compatible with 
weight loss goal), based on the hypothesis that dietary restraint failure occurs when a hedonic 
reward is desired. The desserts group contained brownie, crêpe, cookie, pie, cake and cupcake. 
The vegetable group contained beetroot, radish, turnip, celery, cabbage and brussel sprout. The 
two stimulus categories did not differ significantly in letter length, t(10)= –1.795, p=.103. 
Desserts were rated as significantly more palatable (M=4.03) than vegetables (M=2.43) by the 
pilot group t(10)=9.414, p<.000. Average fat content as a per-cent of 100g was calculated for 
the foods in each group using the online resource http://caloriecount.about.com. Desserts 
were considerably higher in fat content compared to vegetables, t(10)=5.745, p<.000. 
The valence categories consistent of “tasty” (tasty, delicious, yummy, pleasant, succulent, 
appetising) and “not tasty” (tasteless, flavourless, gross, unpleasant, nasty, unappetising). The 
IAT was therefore intended as a measure of automatic associations between desserts (high-fat 
food), vegetables (low-fat food) and palatable or unpalatable qualities. The words chosen for 138 
 
the valence categories represent specific associations with palatability, and are arguably less 
ambiguous than measures which use more global “Good”/”Bad” stimulus sets, which could 
hypothetically activate associations with both palatability and health concerns. 
Each participant also completed the self-esteem IAT from Study 1, which was used as a dummy 
task in one of the sessions (chosen at random). This was done in order to control for contents of 
the task set within each experimental session. 
 
6.4. THE EGO DEPLETION PROCEDURE 
 
The ego depletion procedure was adapted from Baumeister et al.’s (1998) radish-cookie 
task. A within- rather than a between-participant design was used in order to account for 
individual differences in puzzle perseverance. Additionally, the intention was to develop a 
methodology which could be extended to clinical research, where recruitment of large sample 
sizes is often difficult. Participants therefore attended two sessions: one with a plate of radishes 
(control condition) and another with a plate of cookies (ego depletion condition). The order of 
the sessions was counterbalanced between participants. In order to induce ego depletion, 
participants were seated at a table with a plate of chocolate-covered cookies, but asked not to 
eat any – ostensibly, as a result of their experimental condition to which they were “randomly 
allocated”. Participants therefore filled out questionnaires while in near proximity to tempting 
food (or, in the control condition, not very tempting food) for approximately 10 minutes. This 
task was designed as an act of dietary restraint: consistent with the definitions discussed in 
section 1 (p. 123), resisting a tempting food requires cognitive self-control – however, because 
participants are free to eat as much as they want upon the study’s completion, it is restraint, 
rather than restriction which is required. The cookie task therefore constitutes a form of self-
control and is assumed to result in ego depletion. 
The procedure used here deviates from the original radish-cookie task in that 
participants were not asked to eat any of the food.  Findings from an ego depletion study by 139 
 
Vohs and Heatherton (2000) indicate that simply being near tempting food is sufficient to 
induce ego depletion. 
Following the cookie-radish task, ego depletion was assessed using a puzzle task. 
Participants were asked to replicate a geometric figure (different in each session) without lifting 
their pen off the paper or tracing the same line twice. Unbeknownst to participants, the task 
was actually unsolvable; the “self control” element of the task was the effort to persevere at a 
solution in favour of giving up. Participants were asked to persevere with the task until they 
arrived at a solution, or simply wanted to stop. The dependent variable was therefore the 
amount of time participants persevered at the task before giving up. The maximum amount of 
time allowed for the puzzle task was 20 minutes. 
 
6.5. PROCEDURE 
 
The study employed a repeated-measures design. Participants attended two testing 
sessions, approximately one week apart. At the start of the first session participants were given 
an information sheet which informed them of the procedure and also stated that they may be 
asked to taste some food during the study – of course, this was not true for any of the 
participants. This was done to conceal the actual purpose of the study and give a reasonable 
justification for the presence of food on the table. In each session, participants then completed 
half of the total questionnaire set, seated either next to a plate of cookies, or a plate of 
radishes. Participants then completed one of the IATs (food or self-esteem; order was 
counterbalanced between participants) and the HCS. Participants were remunerated £3 for 
each session and given a debrief at the end of the second session in which the true purpose of 
the study was explained. Participants who did not attend the second session were sent the 
debrief by email. 
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7. Results 
 
7.1. IMPLICIT FOOD ATTITUDES 
 
A Shapiro-Wilk test conducted with EDE-Q group as the factor and IAT-D scores as the 
dependent variable was not found to be significant, p=.504, indicating that data for this 
measure was normally distributed. Hence data was not transformed and parametric statistics 
were used. The IAT-D in the overall sample was significantly different from zero, as found using 
a one-sample t-test, t(27)=2.100, p=.045, d=.810, which suggests stronger positive implicit 
associations with desserts compared to vegetables. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, no significant 
differences in IAT performance were found using a univariate ANOVA between the high-
pathology4 (M=.302) and the low-pathology (M=.612) group, F(1,26)=.495, p=.488, η2
p=.019. 
However, a different pattern was observed when IAT data was analysed independently within 
each group. Low pathology participants reported an IAT-D value significantly different from 
zero, t(13)=2.683, p=.019, which suggests a relative preference for desserts. However, high-
pathology participants had no such preference; the IAT-D value was not significantly different 
from zero t(13)=.805, p=.435 suggesting no preference for desserts amongst high pathology 
participants. Therefore Hypothesis 2 was supported, as no differences between high- and low-
pathology participants were found, but hypothesis 1 was not supported, as only low-pathology 
participants had positive implicit associations with desserts. Furthermore, a linear regression 
predicting IAT-D scores from EDE-Q Total scores was not significant, β=–.011, p=.954, hence 
there was no relationship between ED pathology and implicit preference for deserts. 
Marginally significant differences on the IAT-D were found between high- (M=.162) and 
low-restraint (M=.910) participants, F(1,26)=3.041, p=.093. IAT-D scores in the low-EDE-Q-
Restraint group were significantly higher than zero, t(10)=4.394, p=.001, indicating a significant 
                                                             
4 For the sake of clarity, “high/low pathology” refers to participants’ scores on the EDE-Q-Total, 
while “high/low restraint” refers to the EDE-Q-Restraint subscale (although, as mentioned 
previously, it actually constitutes a measure of both restriction and restraint). 141 
 
implicit preference for desserts. No such preference was found in the high-pathology group, as 
the IAT-D was not significantly different from zero, t(16)=.513, p=.615. However, a linear 
regression predicting IAT-D scores from EDE-Q-Restraint was not significant, β=–.314, p=.104, 
contradicting the findings from the median split analyses and suggesting no relationship 
between EDE-Q Restraint and the implicit preference for deserts. 
Further to findings pertaining to Hypothesis 1, post-hoc analyses were carried out in 
order to discount alternative explanations for why high-pathology participants did not 
apparently have an implicit food preference (i.e., their IAT-D score was not significantly 
different from zero). First, it was possible that people in the high-pathology group could have 
manipulated the IAT to respond in a socially desirable way (i.e., vegetables are good and 
desserts are bad). As discussed in Chapter I, although most studies suggest that people are not 
very good at faking IAT responses (Banse et al., 2001; Kim, 2003; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), 
they are at least somewhat aware of what the task is measuring (Monteith et al., 2001). The 
way to fake an IAT response is to slow down responses on the congruent trial, which would 
result in similar or slower response latencies as the incongruent trial. Faking can therefore be 
detected by comparing overall response latencies between groups. If participants in the high-
pathology group are faking, we would expect an overall longer task completion time. Response 
latencies for both the congruent and the incongruent block were therefore summed and 
contrasted using an independent-measures ANOVA. No significant differences were found 
between participants, F(1,27)=.161, p=.691, which suggests that faking was unlikely. 
A second alternative explanation refers to the methodological limitations of the IAT. If a 
participant’s IAT-D score is not significantly different from zero, the task does not inherently 
discriminate between a person who has no strong associations between the target stimulus and 
each valence category (such as someone who doesn’t have strong feelings about cake either 
way), and someone who has strong, ambivalent associations with the target stimulus (such as 
someone who really likes the taste of cake but feels like they shouldn’t). A way to assess this is 
to contrast response latencies within the congruent trial only; someone with true neutral 142 
 
associations should respond at a normal speed (as responding to a neutral object as positive or 
negative is equally easy). By contrast, someone with strong ambivalent attitudes should 
experience interference whether they are responding to the stimulus as positive or as negative 
and thus take longer to respond. A one-way ANOVA was therefore conducted between high- 
and low-pathology groups using response latencies within the congruent block only. No 
significant differences were found between the groups, F(1,27)=.010, p=.921, which suggests 
that neither group was experiencing stronger ambivalence on an implicit level. On the basis of 
the analyses conducted to address alternative explanations, it can therefore be concluded that 
high-pathology participants did not have an implicit preference for either desserts (high-fat), or 
vegetables (low-fat). 
 
7.2. EXPLICIT FOOD ATTITUDES 
 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted using a 2 x 2 design (depletion condition x 
pathology group) to assess differences in self-reported hunger. The interaction was not 
significant, F(1,25)=.063, p=.804, nor was there a main effect of group, F(1,25)=.024, p=.879, 
which suggests that there were no differences in hunger between groups or between trials 
which could have affected the explicit food ratings. The depletion x group interaction was also 
not significant in the assessment of time since last meal, F(1,26)=.026, p=.872. The main effect 
of group was also not significant, F(1,26)=.579, p=.453, which suggests that high- and low-
pathology participants did not differ in the amount of time since their last food intake. There 
were no significant correlations between EDE-Q-Restraint scores and hunger in either the 
cookie condition, r=–.055, radish condition, r=.061. Similarly, no differences were found in the 
time since last meal in the cookie, r=–.055, or radish, r=.018, conditions (all p values >.1). 
Average ratings of desserts and vegetables were calculated for each participant. 
Participants in the overall sample rated desserts (M=4.163) as better tasting than vegetables 
(M=2.973), t(26)=-5.319, p<.000. A food x pathology group interaction assessed using a 143 
 
repeated-measures ANOVA was not significant, F(1,25)=.000, p=.996. As expected, there was a 
significant main effect of food, F(1,25)=27.166, p=.000; however, there was no effect of 
pathology group, F(1,25)=.383, p=.542. This suggests that participants in both the high-
pathology and the low-pathology groups explicitly reported a preference for the taste of 
desserts compared to vegetables. To confirm the hedonic experience of this distinction, 
cravings for cookies and radishes (reported on the HCS at the end of each session) were 
compared. Consistent with explicit ratings, participants reported craving cookies more than 
radishes across all trials: t(27)=3.06, p=.005. A repeated-measures ANOVA of craving x 
pathology found a main effect of craving, F(1,26)=9.114, p=.006 (cravings were higher for 
cookies, M=5.00, than radishes, M=3.5), but no main effect of group, F(1,26)=233.32, p=.258. 
The craving x group interaction was not significant, F(1,26)=.186, p=.670, η2
p=.007, which 
suggests that there was no significant difference in the pattern of food craving between those 
with high or low pathology. High- and low-restraint participants similarly did not differ in their 
explicit ratings of either desserts, F(1,25)=.005, p=.945, or vegetables, F(1,25)=.000, p=.983. 
Ambivalence ratings were calculated using the unipolar attitude scales from the EFAQ. 
Positive (P) and Negative (N) ratings were used to calculate ambivalence using a formula 
adapted from Thompson, Zanna and Griffin (1995): [(P+N)/2] – |P–N| + 3.5 (the adjustments 
reflect that fact that a 5-point, rather than a 7-point, scale was used). A higher ambivalence 
score therefore indicates greater attitude intensity on both the positive and negative scale. 
Post-hoc tests using a Bonferroni correction5 were conducted following a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Global EDE-Q as the independent variable and vegetable and dessert ratings and 
ambivalence as the outcome variable. The tests revealed that high- and low-pathology groups 
did not differ in their ambivalence towards vegetables, F(1,25)=.000, p=.991, η2
p<.000. 
However, high-pathology participants were significantly more ambivalent towards desserts 
(M=5.09) compared to low-pathology participants (M=3.69), F(1,25)=5.41, p=.028, η2
p=.178. 
                                                             
5 Bonferroni corrections were used in all post-hoc analyses here and in subsequent studies, unless 
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This difference in dessert ambivalence was specifically qualified by enhanced negative 
attitudes, rather than enhanced positive ones: high-pathology participants had significantly 
stronger negative attitudes towards desserts (M=2.87) compared to low-pathology participants 
(M=1.90), F(1,25)=5.89, p=.023, η2
p=.191. At the same time, the groups did not differ in the 
strength of their positive attitudes towards desserts, F(1,25)=1.709, p=.203. 
The results therefore suggest an inconsistency between implicit and explicit food 
attitudes in the high-pathology group. Low-pathology participants held positive implicit 
associations with desserts and, consistently reported a stronger explicit liking for their taste 
compared to vegetables. By contrast, high-pathology participants reported a similar explicit 
preference for the taste of desserts, but this preference was not reflected on an implicit level. 
High-pathology participants did, however, express stronger explicit ambivalence towards 
desserts than vegetables. 
 
7.3. EGO DEPLETION 
 
Hypothesis 3 was designed to assess the effects of ego depletion between the restraint 
and the pathology groups. Ego depletion was assessed using perseverance time (in seconds) on 
the puzzle task. A repeated-measures condition x pathology group ANOVA interaction was 
carried out and was found to be significant, F(1,26)=6.625, p=.016, η2
p=.203. A main effect of 
condition was found, F(1,26)=5.081, p=.033, η2
p=.163, but in the opposite direction to the one 
hypothesised: participants persevered significantly longer in the depletion (cookie) condition 
(M=611) compared to the control (radish) condition (M=460), F(1,26)=5.081, p=.033. However, 
there was no significant effect of pathology group, F(1,26)=1.144, p=.295, indicating that puzzle 
task perseverance was not different between high-pathology and low-pathology participants.   
These analyses were repeated using the restraint groups in order to directly assess the 
hypothesised effects of chronically elevated restriction/restraint and ego depletion. A repeated-
measures condition x restraint group ANOVA interaction was carried out and was not found to 145 
 
be significant, F(1,26)=2.465, p=.129. A main effect of condition was found, F(1,26)=5.726, 
p=.024; however, this effect was again in the opposite direction to the one hypothesised: 
participants persevered on the puzzle for longer in the cookie condition (M=638) compared to 
the radish condition (M=462).  
A significant correlation between overall cookie and radish condition puzzle times was 
found, r=.410, p=.030, which suggests that puzzle performance was associated with individual 
ability, regardless of pathology. A linear regression predicting puzzle time from EDE-Q-Restraint 
scores in the cookie condition was found to be marginally significant, β=–.342, p=.075. This 
suggests that higher levels of restraint were associated with lower perseverance times. The 
identical regression for the radish condition was not significant, β=–.147, p=.454, which is also 
consistent with the hypothesis. 
The results of the interaction analyses indicated that puzzle times were greater in the 
cookie (depletion) condition, than in the radish (control) condition. This suggests that the ego 
depletion procedure used in the present study may not have correctly induced an effect of ego 
depletion, as this would have led to the opposite pattern of results. Further analyses were 
therefore conducted to assess the methodological validity of the ego depletion procedure. A 
paired-samples t-test did not find a significant difference in puzzle perseverance between the 
cookie and the radish trial, t(28)=1.625, p=.115, d=.614. This suggests that the ego depletion 
task (resisting the cookies placed nearby) had failed to induce ego depletion in the participants. 
This explanation was further supported by a contrast of self-reported cookie craving in the 
cookie (ego depletion) versus radish (control) condition. No differences in craving were found 
between conditions, t(27)=.250, p=.805, d=.096, which suggests that participants were simply 
not tempted to eat the cookies in the depletion condition. 
A significant difference in perseverance was also found between session 1 and session 2 
using a paired-samples t-test. Participants persevered significantly longer in the first session 
(M=659) compared to the second (M=416), t(28)=3.73, p=.001, d=1.410, even though the order 
of sessions (cookies or radishes) was counterbalanced across participants. Order effects may 146 
 
therefore have masked the group x condition interaction. Scores on the PPPQ and the UPPS-P 
were also not significant as covariates in puzzle task performance; F(1,24)=.447, p=.510 and 
F(1,24)=.102, p=.753, respectively. 
 
8. Discussion 
 
8.1. RESULTS OVERVIEW 
 
The purpose of the present study was to assess preliminary evidence in support of the 
possibility that implicit food attitudes could affect eating behaviour through ego depletion. It 
was hypothesised that positive implicit attitudes towards high-fat food would be unaffected by 
individual differences in ED pathology. Such positive associations may partially explain 
impulsive eating following periods of dietary restraint. In contrast to previous research, the 
current study specifically assessed implicit associations between food and palatability. 
Participants were also assigned to groups on the basis of overall ED symptomatology, rather 
than, for example, dietary restraint or overweight. Regressions and correlational analyses were 
also conducted to examine relationships between eating disorder pathology (measured by EDE-
Q Global), restraint/restriction (measured using the EDE-Q Restraint subscale) and implicit and 
explicit associations with desserts and vegetables. 
Hypothesis 1 was not confirmed; although low-pathology participants had stronger 
positive associations with desserts than vegetables, such a preference was absent in high-
pathology participants. Post-hoc analyses suggest that this finding cannot be attributed to 
either faking or implicit ambivalence in the high-pathology group. A similar pattern was found 
for participants scoring high on the EDE-Q-Restraint subscale. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 was 
supported: no group differences in implicit food attitudes were found, despite the results of the 
one-sample t-tests conducted for each group’s IAT-D values. Finally, Hypothesis 3 was designed 
to assess group differences in ego depletion susceptibility as a consequence of dietary restraint. 147 
 
Regression analyses indicated that restriction/restraint as assessed using the EDE-Q-R was a 
significant predictor of puzzle time perseverance in the cookie, but not in the radish, condition. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 3 and supports the assertion that people chronically engaged 
in restriction/restraint may also be in a state of chronic ego depletion as a result. A significant 
condition x pathology group interaction was also found; however, the effect of condition was in 
the opposite direction to the one hypothesised. Further analyses indicated that the ego 
depletion procedure failed to induce a state of ego depletion, which rendered further analyses 
of the data impossible. Significant order effects were found despite counterbalancing the 
conditions between participants; in that participants were significantly less likely to persevere 
in session 2, regardless of the type of food present. This may be due to the unsolvable nature of 
the task, which some of the participants may have worked out during their first session. If 
significant differences in ego depletion were present between groups, these were most likely 
masked by the order effects. However, analyses of participants’ cravings in each condition also 
suggest that participants did not find the cookies significantly more tempting than radishes, 
which means that they were unlikely to exert more self-control in the depletion condition 
compared to the control condition. Because the ego depletion procedure was unsuccessful, 
further analyses of the role of additional variables (persistence, perseveration and 
perfectionism) in ego depletion was not possible. 
Self-reported food attitudes revealed participants' overall preference for the taste of 
desserts compared to vegetables. This preference was not different between high-pathology 
and low-pathology participants. However, high-pathology participants reported a stronger 
ambivalence towards desserts, which was qualified by a stronger negative attitude compared to 
the low-pathology group. These results suggest that participants who exhibit elevated ED 
symptoms – including, for example, elevated restriction/restraint and/or body dissatisfaction – 
are prone to having a more complex relationship with high-fat foods. While low-pathology 
participants express an unambiguous liking for desserts, those with concerns about their eating 148 
 
or weight develop an additional negative attitude (presumably towards the high-fat foods’ 
fattening/unhealthy properties), but retain the positive one (presumably towards their taste) 
 
8.2. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT FOOD ATTITUDES 
 
Results from the explicit food attitude measures confirm previous research which 
suggests that people have a particular hedonic liking for food which is high in fat and/or sugar 
(Drewnowski & Greenwood, 1983; Drewnowski et al., 1985; Birch, 1999): participants reported 
liking the taste of desserts significantly more than vegetables. This pattern of preferences did 
not appear to be affected by participants’ eating pathology status; the liking of foods higher in 
fat and sugar content was not significantly higher or lower in the high-pathology compared to 
the low-pathology group, nor in the high-restraint versus low-restraint groups. 
However, the two pathology groups did differ significantly in their ambivalence towards 
different food types. Urland and Ito (2005) previously addressed this in a study which found 
that restrained eaters (assessed using the RS)were more ambivalent towards foods high in fat 
or carbohydrates, which was specifically qualified by an increased negative attitude. In the 
present sample, high-pathology participants (high restraint, as well as high body and shape 
concern, and eating concern) were also found to score higher on ambivalence towards desserts. 
High- and low-pathology participants did not differ in their positive attitudes towards desserts, 
but those with elevated pathology had significantly more negative attitudes. This is consistent 
with the goal conflict model of food attitudes, although the present research suggests that it 
applies more broadly than just restrained eating behaviour to pathologies including body 
dissatisfaction and eating concern. These findings suggest that people with elevated ED 
pathology retain their positive attitudes towards certain foods, even when they are inconsistent 
with long-term weight loss goals. Although the current study did not address this directly, the 
findings also suggest that the participants likely have at least a rudimentary understanding of 149 
 
the relationship between the fat and sugar content of food and body mass (Albanes, 1987), 
based on the increased negative associations with fattening foods in the high-pathology group.   
It would appear that the pleasure we derive from foods high in fat or sugar is difficult to 
subvert through other negative qualities of the food, such as its implications for health or 
weight gain. It is worth noting however that despite the fact that participants reported a 
preference for the taste of desserts, they did not report a higher craving for cookies relative to 
radishes. This may be a methodological flaw; perhaps these two options covered an insufficient 
scope of foods to find a difference, or maybe the phrasing of the HSC, which has not been 
validated, made the purpose of the study too transparent and resulted in socially desirable 
responding. 
The findings from the implicit attitude measure are somewhat more complex to 
interpret. Previous findings from non-relative measures such as the EAST and the affective 
priming task suggest that both restrained and unrestrained eaters hold positive implicit 
attitudes towards high-fat, high-calorie food (Roefs et al., 2005; Hoefling & Strack, 2008; Papies 
et al., 2009; Veenstra & de Jong, 2010). However, it is worth noting that these studies used 
either the RS or the TFEQ to classify participants as “restrained” or “unrestrained”. To some 
extent these results were replicated with regards to a broader spectrum of ED symptoms: no 
significant differences were found between high- and low-pathology participants. However, 
analyses of implicit attitudes within each group suggest that while low-pathology participants 
held a preference for desserts relative to vegetables, such a preference was absent in those 
with elevated pathology levels. Echoing the findings in discrepant self-esteem from Study 1, 
these results suggest that people with elevated ED symptoms may be experiencing a 
discrepancy between their explicit attitudes and automatic associations with high-fat foods. The 
consequences of this are not clear from the present study. However, they are consistent with 
research in implicit attitude change, which suggests that automatic associations can be changed 
using conditioning paradigms (Olson & Fazio, 2001; Baccus et al., 2004). Based on the current 
findings, it could be hypothesised that a lack of implicit preference for desserts in the high-150 
 
pathology sample could be attributed to the effects of classical conditioning. People with 
elevated ED symptoms (including body dissatisfaction and dietary restraint) are likely to change 
how they think about and behave towards food, or the types of cues they attend to; for 
example, while fast food may have had the primary connotation of “tasty” prior to restraint, its 
fattening or unhealthy qualities are likely to become more salient once the weight loss goal is 
activated. These changes could potentially affect automatic association patterns. However, this 
hypothesis would require a longitudinal study design. 
It is worth noting that the present findings appear inconsistent with the two other 
studies which have assessed implicit attitudes towards food using the IAT. However, the 
apparent differences can be accounted for by differences in methodology and sampling. Maison 
et al. (2001) found more positive associations with low-calorie compared to high-calorie foods 
in a non-clinical participant sample. However, the associations assessed were global 
(positive/negative); the result pattern could therefore reflect interference between different 
associative processes (e.g., tasty, good – fattening, bad). This is different from the present 
study, which assessed specific associations with palatability only. Similarly, Roefs and Jansen 
(2002) found a negative association with low-fat, compared to high-fat foods, but this research 
was conducted in an overweight participant sample. The present study was conducted in a 
healthy weight sample, and was designed to assess associations with palatability because, 
arguably, it is the hedonic associations with food, and the anticipation of a hedonic reward, 
which have the potential to drive impulsive eating behaviour. 
Findings from the implicit attitude measure do not overall support the hypothesised role 
of ego depletion in elevated ED pathology. Contrary to expectations, high-pathology 
participants did not have stronger associations with high-fat compared to low-fat food. If 
impulsive behaviour in a state of ego depletion is motivated by implicit, rather than explicit, 
attitudes, then the current findings would suggest that implicit associations with food may 
actually be conducive rather than damaging, to the weight loss goal. A person who does not 
hold a strong implicit preference for high-fat food might be less likely to eat it impulsively in a 151 
 
state of ego depletion. Further research comparing actual food choices in a state of depletion in 
high- and low-pathology participants would be necessary to confirm or reject this hypothesis.  
 
8.3. THE EGO DEPLETION PROCEDURE 
 
The analyses of the ego depletion procedure (self-reported experiences of the radish and 
cookie conditions) and performance on the subsequent puzzle task suggest that the 
methodology used failed to induce ego depletion in the participants. There are several reasons 
why this might be the case. First of all, participants persevered for significantly longer in the 
first session compared to the second session. This suggests that perseverance in the second 
session was motivated by something other than the experimental condition. Some participants 
informally reported having figured out that the task was unsolvable, or simply being 
demotivated by their failure to solve a similar puzzle in the first session. Of course, it is possible 
that ego depletion did occur, but was masked by other interfering variables. However, analyses 
of cookie cravings between conditions suggest that participants were simply not tempted to eat 
the cookies, which would have been necessary to exert self-control. 
Second, the stimuli could have been at fault. Perhaps the cookies used were simply not 
appetising enough, or not to the liking of the participants, or just not appealing to those 
without much of a sweet tooth. Finally, some elements of the procedure could have been 
flawed. For example, the experimenter was in the room with the participants at the time of 
data collection. The feeling of surveillance could have diminished the self-control needed to 
resist eating the cookies. The questionnaires may have also been too much of a distraction. 
Although it was assumed that participants would be at least peripherally aware of the nearby 
plate of (appetising, presumably) cookies, the questionnaires may have been too engrossing. 
This design was initially adopted because it was not desirable to include a taste test element to 
the procedure and not having any distractions during the ego depletion procedure (e.g., being 
left alone with the cookies for a short time) would have likely seemed conspicuous. 152 
 
Additionally, most people, when left alone, would likely entertain themselves with a 
smartphone, rather than solemnly contemplate the tempting cookies in front of them. The lack 
of a taste test is also a key difference between the procedure used and the design of the 
original Baumeister et al. (1998) study. Perhaps the act of eating an unpleasant food within 
reach of a forbidden pleasant food is integral to inducing a state of ego depletion. 
In light of these problems which could have affected the outcome of Study 2, a second 
version of the ego depletion procedure was designed and piloted and is described below. The 
intention was to solve the key issues identified, but keep the design suitable for clinical 
research. This meant a) retaining the repeated-measures design, and b) circumventing the 
original taste test procedure.  
 
8.4. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
 
Although the current study used a pilot survey to design the stimulus set for both the 
explicit and implicit food attitude assessments, ideally the stimuli should have been tailored to 
the tastes and preferences of each individual participant. This would have allowed for better 
ecological validity as it would have reflected personal eating habits of each participant. Second, 
the stimuli selected consisted of the most hedonically pleasant desserts and the most 
hedonically unpleasant vegetables. This decision was made with the intention of assessing 
attitudes towards foods which are likely or unlikely to motivate impulsive eating when seeking a 
hedonic reward. However, it also may not adequately reflect real-world decisions if people 
prefer to indulge in foods they like, even when engaging in dietary restraint. This would suggest 
that hedonically pleasant desserts should have been compared with hedonically pleasant 
vegetables. On the other hand, some studies suggest that people associate healthiness with 
unpleasantness (Raghunathan, Naylor, & Hoyer, 2006) and that many restrained eaters have a 
tendency to follow strict diets which ban their favourite foods (Kayman, Bruvold, & Stern, 153 
 
1990). Nevertheless, this limitation was corrected in Study 3 and did not appear to have a 
significant effect on the measure outcome. 
The main limitation of the study was that the ego depletion task failed to induce a state 
of ego depletion in the participants. To address this, a second version of the ego depletion 
procedure was designed with reference to the potential problems and piloted. It is worth 
noting that the findings from the ego depletion trial cannot be reasonably used to argue against 
ego depletion as a recognised phenomenon. Ego depletion has been extensively studied and 
replicated, while the design used here (adapted for ethical reasons linked to planned testing in 
a clinical population) had flaws, which were supported empirically. 
Further research is needed to clarify the findings of the present study. The results 
suggest that people with elevated, though subclinical ED pathology may not hold positive 
implicit associations with high-fat food, relative to low-fat food. Further research is needed to 
clarify whether this difference reflects individual differences in cognition, or if the associations 
change as a consequence of body dissatisfaction or restrained eating behaviour. Study 4 was 
designed to address these questions. Findings from a clinical population are also necessary to 
determine whether the pattern continues consistently with the severity of pathology. Although 
there are some relevant findings in a mixed AN/EDNOS sample (Roefs et al., 2005), more 
research is needed in BN, as it is unclear whether implicit attitudes play a role in the relatively 
extreme binge/purge cycle seen in this disorder. 
 
9. Version 2 of the Ego Depletion Procedure 
 
Some of the limitations of the ego depletion design used in Study 2 were addressed by 
designing a new version of the procedure, with reference to the possible problems which were 
identified. However, the aim was still to design a procedure which would be suitable for use in a 
clinical setting (retaining the repeated-measure procedure for use in a small participant sample, 
and not requiring any taste tests as part of the measure). The preliminary study described 154 
 
below was intended as a small-scale pilot to ascertain the feasibility of the new procedure, with 
the intention of expanding to a full-scale study if the results appeared promising. The following 
key changes were made to the procedure used in Study 2: 
 
a)  Experimenter presence.  The experimenter was no longer present in the room during 
the first part of the ego depletion procedure (the induction of ego depletion) to 
remove any external influence on self-restraint. 
b)  Increased focus on the food. Participants in Study 2 may have been too distracted by 
the questionnaires to fully focus (and therefore be tempted by) the cookies in the 
depletion condition. An alternative paradigm was therefore adopted. Participants were 
presented with the food and asked to fill out a “sensory perceptions questionnaire”, in 
which they were asked to report their impressions of the non-taste properties of the 
food, such as its appearance, smell and texture. 
c)  Increased variety of food. In the depletion condition, participants were given five bowls 
of diverse dessert-type foods (cookies, brownies, shortbread, etc.). In the control 
condition, the bowls contained various vegetables (radish, cabbage, celery, etc.). The 
aim of this change was to account for the fact that some participants may not have 
found the cookies tempting. 
d)  Alternative ego depletion measurement. In Study 2, participants’ ego depletion was 
assessed using their perseverance on an unsolvable puzzle task. This was problematic 
as participants persevered significantly less in the second session, possibly due to 
feelings of demoralisation or boredom because participants realised that the task was 
unsolvable. The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used instead. In this task, participants 
must override the impulse to read the names of colours in favour of saying the colour 
of the font in which they are printed. For example, the word BLUE written in green 
requires the response “green”. 
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9.1. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Twelve female undergraduates took part in the study. Of these, four did not attend the 
second session. The final sample size therefore consisted of eight participants. Demographic 
data was not collected for this pilot study. No control group was included, as the aim was to 
assess the new ego depletion procedure, rather than collect empirical data. 
 
9.2. MATERIALS 
 
Sensory perceptions questionnaire. The questionnaire contained qualitative dummy 
questions pertaining to the appeal of the different foods (e.g., “Please comment on the visual 
appearance of [this] food”, “Does the food smell more artificially-scented or natural?”) which 
were irrelevant to the study. The questionnaire also included 5-point Likert scales of food liking, 
including a) visual appeal, b) appeal of smell, and c) desire to consume. These ratings (15 in 
total; three for each of the five foods) were averaged for each participant to derive an overall 
“appeal” score. 
Stroop task. The Stroop task used consisted of 96 colour words (red, blue, green, orange, 
purple and yellow) printed in incongruent colours. Errors were recorded, as well as completion 
time (in seconds).  
 
9.3. PROCEDURE 
 
Participants attended two sessions, approximately one week apart. Each session lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. The study was framed as research on the sensory perceptions of 
food “in the absence of the ability to taste”. Participants were therefore instructed to not taste 
any of the food, as this would ostensibly interfere with the data. Participants were left alone for 
10 minutes to complete the sensory perceptions questionnaire. Most did not complete it in its 
entirety; however, given its purpose (to ensure the participant is focusing on the food) this was 156 
 
not necessarily problematic. However, it did mean that the number of appeal ratings made was 
not uniform across all participants. After the questionnaire phase, participants completed the 
Stroop task. Participants read their responses aloud while the experimenter marked down their 
answers. The procedure was identical in session 2, only with a different assortment of food, and 
condition order was counterbalanced between participants. At the end of the second session 
participants were debriefed as to the true nature of the study, thanked and remunerated £3. 
Participants who did not attend the second session were debriefed via email. 
 
9.4. RESULTS 
 
Independent-sample t-test analyses of appeal ratings suggested that participants found 
the desserts (M=3.45) more appealing than the vegetables (M=2.50), t(7)=6.778, p=.000, 
d=5.123. This is more consistent with previous studies than the results of Study 2, in which 
participants did not report craving cookies any more in the depletion condition than in the 
control condition. 
Only completion time data was used in Stroop analyses, as participants made very few 
errors. No differences were found in performance between the first and second session using a 
paired-samples t-test, t(7)=.640, p=.543, d=.048, in comparison to study 2, which showed 
significant order effects. However, the key ANOVA of Stroop performance between conditions 
was not significant. Participants did not perform any faster in the vegetable condition (M=100) 
than in the dessert condition (M=93), t(7)=–1.440, p=.193, d=.478. 
 
9.5. DISCUSSION 
 
The second ego depletion pilot was marginally more successful than the procedure used 
in Study 2: participants found the larger selection of food more tempting, and the Stroop task 
was not susceptible to order effects in contrast to the puzzle task. This suggests that the Stroop 157 
 
may be more suitable for ego depletion studies with a repeated-measure design. Nevertheless, 
this version of the procedure also failed to induce ego depletion in participants. 
Some participant feedback collected informally during the debrief procedure suggests 
that some participants simply do not find sweet foods very appealing. A greater variety of 
sweet and savoury food during the ego depletion phase could therefore increase the 
temptation to eat. It is also worth noting that self-restraint in the study was also externally 
imposed; participants would not eat the food on instruction from the experimenter, but were 
still free to indulge in anything they liked as soon as the study was finished. This is qualitatively 
different from the kind of chronic restraint exercised by those with eating disorders, or people 
with elevated ED pathology. However, the same can be said of other ego depletion studies 
which have used dietary restraint as a paradigm. The key difference appears to be the 
consumption of bland food when much more tempting food is available.  However, using “taste 
test” paradigms in clinical ED samples may lead to difficulties in recruiting participants. 
An alternative explanation for the results is that the Stroop task was insufficiently long or 
complex in order to detect the effects of ego depletion. Ego depletion studies which have used 
the Stroop task typically use around 150 words (Inzlicht, McKay, & Aronson, 2006; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2003; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002), which is somewhat more than the 96 used in the 
present study. However, the effect has been successfully replicated with as few as 50 (Job, 
Dweck, & Walton, 2010). The measure can also be made more complex e.g. by including a) 
more words and b) greater complexity. To achieve the latter, Job et al. (2010) interspersed 
incongruent words (i.e., font colour different from word) in their Stroop task with congruent 
words (i.e., font colour the same as word). 
Although the second version of the ego depletion procedure removed some of the 
methodological issues of the procedure used in Study 2, it was still not sufficient to induce, or 
detect, the effects of ego depletion in the participants. At this stage practical constraints did not 
lend themselves to further adapting the methodology. Instead, Study 3 was focused on what is 158 
 
arguably the mediating step between ego depletion and impulsive eating (or dietary restraint 
failure): automatic approach and avoidance. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
Results of Study 2 suggest that non-clinical participants with elevated ED symptoms 
explicitly prefer the taste of high-fat, high-sugar foods compared to low-fat, low-sugar ones. 
However, this preference was not found on an implicit level within the high-pathology group, 
and regression analyses did not support an association between pathology levels and implicit 
food attitudes The results of the study therefore do not support the hypothesis that positive 
implicit associations with high-fat food could play a role in dietary restraint failure via ego 
depletion. 
Results from explicit food assessment suggest that high-pathology participants hold 
positive associations with high-fat food on an explicit level, despite an absence of such a 
preference on an implicit level. Similar to the results of Study 1, there appears to be a 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitudes in participants with elevated ED pathology. 
Explicit food attitudes in this group were also marked by greater ambivalence. 
Analysis of the ego depletion procedure suggested methodological flaws, which could 
not be rectified in a second version piloted in a small sample of participants. Although the 
results of the study were not sufficient to reject the hypothesis that positive implicit food 
attitudes contribute to impulsive eating behaviour in a state of ego depletion, the findings from 
the implicit measure are not consistent with the paradigm proposed. Study 3 was designed to 
address some of the methodological issues of the present study. 
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CHAPTER V 
Study 3: Implicit attitudes towards food and dietary restraint success 
 
Study 2 was designed to investigate the potential role of implicit food attitudes in 
disordered eating behaviour. People with elevated ED pathology (and indeed those with clinical 
eating disorders) commonly (and often unsuccessfully) attempt to modify their eating 
behaviour with the intention of weight loss (Franz et al., 2007). The low-success rate of 
attempted weight loss suggests that people are not able to regulate their eating behaviour 
effectively. In Study 2 it was hypothesised that this failure in self-regulation could be partially 
attributed to the role of positive implicit associations with high-fat foods, and the diminished 
self-control capacity in a state of ego depletion. Consistent with this hypothesis, no significant 
differences were found between high- and low-pathology participants. Unfortunately the ego 
depletion procedure used did not induce a state of ego depletion in the participants and the 
results were not able to either support or reject the paradigm. 
  The current study was designed to take an alternative approach to the questions raised 
in Study 2. Although the current study does not include a measure of ego depletion, it was 
designed to assess the implied behavioural outcomes of positive implicit associations with high-
fat food in a state of ego depletion: automatic approach or avoidance tendencies towards food. 
If people do indeed act on implicit food attitudes when their self-control capacity is diminished, 
we might expect those with elevated restraint to have stronger impulses to approach high-fat 
food (and/or avoid low-fat food) when the higher-order diet goal cannot override them. If such 
tendencies exist, it may help explain why dietary restraint frequently fails: namely, dietary 
restraint contributed to diminished self-control capacity, which increases automatic approach 160 
 
tendencies towards high-fat food, which then leads to an increased probability of restraint 
failure. 
Because this paradigm is focused on specifically eating behaviour, Study 3 focused 
specifically on people with elevated restraint, rather than elevated ED pathology in general. 
This chapter will introduce automatic approach and avoidance, its role in dietary restraint and 
methodological approaches to its measurement, followed by Study 3, which will assess 
differences in implicit attitudes and the (hypothesised) differences in automatic approach and 
avoidance tendencies towards high-fat and low-fat foods between restrained and unrestrained 
eaters. 
 
1. Automatic approach and avoidance 
 
Automatic approach and avoidance play a fundamental role in species’ survival. Zajonc 
(1984) has argued that the ability to translate perception (e.g., presence of predator) into 
activation of the sensorimotor system (e.g., flight), without the “stop-over” for meaningful 
encoding is vitally necessarily for effective functioning in an environment. Approach and 
avoidance can be conceptualised as a behavioural expression of attitudes (Elliot & Covington, 
2001): positive stimuli elicit physiological approach readiness, while unpleasant ones elicit 
preparedness for withdrawal. Behaviourally, this manifests as the decreasing or increasing 
distance between oneself and a (respectively) pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (Krieglmeyer, 
Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010). For example, people are faster to pull a lever towards 
a positive or pleasant stimulus and away from a negative or unpleasant stimulus than the other 
way around (Solarz, 1960; Chen & Bargh, 1999). Elliot and Covington (2001) define the 
distinction between approach and avoidance in terms of valence: approaching the positive and 
avoiding the negative. 
Similarly to attitudes, approach and avoidance behaviour can be either automatic or 
controlled. Positive or desirable stimuli will automatically evoke a positive implicit attitude and 161 
 
subsequently a behavioural approach tendency. However, this tendency can be overridden by a 
conflicting goal. Elliot and Covington (2001) give the example of an approach tendency for 
chocolate cake being overridden by the deliberate activation of a “lose 15 pounds” goal (p.80). 
Empirical evidence suggests that approach and avoidance tendencies can indeed be activated 
automatically. In Chapter I the assessment of automaticity was discussed with reference to a) 
goal-independence and b) efficiency. Goal-independence refers to uncontrollability, or people’s 
inability to (effectively) control or fake their responses. Efficiency, on the other hand, refers to a 
low demand on cognitive resources and relatively quick response times. Empirical evidence 
supports both of these qualities in automatic approach and avoidance. Goal-independence has 
been supported by response-compatibility tasks, in which automatic approach and avoidance 
tendencies interfere with the task goal. For example, Rinck and Becker (2007) found that when 
participants are instructed to push or pull a lever depending on whether they see a landscape- 
or a portrait-oriented image, they are slower to “pull” an image containing a spider (an 
unpleasant stimulus) than a neutral image. Approach and avoidance responses also appear to 
be efficient; for instance, approach or avoidance responses in the Chen and Bargh lever pull 
study (1999, Study 2) study were made in under 1,500ms. While this is higher than typical 
response times on implicit attitude measures (for example, participants’ responses on food IAT 
trials in Study 2 were typically <1,000ms), this is consistent with a cognitive response 
precipitating a behavioural one.  
The conceptualisation of automatic approach and avoidance is consistent with dual-
process models. Given the evidence that explicit processes drive rational, conscious behaviour 
and implicit ones drive impulsive, automatic ones, automatic approach and avoidance 
behaviour can be conceptualised as a behavioural expression of implicit attitudes. This 
behavioural extension of dual-process cognition was explicitly included in the Strack and 
Deutsch (2004) reflective-impulsive model, which was specifically designed as a model of 
behavioural determinants. Within the context of this model, implicit attitudes act as precursors 
of automatic behaviour, and explicit ones as precursors of behaviour which is consciously 162 
 
controlled. In the context of the present research, automatic approach and avoidance is 
therefore conceptualised as a behavioural outcome of implicit attitudes. 
 
1.1. MEASURES OF APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE 
 
The joystick task (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 
2007), often referred to as simply the “approach avoidance task” (AAT), is commonly used in 
the assessment of approach and avoidance behaviour. Its design is similar to priming tasks used 
in implicit attitude assessment. Participants are asked to push or pull a joystick based on a 
valence-irrelevant feature of the stimulus (picture orientation or frame colour). A behavioural 
response consistent with the correct response would be expected to facilitate response time. 
Conversely, an inconsistent behavioural response would inhibit it. For example, if a person is 
instructed to “push away” landscape-oriented photos and “pull” portrait-oriented photos, they 
may perform quicker when “pushing” a landscape picture of a spider than when “pushing” a 
landscape picture of cake. In this example, an automatic avoidance tendency for spiders would 
facilitate the correct “push away” response. 
One of the criticisms of the AAT is the interpretation of the movements made by the 
participants. Studies typically instruct participants to push the joystick to indicate avoidance 
(“pushing away” the image) or pull the joystick to indicate approach (“pulling” the image 
towards them). However, the movements could also be interpreted in a different way. Pushing 
the joystick could indicate approach if interpreted as “reaching towards” the image and pulling 
it as “pulling away” from it, the way one might jerk a hand away from a snake.  
Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson and Strack (2008, Study 3) found evidence to support this 
criticism. When participants were instructed to use a joystick to “push” negative words and 
“pull” positive words (body-reference condition) the response-compatibility effect was seen as 
in the Chen and Bargh (1999) study. However, when the instructions were reversed (“pull 
away” from negative, “push towards” positive), participants adopted an object-reference 163 
 
interpretation; here, they were faster to push positive and pull negative words than vice versa. 
Rinck and Becker (2007, Study 2) also addressed this problem in the context of spider phobia. 
Participants were given object-reference instructions to “pull away” from spider images and 
“push towards” neutral images. Consistently with Seibt et al.’s (2008) findings, non-spider 
fearful participants could adhere to these instructions. However, spider-fearful participants 
continued to perform faster in the push-negative/pull-positive condition. This suggests that 
while the cognitive interpretation approach and avoidance behaviour is malleable, it may be 
more difficult to override a body-reference response for more salient stimuli. 
Krieglmeyer et al. (2010) suggest that the criticism of movement interpretation can be 
overcome with the “manikin” task. The manikin task, designed by De Houwer (2001) is an 
adaptation of the Affective Simon Task (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998). Participants are instructed 
to press the up or down key on the keyboard to move a “manikin” (figurine) up or down on the 
screen. Stimuli appear in the centre while the manikin is placed at the bottom of the screen, 
creating the illusion of “approaching” or “avoiding”. This removes the need for explicit 
instruction for approach to approach and avoidance response labels and creates and 
unambiguous visual representation of the response made. Participants’ responses result in 
either increasing or decreasing the distance between the manikin and the stimulus – this is 
consistent with the motivational conceptualisation of approach and avoidance as a behavioural 
response to stimulus valence. Krieglmeyer et al (2010) have demonstrated empirically that 
participants’ responses on the manikin task were facilitated by compatible responses (i.e., 
moving the manikin towards positive stimuli and away from the negative) and inhibited by the 
incompatible (i.e., away from the positive and towards the negative). This effect was still 
present when stimulus valence was task-irrelevant, which suggests that the manikin task is an 
effective measure of automatic approach and avoidance.  
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1.2. APPROACH/AVOIDANCE IN EATING DISORDERS AND IN 
RESTRAINED EATING 
 
In the context of the present research, automatic approach and avoidance is relevant to 
understanding dietary restraint failure, which frequently manifests as disinhibition 
(Westenhoefer et al., 1994; Stunkard & Messick, 1985). Impulsivity and impulsive eating 
behaviour are the common catalysts of disinhibition, and are prevalent in both restrained 
eaters (Nederkoorn et al., 2004) and in those with bulimic symptoms (Claes et al., 2006). 
However, implicit food associations and impulsivity, as it might be expected, do not appear to 
play the same role in AN. Veenstra and de Jong (2011) found that healthy controls had stronger 
automatic approach tendencies towards high-fat than neutral stimuli, but no difference in their 
approach towards low fat and neutral stimuli. However, participants with AN did not show this 
stronger approach towards high fat foods. Furthermore, BMI was negatively correlated with the 
tendency for automatic approach towards high-fat food in the clinical sample. Explicitly, 
participants with AN also reported less craving for high-fat foods compared to controls. These 
results suggest that people with AN (especially those with lower weights) may not experience 
automatic approach tendencies towards food, which could contribute to the maintenance of 
low body weight. These results are consistent with Roefs et al.’s (2005) research in implicit food 
attitudes in AN, which suggests that people with AN do not have an implicit preference for high-
fat, compared to low-fat food. It could therefore be hypothesised that people with AN do not 
have positive implicit associations with high-fat foods, which inhibits automatic approach 
tendencies towards these foods, and reduces the probability of disinhibited eating and dietary 
restraint failure. 
In  people engaging in dietary restraint (either via elevated restraint, caloric restriction, 
or dieting – as all three qualify as acts of self control), we might expect a pattern opposite to 
the one observed in AN: 1) restrained eaters hold positive implicit associations with high-fat 
foods; 2) dietary restraint results in a state of ego depletion, which 3) increases automatic 
approach tendencies towards these foods and ultimately 4) results in restraint failure. The 165 
 
empirical findings to support this model have been somewhat mixed. Study 2 did not find 
differences in implicit food attitudes between high-pathology and low-pathology participants, 
which supports the first aspect of the model: both groups held similarly positive attitudes 
towards high-fat foods. Veenstra and de Jong (2010) assessed automatic approach tendencies 
for high-fat and low-fat food in restrained and unrestrained eaters using the manikin version of 
the Affective Simon Task. Restrained eaters had enhanced approach tendencies towards both 
high- and low-fat foods, compared to the unrestrained – which is also consistent with the 
model proposed above. Seibt, Häfner and Deutsch (2007) also assessed approach and 
avoidance tendencies towards food in a clinical (mixed BN/AN) group and in healthy controls. 
Both groups were faster to approach than to avoid food stimuli; however, both groups were 
also faster to approach food if they were hungry (tested before lunch) than if they were 
satiated (tested after lunch). This suggests that hunger could enhance automatic approach 
tendencies towards food.  
Fishbach and Shah (2006, Study 2) found a somewhat conflicting result pattern using a 
joystick design in which restrained and unrestrained eaters approached and avoided “food” 
stimuli or “fitness” stimuli. Restrained eaters were faster to avoid (push) food words than 
fitness words compared to the unrestrained. However, it must be noted that the study assessed 
approach and avoidance tendencies towards food relative to another stimulus, rather than 
contrasting approach and avoidance tendencies for different food types. 
 
2. The present study 
 
Study 3 follows on from the findings of Study 2. Study 2 was designed to assess whether 
differences in implicit food attitudes or in susceptibility to ego depletion were associated with 
elevated ED symptomatology. No differences were found in implicit food attitudes between the 
high-ED and low-ED group – however, participants with elevated ED symptomatology did not 
have an implicit preference for desserts (high fat) compared to vegetables (low fat). The ego 166 
 
depletion procedure did not successfully induce a state of ego depletion, and a further 
adaptation of the methodology was unsuccessful. Study 3 was therefore designed to approach 
the role of implicit food attitudes from a different direction, by assessing implicit food attitudes 
and automatic approach and avoidance tendencies in elevated dietary restriction/restraint (as 
both constitute an act of self-control and can therefore be expected to contribute to ego 
depletion), and specifically in diet failure. However, the hypotheses have remained consistent 
with the role of ego depletion in restraint hypothesised in Study 2.  
 
2.1. RESEARCH AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
  Hypothesis 1. Current dieters will not differ from current non-dieters in their implicit 
attitudes towards high-fat and low-fat foods. This is a replication of Study 2 findings 
within participants who self-identify as “being on a diet”. 
  Hypothesis 2. Current dieters will have stronger approach tendencies for high-fat foods 
compared to current non-dieters. Current dieters (i.e., people who report “dieting” at 
the time of the study) can be expected to be in a state of ego depletion It is 
hypothesised that positive implicit associations with high-fat food will therefore 
enhance automatic approach tendencies towards it, as a consequence of this state. 
This hypothesis also draws on findings by Seibt et al. (2007), which suggest that hunger 
enhances automatic approach tendencies towards high-fat food. 
  Hypothesis 3. Unsuccessful dieters will have more positive implicit attitudes towards 
high-fat food compared to successful dieters. If diet failure is predicated on the 
tendency to engage in impulsive eating behaviour, then stronger positive implicit 
associations with high-fat food should contribute to a stronger tendency for 
disinhibition, and therefore unsuccessful restraint, in a state of ego depletion (i.e., 
following dietary restraint). 167 
 
  Hypothesis 4. Successful dieters will be more likely to automatically approach low-fat 
foods than unsuccessful dieters. As an extension of Hypothesis 3, positive implicit 
attitudes towards high-fat food would be expected to manifest as automatic approach 
and avoidance towards that food type, and vice versa for low-fat food. 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Female participants (N=157) were recruited through a university subject pool. Study 
advertisements stated an interest in participants who either have, or haven’t, been on a “diet” 
within the last year (see Terminology section below). Because this yielded unbalanced group 
recruitment (more non-dieters had responded), the advertisement was subsequently altered to 
recruit current dieters only. Of the participants recruited, 17 were excluded for failing to meet 
minimum accuracy criteria on the IAT; 10 were excluded due to equipment malfunction and a 
further 4 were excluded for failing to follow instructions. The final participant sample therefore 
consisted of 126 women. Sample size calculations using a mean effect size of d=.48 (based on 
the following implicit food attitude studies: Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007; Veenstra & de Jong, 
2010; Veenstra & de Jong, 2011) and a 3 x 2 x 2 (group x stimulus x approach/avoidance) design 
indicated a minimum sample size of N=80, which is below the actual number of participants 
recruited. Mean age in the sample was 23.3 (SD=8.0) and mean BMI 21.2 (SD=3.1). The majority 
of the participants (87%) spoke English as their native language and the remainder were fluent 
in English (have obtained at least a C in GCSE English, or international equivalent, as per 
university admissions requirements). Most (51%) were of UK origin, followed by China (21%). 
Three participants reported an eating disorder diagnosis in the past. Excluding them from 168 
 
analyses did not make any significant differences to the results, and they were therefore 
included in the sample. 
 
Terminology. In contrast to Study 2, the present study assesses cognitive and 
behavioural differences of “dieters” and “non dieters”, rather than “restrained” and 
“unrestrained” eaters. The terminology used throughout this study draws on research by Lowe 
and Timko (2004b) and Ogden (1993) in identifying current dieters and successful/unsuccessful 
dieters, respectively. “Dieting” encompasses aspects of both dietary restriction and cognitive 
restraint – while a restrained eater can be dieting or not dieting, a dieter is, by definition, 
engaging in behaviour and cognitions which they believe will result in weight loss. In the 
context of ego depletion, this is arguably a more naturalistic (and therefore ecologically valid) 
approach, as it allows us to study the outcomes of the “dieting” behaviours in which people 
naturally engage (whatever these may be). “Dieting” is used throughout the section to refer to 
cognitive or behavioural changes associated with self-identifying as a “dieter”: i.e., self-imposed 
changes perceived by the person to contribute to weight loss, including caloric restriction, 
restriction of the types of food consumed, and/or cognitive restraint. The sections below 
explain the recruitment and grouping process in more detail. 
 
Current dieters and non-dieters. In order to address Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
participants were classified on the basis of their dieting status at the time of data collection. 
Participants who responded “yes” to the relevant question on the eating habits questionnaire 
(“Are you currently dieting?”) were classified as current dieters (N=44). Those who responded 
“no” were classified as current non-dieters (N=82). This classification method reflects the one 
used by Lowe and Timko (2004b) to identify people who were “dieters” at the time of data 
collection. Current dieters scored significantly higher, M=2.61 (SD=1.09) on the restraint 
subscale of the EDE-Q compared to current non-dieters, M=1.09 (SD=1.09), t(124)=7.43, p=.000, 
which suggests that the self-reported classification was consistent with self-reported dietary 169 
 
behaviour. The current dieters in this study were therefore more likely to be restrained eaters, 
but cannot be classified as such because group assignment was not done on the basis of the 
EDE-Q-Restraint subscale. 
It must be noted that participant recruitment was specifically targeted towards dieters 
(i.e., by outlining inclusion requirements for each group) to allow for recruitment of sufficient 
participants within each group. For this reason the proportion of dieters and non-dieters cannot 
be considered to be representative of the general population. 
 
Successful and unsuccessful dieters. To address Hypotheses 3 and 4, 
participants were re-classified as successful dieters (N=30), unsuccessful dieters (N=28), and 
non-dieters (N=35). The criteria used in the classification were partially adapted from van 
Strien’s (1997) research in dietary restraint success (see Questionnaires below for more details) 
and Ogden’s (1993) study in successful and unsuccessful dieters. Originally, there had been an 
intention to use the Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire to corroborate self-reported diet 
success/failure (consistently with van Strien’s (1997) study); however this could not be put into 
practice as its inclusion resulted in insufficiently large participant groups for statistical analysis 
(N<10). However, one of the aims of the study was to assess the cognitive consequences of 
naturalistic dieting behaviour, and the small outcome sample size would suggest that this 
selection strategy yields very rare behavioural/cognitive profiles. Because the participant 
sample is already predominantly composed of young, educated, slim women (see Limitations 
section in Chapter VII), this approach was abandoned in favour of self-reported diet status. 
Participants were classified as “successful dieters” if they a) reported having dieted at 
least once in the past 12 months, b) reported dieting skill above the median (on the question 
“How well are you able to sustain a diet?”, on a scale of 1 to 5), and c) must not have reported 
weight gain in the past 6 or 12 months. Criterion (c) was used as an objective corroboration of 
the participants’ self-reported claims. Participants were classified as “unsuccessful dieters” if 
they a) reported having dieted at least once in the past 12 months, b) reported dieting skill 170 
 
below the median, and c) must not have deliberately lost weight in the past 6 or 12 months. 
Participants were classified as “non-dieters” if they reported not having dieted in the past 12 
months. In total, 33 participants were excluded from this portion of the analyses; 22 were 
excluded on the basis of the median split pertaining to dieting skill. The rest (N=11) were 
excluded for failing to satisfy inclusion criteria for any group. It is important to note that, in 
contrast to the “current dieter” and “current non-dieter” classifications, these groups referred 
to trait success as subjectively reported by participants – rather than state diet status at the 
time of data collection. 
In support of the group classification criteria used, a significant main effect of group was 
found on both the Restraint subscale of the EDE-Q, F(2,90)=27.703, p<.000, and on the 
Restraint subscale of the DEBQ, F(2,90)=32.160, p<.000. Multiple comparisons (Scheffe 
correction) indicated that non-dieters scored significantly differently from the successful 
dieters, 95% CIs [-2.33,-1.12], p<.000, and from the unsuccessful dieters, 95% CIs [-2.02, -.77], 
p<.000, on the Restraint scale of the EDE-Q. However, no differences were found between 
successful and unsuccessful dieters, 95% CIs [-.97, .31], p=.447, indicating similar levels of 
restraint in these groups. Similar patterns emerged within the Restraint subscale of the DEBQ. 
This suggests that both dieter groups were more likely to engage in restrained eating behaviour 
than the non-dieters; however, as with Hypotheses 1 and 2, neither of the diet groups can be 
necessarily qualified as “restrained eaters”. 
 
3.2. QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Questionnaire order was randomised within each participant’s set. The set consisted of a 
demographic questionnaire, the EDE-Q, the Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire (van Strien et 
al., 1986) an explicit food attitudes questionnaire (EFAQ, adapted from Study 2), and an eating 
habits questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire, EFAQ and EDE-Q were identical to those 
used in Study 2. Chronbach’s alpha for the EDE-Q in the current sample was α=.906. 171 
 
The DEBQ is designed to assess eating style, or the extent to which eating behaviour is 
emotionally triggered. The questionnaire consists of 33 questions on three sub-scales: 
restrained eating (deliberately limiting food intake with the intention of weight loss), emotional 
eating (eating in response to negative emotional states or mood) and external eating (the 
extent to which eating behaviour is triggered by external cues). The measure has good 
discriminant validity (Wardle, 1987) and internal consistency (Halvarsson & Sjödén, 1998), and 
has been successfully used in the research of dietary restraint failure (van Strien, 1997). An 
analysis of its factor structure yielded a clean, 3-factor solution, which accounted for 87.3% of 
the variance (Wardle, 1987). Chronbach’s alpha ranged between .80 and .95 for the subscales in 
van Strien’s (1986) development and validation analyses. Chronbach’s alpha in the current 
sample was α=.904 for the Restrained Eating subscale, α=.942 for the Emotional subscale, and 
α=.794 for the External. Shapiro-Wilk test was not significant for the DEBQ or EDE-Q, using diet 
group as the independent variable, p=.341 and p=.606, respectively. 
The eating habits questionnaire was adapted from van Strien’s (1997) research in dietary 
restraint success. The questionnaire assessed participants’ current diet status and consisted of 
the following questions: (“Are you currently dieting?”), dieting history (“How often have you 
dieted over the past year?”), subjective diet success (“How well are you able to sustain a diet 
during these times?”), weight over the past 6 and 12 months (weight loss, gain, fluctuation or 
no fluctuation) and whether any changes in weight had been deliberate6. 
 
3.3. IMPLICIT ATTITUDE TEST (IAT) 
 
The IAT used to assess implicit food attitudes was identical to the one used in Study 2. 
However, the stimulus set was adjusted to reflect the new focus on successful and unsuccessful 
dieting. While previously the stimuli used were the more palatable desserts and the less 
palatable vegetables, the stimuli used in Study 3 were the desserts and vegetables the highest 
                                                             
6 See Appendix IV for full questionnaire 172 
 
rated for taste in the pilot questionnaire used in Study 2 stimulus development. All stimuli had a 
minimum 80% familiarity rating in the pilot. The new stimulus set consisted of 6 vegetables 
(broccoli, cucumber, lettuce, radish, brussel sprout, and celery) and 6 desserts (brownie, cookie, 
cake, ice cream, pancake, and cupcake). The reason for the adjustment was to reflect the reality 
of dieting. Weight loss success is dependent on the choice of food made (as not-eating is not a 
viable long term option). Dieters are therefore more likely to face the choice between palatable 
low-fat and palatable high-fat foods. Target stimulus categories did not differ in word length 
t(10)=–1.246, p=.241. However, they did differ significantly in estimated fat content (grams of 
fat per 100g), t(10)=6.08, p=.000 and estimated caloric density (calories per 100g), t(10)=7.484, 
p=.000. The valence stimuli set (tasty/not tasty) was unchanged. The Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality using diet group as the independent variable and IAT-D scores as the dependent 
variable was not significant, p=.647, indicating normal distribution within the IAT for this 
sample. 
 
3.4. APPROACH AVOIDANCE TASK (AAT)   
 
The AAT was adapted from Papies, Barsalou and Custers (2012). The task is a response-
compatibility task using key presses (rather than a joystick) to make responses, following a 
visual illusion of moving towards, or away from, the stimulus. During the task, participants see a 
series of photographs outlined with a border of one of two colours (blue or purple). Participants 
are asked to press an “approach” or “avoid” key on the basis of the outline colour, ostensibly 
ignoring the contents of the photograph: e.g., “approach” key (up arrow) for blue frames and 
“avoidance” key (down arrow) for purple frames. Following an avoidance response, the 
photograph physically shrinks on the screen, simulating moving away from the stimulus. 
Following an approach response, the photograph grows on the screen, simulating approach. 
Automatic approach or avoidance tendencies are assessed on the basis of mean 
response latencies towards a stimulus supposedly “compatible” or “incompatible” with making 173 
 
an approach or avoidance response. For example, pressing an “approach” key in response to a 
picture of a radish would be expected to create more dissonance (and therefore a longer 
response time) than it would in response to a picture of a cake. A participant with stronger 
approach tendencies towards high-fat, than low-fat, food should therefore have longer 
response time latencies when pressing an “avoid” key in response to an image of cake than to 
an image of celery (and vice versa). 
Three sets of 10 stimuli were used: desserts, vegetables and animals (positive, but not 
food-relevant). Food stimuli were adapted from the IAT stimulus set. Two images exemplifying 
each food type were used to reduce any potential effects of each photo’s subjective appeal. 
However, all images were selected to look objectively appealing. The animal images were 
selected for the purpose of post-hoc analyses of approach tendencies towards food stimuli 
versus pleasant non-food stimuli. If no differences are found in approach and avoidance 
tendencies for high-fat and low-fat foods, these can still be contrasted against neutral objects. 
The animal set consisted of rabbits, hamsters, kittens, puppies, and baby seals. As with the food 
stimuli, these images were selected to be objectively appealing. 
Following a 10-picture practice trial using unrelated images, participants completed two 
experimental blocks of the 30 food and animal images presented in a random order (5 animals, 
5 desserts and 5 vegetables, with two exemplars of each stimulus – one exemplar for each 
block). Photograph and border colour combination (blue or purple) was counterbalanced 
between blocks. If participants responded incorrectly or did not make a response within a 
500ms response window, the trial for that particular stimulus was repeated at the end of the 
block until a correct response was made. 
 
3.5. PROCEDURE 
 
Data was collected individually in a private testing cubicle; each session lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. Participants completed one of the computerised measures (either 174 
 
IAT or AAT), followed by the questionnaires and then the second computerised measure (AAT 
or IAT, respectively). The order in which computerised measures were completed was 
counterbalanced within participants. Questionnaire order was also randomised to account for 
the possibility that eating behaviour salience may influence explicit food attitudes, or vice versa. 
Participants were remunerated £3 for participation and debriefed. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
Mean total score on the DEBQ was 2.94 (SD=.61), and mean Global EDE-Q score was 1.89 
(SD=1.20). The DEBQ scores are somewhat higher than the normative score of 2.41 in a sample 
of healthy women studied by van Strien et al. (1986). Scores on the EDE-Q were also slightly 
higher than the mean score of 1.42 obtained in a female participant sample by Mond, Hay, 
Rodgers, Owen and Beumont (2004), but considerably below the clinical mean of 3.09. The two 
measures were significantly correlated, r=.621, p<.000. The elevated levels of pathology are 
most likely the consequence of restrained eater over-representation in the sample. 
Correlation analyses indicated that body mass index (BMI) was positively associated with 
scores on the DEBQ, r=.24, p=.008, and the EDE-Q, r=.29, p=.001. Other correlations between 
BMI, DEBQ, EDE-Q, IAT-D and explicit food taste ratings can be found in Table 3. 
Participants in the overall sample reported a significant explicit preference for the taste 
of desserts, M=3.87 (SD=0.72) compared to the taste of vegetables, M=3.33 (SD=0.57), t(125)= 
–6.22, p=.000. Ambivalence towards desserts was marginally higher, M=2.80 (SD=1.52) than 
towards vegetables, M=2.39 (SD=1.02), t(125)=2.56, p=.010. The IAT-D effect in the overall 
sample (M=.11) was also significantly different from zero, t(124)=2.43, p=.016, which suggests 
that participants had stronger implicit associations in the congruent trial block (dessert-175 
 
tasty/vegetable-not tasty) than in the incongruent trial block (dessert-not tasty/vegetable-
tasty). 
A paired-samples t-test of average approach and avoidance response time latencies 
across all trials suggested that participants were on average faster to approach (M=398) than 
avoid (M=403) stimuli. This pattern of results was true for animal images, t(125)=-2.578, p=.011, 
d=.461, and marginally true for dessert images, t(125)=-1.769, p=.079, d=.316. However, this 
was not the case for images of vegetables, which participants were equally fast to both 
approach (M=400) and avoid (M=402), t(125)=-.766, p=.445, d=.137. 
 
Table 3 
Study 3 Correlations 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
1. BMI  1                 
2. Diet skill  .024  1               
3. IAT-D  .076  -.058  1             
4. Explicit Vegetable taste  -.077  -.150  -.213*  1           
5. Explicit Dessert taste  .085  .132  .126  -.122  1         
6. Vegetable ambivalence  -.027  .095  .168  -.587**  .154  1       
7. Dessert ambivalence  .102  .211*  -.154  -.005  -.164  .061  1     
8. DEBQ total  .235**  .145  -.095  -.141  .035  .046  .221*  1   
9. EDE-Q total  .287**  -.103  -.164  .017  -.121  -.121  .281**  .621**  1 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
BMI = Body Mass Index; IAT-D = Implicit Association Test D; DEBQ = Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire; 
EDE-Q = Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire 176 
 
 
4.2. CURRENT DIETERS VS. CURRENT NON-DIETERS  
 
Current dieters reported higher levels of pathological behaviours and cognitions 
compared to non-dieters. Dieters scored higher on the EDE-Q Global, M=2.71 (SD=1.03), 
compared to non-dieters, M=1.45, (SD=1.05), F(1,124)=41.87, p=.000. Dieters and non-dieters 
did not differ on the External sub-scale of the DEBQ, F(1,124)=.02, p=.849, but dieters scored 
significantly higher (M=3.01) on the Emotional sub-scale, compared to non-dieters (M=2.58), 
F(1,124)=5.54, p=.020. The two groups did not differ in their explicit taste ratings for desserts, 
F(1,124)=1.08, p=.302, or vegetables, F(1,124)=2.16, p=.144. There were also no significant 
differences in ambivalence towards desserts, F(1,124)=1.50, p=.223, or vegetables, 
F(1,124)=1.98, p=.162.  
Univariate analyses of variance indicated that current non-dieters had higher IAT-D 
scores, M=.25 (SD=.46) compared to current dieters, M= –.14 (SD=.49), F(1,123)=19.41, p=.000. 
Post-hoc one-sample t-tests indicated that IAT-D was significantly greater than zero in non-
dieters, t(80)=4.8, p=.000, d=1.073. In current dieters, IAT-D scores were marginally lower than 
zero, t(43)= –1.94, p=.059, d=.591. Overall, these results suggest that current dieters had 
marginally stronger positive implicit attitudes towards vegetables, compared to desserts – in 
contrast to the current non-dieter group, in which the preference was reversed. This is in 
contrast to the results from the explicit food attitudes, which did not differ between the two 
groups. 
A 3 (stimulus) x 2 (approach/avoidance) x 2 (group) interaction was carried out to 
determine approach and avoidance tendencies (i.e., reaction times) between the groups. The 
overall interaction was not significant, F(2,248)=.291, p=.748, n2
p=.004. There was, however, a 
marginally significant main effect of group: current dieters (M=406) were significantly slower to 
make responses overall, compared to current unrestrained eaters (M=399), F(1,124)=3.562, 
p=.061, ηp
2=.028. The main effect of stimulus was also marginally significant, F(2,248)=2.906, 177 
 
p=.057, ηp
2=.025. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that participants were significantly slower to 
respond to desserts (M=403) compared to animals (M=401), 95% CIs [-5.670, -.383], p=.025, 
and marginally slower compared to vegetables (M=401), 95% CIs [-.326, 4.685], p=.088. Current 
dieters were slower to approach desserts (M=407) compared to the current non-dieters 
(M=397), F(1,124)=4.399, p=.040, ηp
2=.034, but no other between-group comparisons were 
significant. 
 
4.3. SUCCESSFUL VS. UNSUCCESSFUL DIETERS VS. NON-DIETERS 
 
A significant main effect of group was found in the univariate ANOVA in both DEBQ and 
EDE-Q scores, F(2,90)=9.47, p=.000 and F(2,90)=17.66, p=.000, respectively. However, post-hoc 
tests found significant differences on the EDE-Q only between the successful dieter and non-
dieter groups, 95% CIs [-2.02, -.74], p<.000, and between the unsuccessful dieter and the non-
dieter group, 95% CIs [-1.87, -.57], p<.000. No differences were found between the successful 
and unsuccessful dieter groups, 95% CIs [-.52, .84], p=.842. An identical pattern of results 
emerged in the post-hoc analysis of the DEBQ. However, simple contrasts of the DEBQ 
subscales found higher scores on the External Eating subscale in the unsuccessful dieter group 
(M=3.47) compared to the successful dieters(M=3.12) 95% CIs [-.68, -.01], p=.042. This suggests 
that unsuccessful dieters were more likely to eat as a consequence of external triggers 
compared to the successful. 
Analyses of variance in explicit food attitudes yielded a significant main effect of group 
for desserts F(2,89)=4.38, p=.015 η2
p=.096, and a marginally significant main effect for 
vegetables, F(2,89)=2.42, p=.095, η2
p=.049. Multiple comparisons of dessert taste ratings 
suggest that the non-dieter group rated the taste of desserts higher, M=4.14 (SD=.12) than the 
successful dieter group, M=3.66 (SD=.13), 95% CIs [.05, .91], p=.026. However, the comparison 
between successful and unsuccessful dieters was non-significant, both for vegetables, 95% CIs [-
.16, .64], p=.339, and desserts, 95% CIs [-.54, .37], p=.900. 178 
 
A significant main effect of group was also found for the IAT-D effect, F(2,89)=5.81, 
p=.004. However, post hoc comparisons suggest that this effect was primarily driven by the 
difference between the unsuccessful dieter and the non-dieter group, 95% CIs [.10, .70], 
p=.005. Descriptively, successful dieters had a stronger implicit preference for desserts 
(M=.043) compared to unsuccessful dieters (M= -.102), but this comparison did not reach 
statistical significance, 95% CIs [–.04, .55], p=.103 (see Figure 2) 
One-sample t-tests indicate that IAT-D values in the non-dieter group were significantly 
different from zero, M=0.297 (SD=.38), t(33)=4.58, p=.000, d=1.594, which suggests stronger 
positive associations with desserts compared to vegetables. However, IAT-D values were not 
different from zero in either the successful or the unsuccessful dieter group. 
 179 
 
Figure 2 
Performance on the Food IAT in Study 3. Non-dieters vs. successful dieters vs. unsuccessful 
dieters. 
 
 
A 3 (stimulus) x 2 (approach/avoidance) x 3 (group) interaction analysis was conducted to 
determine the effects of stimulus on automatic approach and avoidance tendencies. 
Differences between stimulus and approach/avoidance variables were assessed using repeated-
measures analyses; the group variable was between-participants.  This interaction was not 
found to be significant, F(4,180)=1.207, p=.309. The main effect of stimulus was also not 
significant, F(2,180)=2.039, p=.133.  Post-hoc comparisons between groups designed to assess 
specific successful/unsuccessful dieter differences in responding did not yield significant results, 
95% CIs [-13.303, 9.189], p=.717 (LSD pairwise comparison). 
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5. Discussion 
 
The current study was designed to follow on from Study 2. The results of Study 2 were 
ambiguous. Both high-pathology and low-pathology participants reported an explicit preference 
for desserts. Consistent with the explicit preference and with the hypothesis, no group 
differences were found in implicit attitudes towards food. However, high-pathology 
participants, unlike the low-pathology participants, showed no implicit preference for desserts 
compared to vegetables. The ego depletion procedure was also found insufficient to induce a 
state of ego depletion, and these findings therefore could not be discussed in the context of the 
hypothesis that acting impulsively on positive associations with high-fat food in a state of ego 
depletion could play a role in pathological eating behaviour. 
Study 3 was specifically focused on the role of implicit food attitudes in dieters. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were relevant to differences between current dieters (at the time of the 
study) and current non-dieters (at the time of the study). Hypotheses 3 and 4 were focused on 
the potential role of implicit attitudes and automatic approach/avoidance behaviour in diet 
success and failure. The approach and avoidance task was used to assess participants’ 
automatic approach and avoidance tendencies towards high-fat (dessert), low-fat (vegetables) 
and neutral (animals) stimuli. The task was designed to assess automatic approach and 
avoidance tendencies in a context where participants would not be motivated to suppress or 
modify them (Elliot & Covington, 2001), as the food stimuli were not real. 
Similarly to Study 2, the current study was broadly aimed at assessing the hypothesis 
that dieting results in a state of ego depletion, which then leads to impulsive eating behaviour 
(presumably of high-fat foods which are incompatible with the weight loss goal). 
 
5.1. CURRENT DIETERS VS. CURRENT NON-DIETERS 
 
It was hypothesised that, similarly to the high-pathology and low-pathology groups in 
Study 2, no differences would be found in explicit or implicit food attitudes between current 181 
 
dieters and non-dieters. Indeed, both groups explicitly reported a preference for the taste of 
desserts compared to vegetables. However, dieters scored significantly lower on the IAT-D 
compared to non-dieters. This finding does not support Hypothesis 1; dieters, in contrast to 
non-dieters, did not have an implicit preference for desserts. To some extent these findings 
have clarified the results of Study 2. In Study 2, despite no group differences in the IAT-D, high-
pathology participants also did not have an implicit preference for either food type. One 
possibility is that this implicit preference may decrease as a consequence of restriction and/or 
restraint, but not as a consequence of other aspects of ED pathology, such as body 
dissatisfaction. If this is the case, the ambiguous findings of Study 2 could be attributed to the 
fact that not all people in the high-pathology group were necessarily dieting. 
Hypothesis 2 was also not supported. Dieters were slower to make responses on the AAT 
compared to non-dieters – and were specifically slower to approach desserts. However, these 
findings are consistent with the results from the IAT. If dieters do not have an implicit 
preference for desserts, their automatic behaviour would be consistent with this preference; in 
this case, a delayed approach response compared to people who do have such an implicit 
preference. This result is not consistent with findings by Veenstra and de Jong (2010), who 
found enhanced approach tendencies for both high-fat and low-fat food in restrained eaters. 
However, the dieters in the study also had positive implicit attitudes towards high-fat food, so 
their behavioural response was consistent. Results similar to the ones obtained in the present 
study were found by Fishbach and Shah (2006, Study 2), who found that restrained eaters were 
faster to avoid high-fat food stimuli than fitness stimuli.  
It must be noted that the design of the current study was cross sectional. The findings 
suggest the presence of group differences between dieters and non-dieters: namely, 
attenuated implicit preferences and slower automatic approach tendencies for high-fat food in 
dieters. However, these findings are insufficient to conclude that dieting is responsible for these 
changes. A prospective design would be needed to test this hypothesis. The alternative 
explanation is that people with this cognitive profile are a priori more susceptible to engaging in 182 
 
dieting. Results from the DEBQ suggested that dieters are more prone to eat while emotionally 
aroused, which suggests that they may experience greater difficulties in self-control when they 
experience such states. It could also be argued that this finding is consistent with the ego 
depletion hypothesis, as the self-control required for regulating a negative emotional state 
would be unavailable for successful diet control. However, if this were the case we would also 
expect to see differences in susceptibility to external cues for eating, which was not the case in 
the present study. 
Perhaps a connection could also be made to the role of implicit-explicit discrepancy 
discussed in Study 1; dieters explicitly prefer desserts, but do not uphold that preference on an 
implicit level. However, the current understanding of the underlying mechanisms is insufficient 
to speculate how this could be translated into restrained eating behaviour. The alternative, 
however (that restraint causes cognitive changes), can be assessed more easily: by measuring 
implicit food attitudes before and after engaging in dietary restraint. 
 
5.2. SUCCESSFUL VS. UNSUCCESSFUL DIETERS VS. NON-DIETERS 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 addressed the possibility that differences in implicit food attitudes, 
and subsequent automatic approach and avoidance tendencies, could contribute to relative 
success or failure of dieting. If this is the case it could be hypothesised that successful dieters 
would hold implicit food attitudes which can facilitate automatic behaviour: namely, an 
attenuation of the normative preference for high-fat foods. In absence of such a preference, 
the impulse to indulge in high-fat food would hypothetically also be diminished. However, 
neither hypothesis was supported, as no differences in either implicit food attitudes, nor 
automatic approach and avoidance, was found between successful and unsuccessful dieters. 
This suggests that alternative mechanisms are likely to be involved in the dieting success of 
successful dieters. Nevertheless, a possible pattern did emerge: successful dieters had lower 
IAT-D scores than the unrestrained, and unsuccessful dieters descriptively scored even lower 183 
 
than the successful. It could be speculated that implicit food preference may be correlated with 
the subjective experience of dietary restraint difficulty. The causal direction, however, is 
difficult to establish from this cross-sectional finding alone. Further research could address 
whether there are significant differences in implicit food attitudes in childhood, and whether 
these change over time (once the cultural meaning of restraint and weight becomes salient). A 
proportionate decrease in the implicit preference for high-fat foods following an unsuccessful 
restraint attempt would also support the hypothesis that behaviour precipitates the cognitive 
change (rather than vice versa). 
It must also be noted that the unsuccessful dieter group scored higher on the External 
Eating subscale of the DEBQ, suggesting that individuals in this group were more susceptible to 
eating as a consequence of external triggers. Together with the findings from Hypothesis 2, this 
suggests that a) dieters are overall more prone towards emotional eating, and b) dieters who 
are additionally more prone to external eating are more likely to be unsuccessful. This is 
consistent with literature which addresses the role of impulsivity in dietary restraint failure and 
in ED pathology (Welch & Fairburn, 1996; Nederkoorn et al., 2004; Claes et al., 2006; 
Nederkoorn, Smulders, Havermans, Roefs, & Jansen, 2006). However, the finding that 
successful dieters reported liking desserts less than non-dieters also suggests that the elevated 
impulsivity could be a consequence of the subjective experience of temptation, hunger, and/or 
craving. In other words, dieters may be more likely to indulge in high-fat food compared to non-
dieters, but this could be a consequence of significantly greater salience of these foods. This 
hypothesis could be addressed in future research, either by analysing diary entries recording 
subjective temptation on a Likert scale, perhaps using an Ecological Momentary Assessment 
methodology (Moskowitz & Young, 2006), or experimentally by recording subjective temptation 
in response to stimuli presented to participants in a lab setting. 
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5.3. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
 
While current dieters and non-dieters were either engaging or not engaging in dieting at 
the time of data collection (a “state” identification), successful and unsuccessful dieters were 
classified on the basis of their “trait” behaviours and tendencies. This was done primarily as a 
consequence of the practical limitations in collecting data from a significantly larger sample. It is 
possible that diet success is fluid rather than stable and that the same person could experience 
considerable difficulty in maintaining restraint diet at one point, but not at another – perhaps 
owing to circumstances (e.g. exposure) or changes in personal attitudes or lifestyle. As a 
consequence, it is necessary to replicate current findings in a sample of successful and 
unsuccessful current dieters: i.e., people who are struggling (or not struggling) to maintain a 
diet at the point of data collection. More stringent criteria could also be adopted to a) assess 
diet success more objectively, and b) recruit more extreme examples of very successful or very 
unsuccessful dieters. It could be suggested that these tendencies are exhibited at their most 
extreme in AN and BN, respectively. Replicating the study in these populations could also yield 
clearer findings. 
The criteria adopted for the classification of successful and unsuccessful dieters could 
also have had an impact on the results. Although the approach used here is similar to one 
successfully used by Ogden (1993), there currently is no single concrete convention for the 
assessment of diet success and failure. Final conclusions therefore shouldn’t be drawn until the 
results can be replicated using a) more stringent criteria (this could be achieved through the 
development and validation of a quantitative measure specifically designed to assess diet 
success/failure), b) more objective assessment to reduce reliance on self-report and 
participants’ subjective assessment (e.g., by using historical “diet attempt” vs. “weight lost” 
data). 
Approach and avoidance tasks have been criticised for their susceptibility of subjective 
interpretation of the instructions: either body-reference (“push away” to avoid or “pull 
towards” to approach) or object-reference (“push towards” to approach or “pull away” to 185 
 
avoid). Rinck and Becker (2007) found that participants could indeed adopt an object-reference 
interpretation when prompted (so long as the stimulus was not too salient). For this reason, 
Krieglmeyer et al. (2010) have suggested using the manikin task for a visual representation of 
the action. The AAT used in the current study used the visual representation of a “shrinking” or 
“growing” image to simulate approach and avoidance, but could still be criticised for not using a 
procedure which physically mimics approach and avoidance behaviour in the way that a joystick 
task does. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the task did not work, or worked 
incorrectly, as the results of the AAT were consistent with some previous research, and with the 
results of the IAT. 
It is also possible that the lack of group differences on the AAT could be attributed to 
insufficient sensitivity of the task. A very short (500ms) response window criterion was used to 
ensure that all responses were made as automatically and with as little conscious input as 
possible. However, the limitation of this is that it could have masked some group differences. 
Future studies may wish to consider using two variations of the task with different response 
windows, or using an intermediate response window (e.g., 1,000ms). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The four hypotheses proposed in Study 3 were not supported by the results. However, 
the findings served to replicate some of the findings in Study 2 (e.g., an explicit preference for 
desserts across all groups) in a sample of dieters and non-dieters, but also to clarify some of its 
ambiguities. The current results suggest that people engaging in dieting do not have an implicit 
preference for desserts (high-fat) compared to vegetables (low fat), which also manifests as an 
attenuation of automatic approach tendencies for desserts. Overall, the findings suggest that 
the ego depletion account of diet failure is an unlikely explanation. However, the results 
indicate that there may be possible differences in implicit food attitudes (and therefore 186 
 
automatic approach and avoidance tendencies) between very successful and very unsuccessful 
dieters 
The present findings do not make it clear whether the implicit attitude pattern in dieters 
is a trait which precipitates the behaviour, or is a consequence of the dieting behaviour. Study 4 
was designed to disambiguate these interpretations. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Study 4: Implicit attitude change following dietary restraint 
 
In Study 3, participants who were dieting at the time of data collection had an explicit 
and an implicit preference for high-fat, high-sugar foods (desserts) compared to low-fat, low-
sugar foods (vegetables). Conversely, dieters who took part in the study reported an explicit 
preference for the taste of desserts but did not hold an implicit preference for either food type. 
The results of Study 3 were insufficient to determine whether these differences were 
premorbid, or the consequence of dieting. One possibility is that an implicit preference for high-
fat foods is normative, but becomes attenuated as a consequence of dieting. The other 
possibility is that a lack of implicit preference for high-fat foods is part of a cognitive profile 
which can predispose a person to dieting behaviour. Study 4 was designed to replicate the 
findings of Study 3 and disambiguate these two potential explanations. 
 
1. Implicit measures and test-retest reliabilities 
 
The present study used a longitudinal design. In order to assess whether the lack of 
implicit preference for high fat foods in dieters was a cognitive trait or a consequence of 
behavioural change, participants were assessed before commencing a weight loss diet, and 
approximately two weeks after starting one. This design involved data collection across two 
sessions, including the administration of two IATs in order to assess any changes in participants’ 
implicit attitudes. The nature of this particular methodological design means that the test-retest 
reliability of implicit attitude assessment must be taken into account. 188 
 
The test-retest reliabilities of different implicit measures have already been briefly 
discussed in Chapter II. The stability of implicit measures varies dramatically depending on the 
methodology used and the research area in which it is being used. Split-half reliabilities of the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (De Houwer, 2003), for example, have been found to be very low, 
at r=.35, .16 and -.20, depending on the stimuli used (De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). Test-
retest reliabilities for the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) 
appears slightly better at r=.49 over a 24-hour period in one study (Cullen, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). Affective priming paradigms have similar parameters, at 
r=.56 (Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001). Median test-retest of the IAT has been reported at r=.56 in a 
meta-review by Egloff et al. (2005). This is a level comparable to affective priming and the IRAP, 
and descriptively the best of the available measures. However, the meta-review notes that test-
retest reliability in IAT studies has varied dramatically, from .3 to .75 – depending on the 
specific methodology, stimuli and research area. 
Compared to self-report measures, implicit measures do not appear to be as stable. For 
example, the test-retest reliability of the Restraint subscale of the EDE-Q over two weeks has 
been found to be r=.81 in one study (Luce & Crowther, 1999). The DEBQ similarly has test-retest 
reliability of r=.85 (Banasiak, Wertheim, Koerner, & Voudouris, 2001). As discussed in Chapter II, 
it is debatable whether this suggests that implicit measures are less methodologically robust, or 
if the lower levels of stability over time reflect a less stable cognitive construct. Nevertheless, 
the IAT appears to be the most structurally robust implicit measure for use in a repeated-
measures design out of the available options. There still remains the possibility of the 
(relatively) low reliability masking group differences and therefore increasing the possibility of a 
Type II error in analysis. However, based on the relatively superior psychometric parameters, 
and in order to maintain consistency with previous studies, the IAT was used in Study 4. 
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2. The present study 
 
The study was designed to prospectively assess the effects of dieting on implicit food 
attitudes. The design of the study mimicked that of Study 3, but participants were assessed 
prior to starting a weight loss diet as well as after approximately 2 weeks of self-reported 
dieting. Participants in the control group (non-dieters) did not report the intention to restrain 
their food intake, or (retrospectively), having engaged in a diet over the course of the study. As 
a result, all participants in session 1 were expected to be non-dieters. In session 2, participants 
in the control condition remained non-dieters, while those in the diet group would have been 
actively engaging in restraint diet for approximately two weeks. Although two different 
explanations for the outcomes of Study 3 have been put forth, the current study was 
predominantly designed to assess the hypothesis that the act of dieting affects implicit food 
attitudes. Specifically, it is hypothesised that dieting decreases the implicit preference for 
desserts (high fat) compared to vegetables (low fat). The specific hypotheses were as follows: 
 
  Hypothesis 1. There will be no differences in implicit food attitudes between groups in 
session 1. 
  Hypothesis 2. In session 2, dieters will have a decreased implicit preference for desserts, 
compared to the non-dieters. Dieters will therefore have a lower mean IAT-D score 
compared to non-dieters. 
  Hypothesis 3. If implicit food attitudes indeed change as a consequence of dieting, 
dieters’ IAT-D scores will be significantly decreased in session 2, relative to non-dieters. A 
significant session x group interaction should therefore be observed. 190 
 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Fifty-four women were recruited for participation in the study. The study was advertised 
on the university’s online participant subject pool. Each participant was emailed and completed 
a screening questionnaire before taking part. The screening questionnaire asked whether the 
participant was a) currently on a weight loss diet, b) currently on any other diet, c) has been on 
a weight loss diet in the past 12 months, d) had an intention of starting a weight loss diet in the 
next fortnight, and e) height and weight. Participants were recruited into the  (prospective) 
dieter group if they a) were not currently on a weight loss diet, or another highly restrictive 
diet, b) had an intention of starting a diet, and c) did not have a BMI below 18.0. The BMI cut-
off was chosen because it was not deemed ethical to encourage further weight loss in 
participants who are already underweight. Participants were recruited into the non-dieter 
group if they a) were not currently on a weight loss diet, or another highly restrictive diet, b) 
had not been on a weight loss diet in the past 12 months, and c) did not have an intention of 
starting a diet. Any women who did not meet either set of criteria (N=7) were not included in 
the study; however, because the criteria were made clear in the study description, this mostly 
reflects a failure to follow directions. 
Of the 54 women recruited, six did not attend the second session and therefore were not 
included in the final sample. Nine more participants were excluded for failing to reach the 
minimum accuracy criteria on both Food IATs (<80%). Two more were excluded due to 
equipment failure. Five participants who were recruited as (prospective) dieters subsequently 
reported that they had not been on a weight loss diet between session 1 and session 2, and 
were therefore also not included. One participant had stopped their diet before attending 
session 2 and was excluded as she did not qualify as a dieter for the whole duration of the 
study. Thirty-one participants were therefore included in the final sample. Of these, 17 were 191 
 
non-dieters and 14 were dieters. Sample size calculations using G*Power for a repeated 
measures F-test with two groups, two measurements, a measure test-retest correlation of r=.56 
and an effect size of .8 yielded a total sample size of N=6, which suggests that the number of 
participants recruited should be sufficient. (Prospective) dieters were not on a weight loss diet 
at the time of data collection in session 1, but were on a weight loss diet at the time of session 
2.  Non-dieters were not on any kind of restrictive diet for the duration of the study. Within the 
dieter group, session 2 was scheduled on average 16.36 (SD=4.51) days after the intended diet 
start, or 19.36 (SD=4.36) days after session 1. Within the non-dieter group, session 2 was 
scheduled on average 15.41 days (SD=5.78) after session 1. The number of days elapsed since 
the first session was significantly longer in the restrained group, t(29)=2.106, p=.044. The 
reason for this difference is that it was not possible to predict how soon after session 1 dieters 
would choose to start their diets, and the corresponding time scale for the non-dieters had to 
be estimated before all data was collected. 
 
3.2. MEASURES 
 
Questionnaires. With the exception of the Eating Habits Questionnaire, all 
questionnaires were identical between session 1 and session 2. These included a demographic 
questionnaire, the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (DEBQ) and the Eating Disorder 
Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q), all of which were identical to those used in Study 3. 
Chronbach’s alpha for the DEBQ in the current sample was α=.89. For the EDE-Q the value was 
α=.918. The Food Attitudes Questionnaire was also adapted from Study 3, but included only 
familiarity ratings (“Do you know what this food tastes like? yes/no”) and 5-point Likert scales 
to assess how much each participant likes the taste of each food. Unipolar positive and negative 
attitude scales were not included as they were not relevant to the research aims of the present 
study. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was α=.753 in the current sample. 192 
 
The Three Factor Eating Questionnaire (TFEQ; Stunkard & Messick, 1985) was also 
included. The TFEQ is designed to measure three dimensions of eating behaviour: cognitive 
restraint (of eating), disinhibition, and hunger. The questionnaire consists of 51 items. The first 
26 are true/false statements, such as “When I feel anxious, I find myself eating” and “I 
consciously hold back at meals in order not to gain weight”. The remainder of the questions in 
part two comprise of 4-point Likert scales tailored to each question, such as “How often do you 
feel hungry? (Only at mealtimes, sometimes between meals, often between meals, almost 
always” and “How likely are you to consciously eat less than you want? (Unlikely, slightly likely, 
moderately likely, very likely)”. Scores on the TFEQ have been found to adequately discriminate 
between different self-reported eating behaviours, such as amount of energy intake and 
emotional eating (de Lauzon et al., 2004). The scale was included to supplement the DEBQ and 
EDE-Q and to facilitate the discussion of results (implicit and explicit food attitudes) in the 
context of self-reported eating behaviour. Reliability in one psychometric analysis was found to 
range from α=.78 to .84 within the subscales (de Lauzon et al., 2004). Alpha in the current 
sample was α=.894 for the overall scale. 
In session 1, the Eating Habits Questionnaire replicated the screening questionnaire, to 
ensure that no significant changes have taken place between screening and session 1. The 
questionnaire consisted of nine questions, including intention to start a weight loss diet, history 
of restraint (“How many times have you started a weight loss diet in the past year?”; never, 
once, twice, three times, more than three times) and weight in the past year (“How constant 
has your weight been over the past six months/year?”; my weight has not changed, I have lost 
weight, my weight has fluctuated, I have gained weight) and subjective restraint success (“How 
well are you able to stick with the diet during [times when you start a weight loss diet]?”), and 
hunger (“How hungry do you feel right now?”). In session 2, the questionnaire was slightly 
modified to reflect changes over the course of the study: i.e., whether the participant had 
actively engaged in restraint, any weight changes since session 1 (“How constant has your 193 
 
weight been over the course of this study?”), and hunger. The primary purpose of the Eating 
Habits Questionnaire was for assessing participants’ eligibility for the group criteria.  
 
Implicit Association Test: Food. The Food IAT was identical to that used in Study 
3. 
 
Implicit Association Test: Insect. A “known group” Insect/Flower IAT was 
included in the study. The relatively unambiguous dichotomy between flowers and insects was 
first used by Greenwald et al. (1998) in the development of IAT in order to illustrate its 
methodology and procedure. Flowers, to most people, are more pleasant than insects. Unlike 
some research areas, such as prejudice, alcohol abuse or food attitudes, there is little reason to 
expect interference from confounding variables (such as context, motivation or faking) on the 
Insect IAT. Both children (Baron & Banaji, 2006) and adults (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) have a 
relatively unambiguous implicit preference for flowers, compared to insects. As a result, the 
Insect IAT is frequently used as the neutral control alongside the experimental IAT to ensure 
that the experimental design is working as expected (Baron & Banaji, 2006), or when assessing 
psychometric properties of the measure, rather than a specific attitude (Govan & Williams, 
2004). In the current study, the results of the Insect IAT were used as a baseline “index” of 
measure stability, practice effects and possible changes to participants’ skill or attention as a 
consequence of dietary restraint, in comparison to the Food IAT. 
The design and procedure of the IAT was identical to the Food IAT. The insect category 
consisted of beetle, wasp, ant, cockroach, centipede and mosquito. The flower category 
consisted of daisy, rose, orchid, daffodil, sunflower and tulip. Word length was not different 
between the categories, t(10)=.252, p=.806. The positive category included good, lovely, 
pleasant, love, happy, and nice. The negative category included bad, horrible, death, pain, evil, 
and awful. These also did not differ significantly in worth length, t(10)=.347, p=.736 In the 
congruent trial block, participants used one key to respond to flower and positive words and 194 
 
another key to insect and negative words. In the incongruent trial block, key assignments were 
switched, and one key was used to respond to flower and negative words, and another to insect 
and positive words. The IAT-D value was calculated in such a way that a positive IAT-D value 
reflects a stronger positive association with flowers, while a negative IAT-D value reflects a 
stronger positive association with insects. 
 
3.3. PROCEDURE 
 
Participants who were approved for participation following completion of the screening 
questionnaire attended two sessions. In each session participants completed a) the Food IAT, b) 
the questionnaires, and c) the Insect IAT. The questionnaires were identical between sessions, 
with the exception of the Eating Habits Questionnaire, which was modified to assess changes 
over the course of the study. At the end of session 1 participants were asked to schedule a 
convenient time for attending session 2. For participants in the unrestrained group, session 2 
was scheduled approximately two weeks after session 1. For participants in the restrained 
group, session 2 was scheduled approximately two weeks after their intended date of starting 
restrained eating. In session 2 participants completed the Food IAT, questionnaires and Insect 
IAT again, were thanked, debriefed and remunerated £6. Participants who did not attend 
session 2 were debriefed via email. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
 
One participant reported a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa five years prior, but self-
identified as an unrestrained eater for the purpose of the study. One more participants 
reported having seen mental health practitioners six years ago with regards to eating 
difficulties, but did not receive an official diagnosis. Her BMI at the time of the study was within 
a healthy range, and she was therefore included in the study. Removing these participants’ data 
did not significantly affect results and they were therefore retained in the final sample. 
Average age in the sample was 27.39 years (SD=13.27). There were no significant age 
differences between (prospective) dieters (M=23.07) and non-dieters (M=30.94), t(29)= -1.694, 
p=.101. Average BMI self-reported at session 1 was within the healthy range of 18.5 to 25 
(M=22.30, SD=5.02). Dieters had a marginally higher BMI (M=24.12) compared to non-dieters 
(M=20.81), t(29)=1.903, p=.067. Changes in BMI between session 1 (M=22.30) and session 2 
(M=22.38) were not significant in the overall sample, t(30)= -.781, p=.441. The session x group 
interaction was not significant, F(1,29)=.761, p=.390, which suggests that there was no 
significant weight decrease (or increase) in the dieter group between session 1 and session 2 
compared to the non-dieter group. Of the 12 dieters who reported their weight in session 2, 
50% reported no change, 25% reported weight loss, 17% reported weight fluctuation (both 
weight gain and weight loss within the specified time period) and 8% reported weight gain. By 
contrast, 60% of non-dieters reported no change to their weight, 13% had lost weight and 27% 
had gained weight. 
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4.2. EATING DISORDER PATHOLOGY  
 
In session 1, (prospective) dieters scored significantly higher on all three measures of 
pathology and eating behaviour. Shapiro-Wilk tests were carried out for the EDE-Q Total for 
session 1 and session 2, and were both found not to be significant, p=.635 and p=.925, 
respectively. Based on the outcome of a one-way ANOVA, dieters scored higher (M=2.10) on 
the EDE-Q Total compared to non-dieters (M=.90), F(1,29)=18.44, p<.000, n2
p=.179. The dieter 
group also scored higher (M=34.79) on the TFEQ in session 1 compared to non-dieters 
(M=20.47), F(1,29)=18.55, p<.000, n2
p=.177. The same was also true for the DEBQ (M=3.14 and 
2.64, respectively), F(1,29)=10.30, p=.003, n2
p=.335. Dieters also reported more attempted 
weight loss diets in the past year (M=.929) compared to the non-dieters (M=.235), t(29)=2.439, 
p=.021. Sub-scale means in Session 2 for all three measures can be found in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Mean scores on measures of eating behaviour and cognition. 
Measure  Dieters Mean (S.D.)  Non-dieters Mean (S.D.) 
  Session 1  Session 2  Session 1  Session 2 
EDE-Q Total  2.01 (.82)  2.29 (1.27)  .91 (.73)  1.59 (1.18) 
Restraint  1.14 (.98)  2.2 (.136)  .49 (.76)  1.32 (1.18) 
Weight  2.98 (1.01)  2.55 (1.66)  1.22 (1.19)  1.94 (1.44) 
Eating  1.30 (.63)  1.73 (.89)  .42 (.53)  1.11 (1.21) 
Shape  2.97 (1.23)  2.67 (1.61)  1.49 (1.16)  2.01 (1.34) 
TFEQ Total  34.78 (7.33)  36.36 (6.68)  20.47 (10.48)  20.78 (10.51) 
Restraint  5.15 (2.60)  6.91 (2.47)  3.11 (2.47)  3.86 (3.08) 
Disinhibition  8.53 (2.88)  8.63 (2.97)  5.29 (2.25)  6.14 (2.74) 
Hunger  7.30 (2.87)  7.18 (2.96)  4.64 (3.28)  4.50 (3.18) 
DEBQ Total  3.13 (.32)  3.24 (.31)  2.64 (.49)  2.55 (.63) 
Restraint  3.02 (.73)  3.44 (.62)  2.04 (.69)  2.20 (.84) 
Emotional  2.98 (.67)  2.97 (.96)  2.74 (.93)  2.34 (.82) 
External  3.40 (.49)  3.32 (.48)  3.16 (.50)  3.12 (.70) 
 
EDE-Q: Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire 
TFEQ: Three Factor Eating Questionnaire 
DEBQ: Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire 
 
In order to assess changes in restriction/restraint behaviour within the dieter group, a 
session x group analysis of variance was carried out with the EDE-Q Restraint subscale as the 
dependent variable. While the main effect of group was significant, F(1,26)=6.897, p=.014, 197 
 
n2
p=.210, the interaction was not, F(1,26)=.935, p=.342, n2
p=.035. This suggests that dieters 
consistently scored higher than non-dieters on the subscale, but did not increase their restraint 
between session 1 and session 2. The same pattern emerged when the session x group 
interaction was carried out using the Restraint subscale of the DEBQ. While the main effect of 
group was significant, F(1,29)=6.518, p=.016, n2
p=.428, the interaction was not, F(1,29)=2.783, 
p=.106, n2
p=.088. Dieters also consistently scored higher on the Restraint sub-scale of the 
DEBQ, compared to non-dieters (see Table 4 for means). A repeated-measures ANOVA of the 
TFEQ Cognitive Restraint subscale found a significant main effect of group, F(1,26)=9.792, 
p=.004, but not a significant group x restraint interaction, F(1,26)=2.821, p=.105, which is 
consistent with the other measures and suggests that neither the dieters nor the non-dieters 
changed their levels of cognitive restraint between sessions.   
To assess any changes in pathology which might have taken place within groups between 
session 1 and 2, a repeated-measures ANOVA with a session x group interaction was carried out 
on the EDE-Q Global, but was not found to be significant, F(1,26)=.797, p=.380, n2
p=.030. The 
main effect of session was also not significant, F(1,26)=1.771, p=.195, n2
p=.064. This suggests 
that EDE-Q Global did not significantly change between sessions, in either the dieter or the non-
dieter group. However, because the EDE-Q refers to behaviour within the last 28 days, some 
overlap between sessions 1 and 2 can be expected. The same pattern was true for the session x 
group interaction for the DEBQ, F(1,29)=1.728, p=.199, and for the TFEQ, F(1,28)=.265, p=.610. 
This suggests that dieting did not result in a significant increase or decrease in ED pathology in 
the dieter group, compared to the non-dieter group. 
 
 
4.3. EXPLICIT FOOD ATTITUDES 
 
Self-reported hunger was not different in the overall sample between session 1 
(M=1.284) and session 2 (M=1.326), as assessed using a repeated-measures ANOVA 198 
 
F(1,29)=.055, p=.816. The hunger x group interaction was also not significant, F(1,29)=.316, 
p=.578, n2
p=.011 which suggests that hunger did not differ between session as a function of 
group. There was also no main effect of group, F(1,29)=.009, p=.924, n2
p<.000, which suggests 
that there were no group differences in self-reported hunger. A repeated-measures ANOVA 
with time since last meal found no main effect of group, F(1,29)=.287, p=.597. The session x 
group interaction was also not significant, F(1,29)=.936, p=.341, which indicates that there were 
no differences in food intake frequency between sessions as a function of diet status. This 
suggests that increasing the time between meals (e.g., cutting down on snacks) is not likely a 
common strategy adopted by dieters. The differences pertaining to eating behaviour between 
groups can be found in Table 5. 
A repeated-measures ANOVA with a three-way food x session x group interaction was 
carried out to assess differences in food taste preferences within groups and between sessions. 
In contrast to the findings of Study 3, there was no main effect of food, F(1,29)=1.569, p=.220, 
n2
p=.016, which suggests that participants did not overall rate desserts as more tasty than 
vegetables. However, the overall interaction was found to be significant, F(1,29)=6.259, p=.018, 
n2
p=.178. Post-hoc analyses of session 1 indicated that dieters rated desserts significantly higher 
compared to non-dieters, F(1,29)=6.346, p=.018. However, the groups did not differ in their 
ratings of vegetables, F(1,29)=.304, p=.437. In session 2, there were no group differences in 
either dessert, F=(1,29)=1.692, p=.204, or vegetable ratings, F(1,29)=.045, p=.834. However, the 
session x group interaction did not reach significance, F(1,29)=.831, p=.369, n2
p=.028, which 
suggests that any changes in dieters’ food preferences between session 1 and 2 were 
descriptive only. Mean ratings for each food type within each group can be found in Table 5. 
 199 
 
Table 5 
Mean and (Standard Deviation) differences in eating behaviour differences between 
restrained and unrestrained participants. 
 
  Session 1  Session 2 
  Dieters  Non-dieters  Dieters  Non-dieters 
EDE-Q Restraint  1.27 (1.00)  .53 (.78)  2.30 (1.35)  1.15 (1.19) 
Hunger  1.21 (.80)  1.35 (1.22)  1.36 (1.28)  1.29 (1.36) 
Last meal (hrs)  2.50 (1.57)  3.65 (5.35)  2.18 (1.30)  4.76 (5.42) 
Dessert rating  3.99 (.58)  3.25 (.93)  3.72 (.81)  3.31 (.91) 
Vegetable rating  3.20 (.47)  3.40 (.84)  3.30 (.51)  3.35 (.77) 
 
4.4. IMPLICIT FOOD ATTITUDES 
 
Shapiro-Wilk test was not significant for either session 1 or 2 with the IAT-D as the 
independent variable, p=.744 and .742, respectively. Session 1 Food IAT-D (M=.470) was 
modestly, but significantly, correlated with session 2 Food IAT-D (M=.382), r=.497, p=.004. Food 
IAT performance was not significantly different between session 1 and session 2 in the overall 
sample t(30)=.755, p=.456. One-sample t-tests revealed that in session 1, Food IAT-D was 
significantly different from zero, t(30)=4.227, p=.000, d=1.543, as it was in session 2, 
t(30)=3.226, p=.003. This indicates that in both sessions participants overall had stronger 
positive implicit associations with desserts, compared to vegetables. 
Consistently with Hypothesis 1, there were no significant group differences on the Food 
IAT-D in session 1, t(29)=-.571, p=.572, d=.212. In both dieters and non-dieters IAT-D scores 
were significantly above 0, t(16)=3.116, p=.007, d=1.558 and t(13)=2.856, p=.013, d=1.584, 
respectively. This suggests that both groups had significantly more positive implicit associations 
with desserts, compared to vegetables. 
In session 2, non-dieters (M=.562) scored marginally higher on the IAT-D compared to 
dieters, (M=.164), t(29)=-1.723, p=.095, d=.640. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
although the result did not reach significance. As in session 1, non-dieters’ scores were 
significantly above 0, t(16)=3.227, p=.005, d=1.614. Non dieters’ scores did not significantly 
change between sessions 1 and 2, t(16)=-.194, p=.848, d=.097.  However, dieters’ IAT-D in 
session 2 was not significantly different from 0, t(13)=1.167, p=.264, d=.647, which suggests 200 
 
that (in contrast to session 1) participants in this group did not have a significant implicit 
preference for either desserts or vegetables. 
In order to address Hypothesis 3, a session x group interaction was carried out to assess 
relative changes to the IAT-D across groups. This interaction did not reach significance, 
F(1,29)=1.360, p=.253, η2
p=.045. This suggests that any changes to dieters’ implicit food 
attitudes over the course of the study were not significantly greater than those of the 
unrestrained eaters. 
 
4.5. INSECT IAT 
 
Due to equipment failure, one participant failed to complete both Insect IATs. Their 
overall data was still included in the sample, as differences in Insect IAT performance were not 
the primary objective of the study. However, the difference in the degrees of freedom is 
reflected in the statistical reporting in this section. 
The Insect IAT-D in the overall sample was significantly different from zero in session 1, 
t(29)=5.769, p=.000, and session 2, t(30)=7.685, p=.000. This indicates that participants had 
more positive implicit associations with flowers, compared to insects. A session x group 
interaction was carried out to assess any group differences on the Insect IAT between sessions. 
There was no main effect of session F(1,28)=.004, p=.951, indicating that performance did not 
differ significantly between sessions. There was also no significant session x group interaction, 
F(1,28)=.001, p=.977, which suggests that there were no significant changes in performance on 
the Insect IAT in either group. 
Performance on the Food IAT was not significantly correlated with the Insect IAT in 
session 1, r=.220, p=.242. However, there was a significant positive correlation in session 2, 
r=.385, p=.032. Insect IAT-D in session 1 was also only marginally correlated with the Insect IAT-
D in session 2, r=.312, p=.093. 
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT FOOD ATTITUDES 
 
The hypothesis that dieting may affect implicit food associations was partially supported. 
There were no group differences in implicit attitudes towards food in session 1, in which none 
of the participants reported being on any kind of restrictive diet. In both groups, IAT-D scores 
were significantly above zero, which indicates stronger positive associations with desserts 
compared to vegetables in both groups. Replicating findings from Study 3, dieters in session 2 
no longer held an implicit preference for desserts: their IAT-D scores were not significantly 
different from zero. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the act of dieting may affect 
implicit attitudes towards food. However, the fact that the session x group interaction was not 
significant suggests that these changes are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the 
alternative hypothesis for the results obtained in Study 3 was that differences in implicit food 
attitudes between dieters and non-dieters are chronic, and not the consequence of dieting The 
results of the present study fail to support this hypothesis, as there were no differences in IAT-D 
scores between groups in session 1. 
The pattern of explicit food attitudes in the present study deviates from the results of 
Study 2 and Study 3. In Study 2, both high-pathology and low-pathology participants preferred 
the taste of desserts to the taste of vegetables. In Study 3, both current dieters and current 
non-dieters also preferred the taste of desserts. By contrast, there were no differences in the 
self-reported liking of desserts compared to vegetables in the current study. In session 1, 
dieters reported higher ratings for desserts than non-dieters. This difference was no longer 
present in session 2. This suggests that dieters’ liking for desserts decreased on both an implicit 
and an explicit level over the course of the study. This is inconsistent with the findings of Study 
3, in which the explicit preference for desserts persisted despite changes to the dieters’ implicit 
attitude. It is worth noting that the explicit Food Attitudes Questionnaire specifically assessed 
participants’ liking of the taste of the different foods. A change in global attitude could reflect 202 
 
goal-directed behaviour: i.e., it is sensible for a person to perceive a high-fat food as less “good” 
after making the decision to lose some weight. However, explicit changes in perceived taste 
suggests that participants are either a) experiencing actual changes to their hedonic experience 
of food, b) experiencing a change in salience of the “negative” qualities of high-fat food, which 
then affects hedonic perception, c) responding in a self-enhancing way in the knowledge that 
the experimenter is aware of their status as a restrained eater. These explanations could be 
disambiguated by replicating the study using more detailed measures of food liking and taste 
perception administered at closer intervals over the course of a weight loss diet. A measure of 
social desirability, such as the Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) could 
help determine its confounding effects on the results. However, differences in explicit food 
attitudes were only found in the current study, and not in Study 2 or 3. The finding should 
therefore be interpreted with caution until it can be replicated. 
 
5.2. EATING BEHAVIOUR AND PATHOLOGY 
 
Dieters consistently scored higher on the EDE-Q, the DEBQ and the TFEQ compared to 
the non-dieting group. Specifically, dieters reported higher levels of restraint on the Restraint 
subscale of the EDE-Q and the Cognitive Restraint subscale of the TFEQ, compared to non-
dieters, despite reporting not being on any kind of restrictive diet at the time of session 1. The 
range of elevated pathology also involved body, shape and weight dissatisfaction (EDE-Q), and 
the tendency to eat in response to emotional triggers or external stimuli (DEBQ)Based on the 
analyses conducted in session 1, the results suggest that differences in eating behaviour and 
related cognitions could be chronic, as participants in the diet group (who were predominantly 
identified by their intention to start a weight loss diet in the near future) reported higher levels 
of disordered eating tendencies. Dieters also reported higher levels of restriction and restraint 
in session 1, despite subjectively reporting that they were not on any diet at the time of data 
collection. This suggests that prospective dieters may be prone to chronic levels of restraint 203 
 
with some discrete periods of “dieting”; prospective dieters reported dieting more frequently 
over the past 12 months compared to non-dieters. 
The differences in explicit dessert attitudes also support the hypothesis that there are 
trait differences in the subjective experience of food and eating behaviour. Although not 
supported by Study 2 and 3, dieters in the current sample rated desserts more positively than 
non-dieters. This could be indicative of baseline differences in the hedonic experience of food. 
In other words, people who experience food as more pleasant are more likely to consume 
more, and therefore gain weight, which subsequently contributes to the intention to engage in 
dieting behaviour. This is consistent with research which suggests that being overweight is 
associated with an elevated hedonic response to food fat content (Drewnowski et al., 1987). 
Restrained eaters also scored higher on the DEBQ, which suggests that they are more prone to 
eat when triggered by stimuli other than hunger. However, it must be noted that dieters in the 
current sample only had a marginally higher BMI compared to non-dieters. This could partially 
be explained by the relatively young age of the participants (27 years on average), which may 
mean that the baseline differences in the experience of food simply have not yet manifested as 
significant weight gain. The study could be replicated in an older population to assess the effect 
of trait differences in food attitudes and eating behaviour on long-term weight changes. 
The primary aim of the current study was to assess differences in implicit cognition 
before and after a period of dieting. In the interests of ethics, participants were not instructed 
to follow any specific diet plan or eating pattern. Neither were they required to report their 
food intake over the course of the study. The advantage of this design is that it allows for a 
naturalistic assessment. Participants were asked in session 2 if they had been on a weight loss 
diet: they were free to interpret this term in a way which was subjectively appropriate. As a 
result the differences in implicit cognition and explicit food attitudes observed in the current 
study are the consequences of the participants’ typical self-reported attempts at weight loss. 
Unfortunately whatever strategies were adopted by the dieters did not appear to be very 
effective, as there were no significant BMI changes between session 1 and session 2 within the 204 
 
group. There were also no differences between sessions on measures of pathology, which 
suggests that dieters did not explicitly change their attitudes towards food or their bodies 
during the restraint period. However, it must be noted that the primary measure of pathology, 
the EDE-Q, addresses behaviours and cognition over the past 28 days, which in most cases was 
shorter than the interval between session 1 and 2. 
In the discussion of Study 3 it was suggested that if implicit food attitudes change as a 
following dietary restraint then this may be a consequence of adopting different eating 
behaviour. However, the results of the current study do not support this assertion. Dieters did 
not report any significant changes to their eating habits or cognitions associated with eating or 
their body image. In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that their eating behaviour changed 
at all: in session 2, dieters were neither hungrier, nor had they gone longer without eating 
compared to non-dieters. Analyses of the Restraint subscales of the EDE-Q, TFEQ or DEBQ also 
suggest that participants in the restrained eating group were not actually controlling their 
eating behaviour more in session 2 than in session 1. It is beyond the scope of the current study 
to speculate on potential weight loss strategies typically adopted by dieters, but the lack of BMI 
change also suggests that any weight loss strategies adopted had not been successful. Only 25% 
of the dieters who reported their weight in session 2 had actually lost weight since session 1. 
Thus, the current data does not support behavioural change as the source of changes to dieters’ 
implicit food attitudes. 
An alternative explanation for the differences in implicit food attitudes is that the 
changes take place as a consequence of changes in goal accessibility. Assuming participants 
were truthful about their intentions to start a weight loss diet, even if behavioural changes did 
not take place, there could still be differences on a cognitive level. Stroebe et al. (2008) 
discussed restraint failure in terms of a goal conflict: the goal to lose weight and the goal of 
experiencing the hedonic pleasure of eating. The authors qualify both goals as “chronically 
accessible”, which is consistent with restrained eaters’ elevated restraint levels and enhanced 
liking of desserts in session 1. One possible explanation is that periods of acute dietary restraint 205 
 
shift goal salience, which subsequently affects which automatic associations with food are 
activated. This is consistent with the Strack and Deutsch (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and the 
Iterative-Reprocessing (Cunningham et al., 2007) models of implicit cognition; both suggest that 
implicit attitudes are not binary associations, but rather constitute a mode complex network of 
different associations. The connections between target stimuli and associated concepts may 
become stronger or weaker, depending on motivation or context. It could be hypothesised that 
it is the context of dietary restraint (or even the intention to engage in dietary restraint) which 
changes implicit attitude accessibility and therefore performance on the IAT. 
The possibility that contextual cues alone could result in implicit attitude change can be 
addressed empirically. It must be noted that no significant group x session interaction was 
found in the present study, which indicates that even if participants in the dieter group did 
significantly modify their diet goals between session 1 and session 2, in doing so they did not 
significantly change their implicit food attitudes. However, the current study was not designed 
to assess differences in goal activation, so further conclusions cannot be made at this stage. 
Further research could focus on specifically assessing implicit attitude change within the 
context of a behavioural change model, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein, 
1979) or the Transtheoretical Model of behavioural change (TTM; Prochaska & DiClemente, 
1983). Studies could be conducted in the short-term, as well as long-term. An example of a 
short-term study would include assessing implicit food attitudes before and after a contextual 
manipulation: e.g., after reading a pamphlet on healthy eating and the health risks of 
overweight, versus a control pamphlet containing diet-irrelevant information. Long term studies 
could focus on the assessment of implicit food attitudes in prospective dieters, current dieters, 
and non-dieters, relative to their position in the TRA: e.g., behavioural intention vs. behaviour. 
Such studies can either be cross-sectional (i.e., classifying participants based on the stage they 
are in at the time of recruitment and using the classifications to compare implicit food 
attitudes) or longitudinal (carrying out implicit food attitude assessment at different time points 
as the participant progresses through the stages of TTM, from contemplation, to intention, to 206 
 
behaviour). If contextual cues are sufficient to induce implicit attitude change, we may expect 
to see differences in the IAT (or any other implicit attitude assessment) at the intention, or 
contemplation, stage. However, if actual behavioural change is necessary then differences will 
emerge only in the behaviour/action stages. 
 
5.3. THE INSECT IAT 
 
No significant differences in Insect IAT performance were found between sessions 1 and 
2, which suggests that any practice effects between the sessions did not make a significant 
impact on the results. The session x group interaction was also not significant, which suggests 
that significant changes in non-food related IAT performance do not take place as a 
consequence of dietary restraint. However, questionnaire results also suggested that dieters 
did not make significant changes to their restraint behaviour in session 2, compared to session 
1, so this interpretation may not generalise to other contexts. 
The Insect IAT was only moderately correlated between sessions 1 and 2 (r=.312), with 
the correlation reaching only marginal significance. This finding further supports the assertion 
that the IAT may not be the best measure for use in repeated-measure designs. Surprisingly, 
the correlation between session 1 and session 2 Food IAT-D was higher (r=.497) than the Insect 
IAT-D, despite the fact that differences between sessions were anticipated in the former, but 
not in the latter. The current results are insufficient to disambiguate whether a) implicit 
attitudes are highly variable over short periods of time, b) the IAT is not a very reliable measure 
for longitudinal implicit attitude assessment, or c) the specific IAT used in the current study is 
not a very reliable measure for longitudinal implicit attitude assessment. As discussed 
previously, other measures of implicit attitudes are also susceptible to poor test-retest 
correlations. The development of a new measure with more stable psychometric properties is 
necessary for future implicit attitude research with a repeated-measures design. 207 
 
The initial inclusion of the Insect IAT in the study design was made with the intention of 
contrasting its outcome with the results from the Food IAT. This inclusion was made 
provisionally, on the assumption that the session x group interaction analysis of the Food IAT 
will be significant. However, because it was not, no further contrasts between the Food IAT and 
the Insect IAT were made. 
 
5.4. LIMITATIONS 
 
The primary limitation of the present study is that participants in the diet group did not 
appear to be actively engaging in dieting behaviour between sessions 1 and 2. Restraint scores 
on the EDE-Q, TFEQ and the DEBQ did not increase in the group, the majority of participants did 
not report weight loss, and there were no differences in self-reported hunger or the frequency 
of food intake between the groups in session 2. The hypotheses of the study were made about 
the outcomes of dieting; however, it appears that any restriction or restraint which did take 
place was minimal, despite participants reporting that they had been dieting. This has an 
obvious effect on the interpretation of the results. The primary hypothesis of the current study 
was whether implicit food attitudes change following a period of dieting. While group 
differences in the Food IAT-D were found in session 2, but not in session 1, the session x group 
interaction failed to reach significance. While this could indicate that the changes which do take 
place are not statistically significant, the outcomes of post-hoc comparisons indicate that this 
result was most likely the consequence of the fact that the dieter group was simply not 
sufficiently restrained/engaged in dietary restriction over the course of the study to yield 
statistically significant differences.  
Further research should address the methodological issue of consistency between 
participants’ anticipated and actual dieting behaviour. Although participants were asked in 
Session 2 whether they had engaged in dieting over the course of the study, the majority of 
those in the dieter group responded affirmatively despite evidence to the contrary. This is likely 208 
 
the consequence of social desirability (not wanting to disappoint the experimenter, feeling 
embarrassed about their own failure, shame about not living up to expectations, etc.) It is 
unclear how many participants in the dieter group never had the intention to start a diet, 
versus how many did have the intention at the time of recruitment but a) reconsidered, or b) 
failed by the time Session 2 took place. In either case, the results of this study suggest that 
relying on self-report for this type of research is insufficient to ensure that participants meet 
the required criteria. Unfortunately it is not practical or cost-efficient to collect objective 
evidence of participants’ eating behaviour (e.g., through video recording or double-labelled 
water). Other strategies may include asking participants to keep daily food diaries, or to issue 
participants in the dieter group with a structured diet plan which would specify their intake 
allowance. The study can also be criticised for an over-reliance on self-report in other aspects. 
For instance, participants self-reported their weight and their diet adherence over the course of 
the study. Given the sensitive nature of the topic and the cultural norms which can be expected 
to have an effect on participants, the data could have been more susceptible than average to 
the effects of social desirability. It would be advisable for future studies to take extra measures 
to reassure participants that their responses are confidential and to emphasise the importance 
of honesty in their responses. Alternatively, the experimenter could check weight at each 
session.  
Another methodological problem is the interval selected between session 1 and session 
2. Restrained participants took part in session 2, on average, two weeks after session 1 or two 
weeks after starting their diet. This period was selected for practical reasons (as drop-out rates 
could be expected to increase following a larger time period). With the exception of 
experimental designs which use conditioning paradigms to induce attitude change, there is no 
research which addresses the speed with which implicit attitudes change in a naturalistic 
setting. The timescale selected could have therefore been too short or too long to adequately 
register the hypothesised changes. Until more findings emerge to address this, research can be 209 
 
expected to rely on sensible, but arbitrary, time scales. However, future studies could examine 
implicit attitude change over a longer timescale. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The primary hypothesis of the study was not supported, as the group interaction in Food 
IAT scores between session 1 and session 2 failed to reach significance. Nevertheless, the 
findings of Study 3 were replicated on a longitudinal scale. Dieters did not differ in their implicit 
food attitudes from non-dieters in session 1, but had significantly lower IAT-D scores in session 
2, indicating a reduced preference for desserts, compared to vegetables. While the results of 
the study could indicate that implicit food attitudes do not change significantly following dieting 
behaviour (including various levels of dietary restriction and/or cognitive restraint, depending 
on individual approach and preference), they could also reflect the consequences of moderate 
restraint. Dieters did not report higher levels of restraint, hunger, or weight loss in session 2, 
which suggests that the levels of restraint in this group did not change significantly between 
sessions 1 and 2. Nevertheless, some implicit attitude change was observed, although this was 
non-significant. Due to the fact that dieters’ eating behaviour was not reported as significantly 
different between sessions, it is hypothesised that the changes may have occurred as a 
consequence of a shift in goal salience, rather than in behaviour. Future studies within this 
research area should adopt more stringent measures to ensure that dieters are adhering to a 
restricted dietary plan, and avoid relying on self-report for measures of weight and BMI. 
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CHAPTER VII 
General Discussion 
 
This research conducted within this thesis was designed to assess some pertinent 
questions in the role of implicit attitudes in eating behaviour and in eating disorder pathology. 
Chapters I and II introduced existing theoretical approaches in implicit cognition and some 
common methodologies used in the assessment of implicit attitudes. Chapters III, IV, V and VI 
consisted of an empirical assessment of implicit self-esteem and implicit attitudes towards 
food, and a brief discussion of each study’s findings. The current chapter will summarise the 
theoretical context in which the research was conducted, review the research findings, and 
discuss the results in the broader context of prior research and existing theories. Finally, 
limitations of the current research will be discussed and proposals will be made for further 
research directions. 
 
1. Implicit attitudes: a summary of the theoretical 
approach 
 
Research in implicit cognition is grounded in challenging the assumptions made by, for 
example, reasoned action theories (Fishbein, 1979; Ajzen, 1991), which suggest the majority of 
human behaviour is grounded in conscious cost/benefit analysis and rational planning. Instead, 
it adopts the perspective that behaviour is conscious and rational only when there is motivation 
and resources to reconsider our spontaneous behavioural responses (Fazio, 1990; Fazio, 2001). 
In this approach, implicit attitudes are conceptualised as one of the factors which can affect 
impulsive behaviour. 211 
 
Chapter I introduced several existing theoretical models of implicit cognition, from earlier 
dual-process models, such as Epstein’s (1994) experiential/rational model or Petty and 
Cacioppo’s (1986) heuristic/systematic model, to later integrative ones such as the Motivation 
and Opportunity as Determinants of Behaviour (MODE; Fazio, 1990) and the Associative-
Propositional Evaluation (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007) models. While some models 
were better supported by empirical research than others, no single model was selected as the 
definitive theoretical context in which to ground the present research. However, the theoretical 
elements which were consistent with prior findings were used in the development of the 
hypotheses and research methodology. Specifically, the following properties of implicit 
attitudes were assumed: 
 
  Introspection: people have some level of awareness of the implicit attitudes 
they hold (Monteith et al., 2001). In lay terms this can be referred to as a ‘gut 
feeling’ (Jordan et al., 2007). However, they may not always be aware of its 
source (Olson & Fazio, 2001). 
  Stability: there is little evidence to suggest that implicit attitudes are 
significantly more stable or resistant to change than explicit ones. However, the 
process of change differs: while explicit attitudes can be changed through 
conscious persuasion (e.g., new information), implicit attitudes can be changed 
through conditioning procedures (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Ebert et al., 2009; Hollands 
et al., 2011). Presumably, these findings from a laboratory setting could be 
generalised to the process of attitudinal change in a naturalistic environment. 
  Automaticity: the ‘hallmark’ property of implicit attitudes common to both 
theoretical and methodological approaches, and also the least ambiguous (De 
Houwer, 2006). This refers to the activation of spontaneous attitudes (i.e., 
valenced associations) following exposure to a stimulus, and is supported by 212 
 
neuroimaging data (Kawasaki et al., 2001; Krolak-Salmon et al., 2004; Phelps et 
al., 2000). 
  Goal independence: while people can be taught to ‘cheat’ measures of implicit 
attitudes with specific instructions (Steffens, 2004), there is little evidence that 
people are able to fake the implicit attitude itself (Banse et al., 2001; Kim, 2003; 
Gregg et al., 2006). This is consistent with the automatic activation of implicit 
attitudes. 
  Effortlessness: implicit attitudes appear to operate with little demand on 
resources, effort, or motivation (Hermans et al., 2000; Friese et al., 2008). This 
further supports implicit attitude activation as an automatic, spontaneous 
process. 
 
Secondary to establishing the properties of implicit attitudes is establishing their 
relationship to explicit attitudes. Some researchers have suggested that implicit associations are 
less susceptible to the effects of social desirability and therefore reveal an individual’s “true” 
attitude. This interpretation is not entirely correct. Although measures of implicit attitudes are 
less susceptible to “faking” than explicit ones, classical conditioning studies suggest that implicit 
attitudes are formed through repeated exposure to stimulus-valence pairs (e.g., cake-delicious 
or spider-nasty) (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Olson & Fazio, 2001; Baccus et al., 2004). As a 
consequence, implicit attitudes may be the product of not only personal experience, but also 
the sociocultural norms of the individual’s environment. For example, a non-racist person may 
still hold negative associations with a particular ethnicity if they live in a racist environment 
(Dovidio et al., 2002; Lowery et al., 2001). Dual-process models tend to conceptualise implicit 
and explicit attitudes as two sides of the same coin: the same attitude measured through 
qualitatively different means. However, integrative models such as MODE, APE and the 
Iterative-Reprocessing model (IR; Cunningham et al., 2007) argue that implicit and explicit 
attitudes are different types of response processes. While most behaviour typically does not 213 
 
require much conscious input, a discrepancy between an implicit and an explicit attitude 
creates a state of dissonance, which is then reconciled on an explicit level (i.e., consciously and 
deliberately). In the racism example, a person may internalise pervasive prejudiced messages 
on an implicit level, but still be aware of the content of their implicit attitudes. This will allow 
them to explicitly assess the validity of these attitudes and, if necessary, modify their 
behavioural response. Alternatively, if no conflict arises between the implicit and explicit 
response, behaviour can proceed with little conscious interference. Implicit and explicit 
attitudes are therefore best conceptualised as different attitudinal responses to the same 
concept: interactive, but qualitatively distinct. 
The final key question in conceptualising implicit attitudes is what, exactly, is activated. 
Most dual-process models describe implicit attitudes as a binary connection: stimulus to 
valence. In some cases this is likely done for the sake of simplicity; many studies have a specific 
interest in association strengths between a concept and positivity or negativity. As a result, 
studies which have demonstrated implicit attitude change as a consequence of changing the 
response context (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Tourangeau et al., 1989) have been 
interpreted as testament to the instability of implicit attitudes. However, these results can 
better be explained through parallel distributed processing. Strack and Deutsch (2004) argue 
that implicit attitudes consist of more than a simple stimulus-valence association. Rather, they 
constitute a more complex semantic network of associations (Smith, 1996). The IR model, which 
is grounded in computational neuroscience and supported by neuroimaging data (Bunge & 
Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo et al., 2008), also suggests a more intricate associative network. Individual 
differences in associations could exist as a product of personal experience or social norms. 
However, individual association strengths are also thought to change on the basis of context, 
information prime, salience or on-line behavioural goals. According to this approach, implicit 
attitude change could be the consequence of temporary changes in processing distribution, 
rather than a “reprogramming” of existing connections. 214 
 
The present body of research was therefore designed with the assumptions that implicit 
attitudes a) are automatic, effortless and goal-independent in their activation, b) are formed 
and changed through repeated exposure to target-valence pairs, c) underlie automatic 
behaviour unless a conflict with explicit attitudes occurs, in which case the discrepancy is 
addressed explicitly, and d) consist of a complex semantic network of associations, rather than 
a simple target-valence pairing. 
 
2. Research overview 
 
2.1. STUDY 1 
 
 Study 1 was designed to a) replicate previous research which suggests that self-esteem 
discrepancy is associated with elevated ED pathology, b) determine whether self-esteem 
discrepancy is a better predictor of ED pathology than explicit self-esteem alone, and c) develop 
a structural equation model to determine if perfectionism acts as a moderator between 
discrepant self-esteem and ED pathology. Only one other study has addressed implicit self-
esteem in a non-clinical sample (Hoffmeister et al., 2010); however, it was focused on dietary 
restraint only. A significant group x self-esteem interaction study 1 supported the hypothesis 
that self-esteem discrepancy is associated with several aspects of elevated ED pathology 
(including dietary restraint, weight concern, shape concern and eating concern) – even at sub-
clinical levels. However, in contrast to previous studies, high-pathology participants had 
significantly lower implicit – as well as explicit – self-esteem. Further analyses of self-esteem 
discrepancy as a predictor of ED pathology failed to result in significant R square change, which 
suggests that self-esteem discrepancy has limited predictive or diagnostic value, at least at sub-
clinical levels. Finally, perfectionism was not correlated with ED pathology in the sample, which 
did not allow for the development of a structural equation model. 
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2.2. STUDY 2  
 
Studies 2 and 3 were designed to assess an “ego depletion” model of implicit food 
attitudes and eating pathology. Research suggests that implicit attitudes are more closely 
associated with impulsive, automatic behaviour. It was hypothesised that people with high ED 
pathology are more likely to engage in dietary restriction and/or restraint, which would 
diminish their self-control capacity, resulting in a state of ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 
1998; Hofmann et al., 2007). Because behaviour is less controlled and more automatic in a state 
of ego depletion, positive implicit associations could then be expected to have a stronger 
influence on behaviour. This hypothesis rested on the assumption that most people hold 
positive implicit associations with high-fat, high-calorie food. Study 2 was therefore designed to 
test this assumption as the first step to assessing the ego depletion model of eating behaviour. 
It was hypothesised that a) both high- and low-pathology participants would hold positive 
implicit associations with high-fat foods, relative to low-fat foods, b) there would be no group 
differences in implicit food attitudes between the groups, and c) high-pathology participants 
would be more susceptible to ego depletion following a dietary restraint task. Consistent with 
the second hypothesis, no group differences in IAT-D performance were found between the 
high-pathology and the low-pathology group. However, contrary to Hypothesis 1, only low-
pathology participants had a significant implicit preference for desserts compared to 
vegetables; high-pathology participants did not have such a preference. It was not possible to 
assess differences in ego depletion, as the results of the study suggest that the manipulation 
failed to induce ego depletion. A follow-up pilot using an adapted methodology also failed to 
yield satisfactory results.  However, unexpected group differences in implicit attitudes did not 
support the ego depletion model as an account of eating behaviour in elevated ED pathology, 
thus it was unlikely that any group differences in ego depletion, even if they had been found, 
could have accounted for differences in eating behaviour. Nevertheless, Study 3 was designed 
to take an alternative methodological approach to assessing the link between implicit food 216 
 
attitudes and automatic eating behaviour, as well as more ecologically valid recruitment 
criteria. 
 
2.3. STUDY 3 
 
Methodological flaws in Study 2 made it impossible to carry out an assessment of 
differences in ego depletion between high- and low-pathology participants. As a follow-on, 
Study 3 was still designed as an assessment of the ego depletion model, but focused on 
measuring the hypothesised behavioural effect of implicit food attitudes on behaviour. 
Automatic approach and avoidance tendencies towards high-fat and low-fat food were 
assessed as precursors of impulsive eating – which is the hypothetical outcome of ego 
depletion. The findings of Study 2 could be attributed to the wide spectrum of the pathology 
criteria included in the high-pathology group, Study 3 was focused on dieters as a group which 
is a) a more naturalistic representation of behaviour outside the lab, and b) a more specific 
behavioural, rather than cognitive, criterion. Finally, the study assessed the potential role of 
implicit food attitudes and automatic approach/avoidance tendencies in dietary restraint 
failure. It was hypothesised that a) there would be no differences in implicit food attitudes 
between dieters and non-dieters, b) dieters would have stronger approach tendencies towards 
high-fat foods as a consequence of chronic ego depletion, c) unsuccessful dieters would hold 
stronger positive implicit associations with high-fat food compared to the successful, and d) as a 
result, successful dieters would be more likely to approach low-fat foods than the unsuccessful. 
None of the hypotheses were supported by the results. Only non-dieters held an implicit 
preference for high-fat foods, and dieters were slower to approach desserts than non-dieters. 
No significant differences in IAT-D or in approach/avoidance tendencies were found between 
successful and unsuccessful restrained eaters. However, descriptively, unsuccessful restrained 
eaters had a stronger implicit preference for low-fat food compared to the successful. These 
findings serve to further reject the hypothesis that the ego depletion model could be used to 217 
 
explain the dietary behaviour associated with dieting. Differences in implicit food attitudes also 
did not appear to explain why some dieters are relatively more successful than others. 
 
2.4. STUDY 4 
 
 The results of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that people with elevated ED pathology and 
dieters may not have typical implicit preferences for high-fat over low-fat foods. Study 4 was a 
longitudinal study designed to address whether these differences are chronic, or whether they 
develop as a consequence of restrained eating. Implicit food attitudes in the dieter group were 
assessed before and after a self-reported dieting period. Although significant differences 
between dieters and non-dieters were found in session 2, but not in session 1, the session x 
group interaction failed to reach significance, which suggests that dieters did not change their 
implicit food attitudes over the course of the study. However, further analyses suggested that 
participants in the diet group did not engage in higher levels of restriction or restraint between 
sessions 1 and 2, despite reporting having dieted. The results of Study 4 are therefore most 
likely attributable to insufficiently rigorous control of dieting participants’ eating behaviour, 
rather than a demonstrable lack of implicit attitude change.  
 
2.5. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLICIT 
SELF-ESTEEM RESEARCH 
 
Within the context of clinical ED pathology, implicit attitude research has the potential to 
be a useful diagnostic tool, for reasons discussed in Chapter I: namely, the mostly non-
conscious nature of implicit attitudes could be used to circumvent some of the difficulties 
associated with ED diagnosis and treatment, such as social desirability, denial, reluctance to be 
treated and the likelihood of relapse. Study 2, for example, was designed with the intention of 
clinical replication. It was hypothesised that high-pathology participants would retain positive 
implicit associations with high-fat food, which would then affect impulsive behaviour in a state 218 
 
of ego depletion. The hypothesis was not supported, however these results cannot be 
generalised to a clinical population. Further studies could assess, for example, differences in 
implicit associations between food and palatability in bulimic populations compared to healthy 
controls, which could partially account for the binge-purge cycle. If this is the case, further 
assessments could be made of whether conditioning changes to these associations in a 
laboratory setting could have an effect on actual behaviour. However, ultimately the results of 
Study 2 and Study 3 suggest that, in a non-clinical population, the ego depletion model is an 
unlikely explanation for the eating behaviours associated with sub-clinical levels of ED 
pathology. 
Study 1 was similarly designed as an assessment of whether discrepancy between 
implicit and explicit self-esteem could potentially be used as a risk-assessment tool when 
identifying people at risk for developing elevated levels of ED pathology. While the results 
supported the presence of a self-esteem discrepancy in the high-pathology group (relative to 
the low-pathology group), it was not found to be a significant predictor of pathology. Thus, 
compared to other risk factors for developing ED symptoms (e.g., internalising the thin ideal, 
history of dieting, or demographic factors such as age and gender), implicit self-esteem does 
not appear to be a particularly useful or practical diagnostic tool. Nevertheless, research in 
implicit self-esteem within this area is significant for understanding the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in ED pathology. 
Studies 3 and 4 had a more theoretical focus, with the aim of understanding the 
relationship between dieting behaviour (and particularly diet “success”) and implicit food 
attitudes. In Study 3 it was hypothesised, within the context of the ego depletion model, that 
dieters and non-dieters would have similar implicit attitudes towards food. This hypothesis was 
not supported, and no implicit food attitude differences were found between successful and 
unsuccessful dieters. However, both Study 3 and Study 4 found that dieters did not hold 
positive implicit attitudes towards high-fat foods, in contrast to non-dieters. This finding opens 
up a new research avenue, towards a better understanding of how implicit attitudes can change 219 
 
and evolve as a consequence of changes in dietary behaviour or cognition. Study 4 was 
designed to address whether implicit attitude differences between dieters and non-dieters 
were a priori, or the consequence of the diet itself. Although the methodology of the study was 
unsuccessful (participants in the dieter group did not, apparently, diet between sessions), the 
results raised questions about whether implementation intentions alone could be sufficient in 
inducing implicit attitude change. Further research (outlined in the Discussion section of Study 
4) in this area could disambiguate how implicit attitudes change under naturalistic settings, and 
shed further light on our understanding of how implicit mechanisms interact with conscious 
cognitions and behaviour. However, it must also be noted that the results of Study 2 and 3 
suggest that the behavioural effects of implicit food attitudes on food-related behaviour (e.g., 
approach and avoidance), if it exists at all, is minimal. 
 
3. Self-esteem and eating disorder pathology 
 
Some research had previously addressed the role of implicit self-esteem in clinical ED 
pathology, with most findings suggesting that it is associated with discrepant self-esteem: low 
explicit, but high implicit. Differentiations between self-esteem which is “genuine” or “not 
genuine” already exist in explicit self-esteem research. For example, models of “defensive” self-
esteem (e.g., Schneider & Turket, 1975) suggest that some “high” self-esteem is, in fact, a 
defensive mechanism to buffer against ego threat, rather than a “true” positive attitude 
towards the self. However, little research has addressed discrepant self-esteem in sub-clinical 
ED pathology. The results of Study 1 suggest that even at sub-clinical levels there are 
differences in the interaction between explicit and implicit self-esteem. 
The role of low explicit self-esteem in eating pathology is fairly well understood. Body 
dissatisfaction can initially lead to a decrease in self-esteem, which the person may attempt to 
“solve” through dietary restraint. This will frequently be met with failure, and reinforce low self-
esteem. This pattern is exacerbated by the fact that people with low self-esteem tend to 220 
 
experience personal failure more severely (Stotland et al., 1957) and are more likely to attribute 
it to internal causes (Fitch, 1970). Every failure (such as a lapse in dietary restraint or weight 
loss falling short of expectations) contributes to a chronic, negative self-evaluation, which then 
moulds expectations about future performance (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). 
Given that people with elevated ED pathology are prone to low self-esteem, it appears 
inconsistent for them to report high levels of implicit self-esteem. Research in implicit attitudes 
suggests that people are, at least to some extent, aware of their implicit associations. The 
“glimmer of hope” explanation (Spencer, Jordan, Logel, & Zanna, 2005; Zeigler-Hill & Terry, 
2007) suggests that people with high explicit/low implicit self-esteem possess an “unconscious 
optimism”: positive self-associations which are nevertheless “overridden” by conscious 
introspection. It has further been hypothesised that this discrepancy creates a state of 
dissonance, which manifests as psychological distress, including ED pathology (Cockerham et 
al., 2009). The “glimmer of hope” hypothesis is arguably consistent with both the MODE model 
of implicit cognition (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), and with the Sociometer model of explicit 
self-esteem (Leary & Downs, 1995). Implicit attitudes are thought to form through repeated 
stimulus-valence presentations, either in close spatial or temporal proximity. Explicit attitudes, 
on the other hand, develop and change as a consequence of information processing. This would 
suggest that people with elevated ED pathology are exposed to similar self-relevant stimuli 
(leading to high implicit self-esteem) to those with low ED pathology; however, those with high 
pathology reject these associations through deliberative processes. The MODE model was 
largely developed within the context of social psychology, and as a model of social behaviour. 
Its authors (Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) argue that automatic processes will 
typically guide behaviour and cognition unless there is motivation and opportunity to engage in 
deliberative processes to override them. It would appear that people with elevated pathology 
are doing just that. The Sociometer theory of self-esteem posits that self-esteem is socially 
constructed as an indicator of our own competence relative to other people in society – it may 
therefore be possible that the feelings of positive self-worth which people with elevated ED 221 
 
pathology retain on an implicit level are constructed subjectively, through personal experiences 
and self-relevant stimuli. Their explicit self-esteem, by contrast, reflects an “objective” 
comparison with others. As discussed in Chapter III, the presence of positive self-evaluation 
could act as a motivating factor for engaging in further pathological behaviour; the “glimmer of 
hope” that one could eventually objectively measure up to one’s subjective feelings. Perhaps if 
people with high explicit self-esteem are more resilient to stress and ego threat (Dumont & 
Provst, 1999), then similar cognitive effects can be seen in those with high implicit self-esteem. 
These interpretations of self-esteem discrepancy are consistent with the evidence 
available to date, including the results of Study 1; however, significantly more research is 
required before it can be confirmed. There is no definitive theory to address the function of 
self-esteem, and its effects on cognition and pathology are not yet well understood. Further 
research is necessary in people with low explicit and low implicit self-esteem, to assess 
relevance to incidence and severity of ED pathology. Longitudinal research should also address 
the question of whether self-esteem discrepancy precipitates pathology, or is a symptom 
thereof. However, the fact that self-esteem discrepancy failed to predict pathology levels in 
Study 1 suggests that, at least at sub-clinical levels, it may not be as important in the 
development and maintenance of ED symptoms as previously thought. The current 
understanding of its role and function are insufficient to consider practical uses of these 
findings in screening or diagnostic procedures at this stage. 
 
4. Implicit food attitudes and eating behaviour 
 
Studies 2 and 3 were designed to address the potential role of implicit food attitudes in, 
respectively, elevated ED pathology and in dieting. The overarching premise was an “ego 
depletion” model, aimed at explaining disinhibited eating following diet failure. Although many 
factors play a role in dietary restraint failure (including homeostatic mechanisms and 
emotions), this model addressed potential cognitive underpinnings which could also be 222 
 
relevant. The model proposes that most people hold positive implicit associations with high-fat, 
high-calorie food. The act of dietary restraint induces a state of ego depletion, in which self-
control capacity is diminished and behaviour becomes less controlled and more impulsive. This 
results in an increased probability of acting on implicit associations with high-fat food by 
indulging in it, therefore resulting in dietary restraint failure. Further hypotheses were designed 
to assess whether individual differences in susceptibility to ego depletion, or in implicit food 
attitudes, could contribute to dietary restraint failure. 
Contrary to expectations, the first premise of the model was not supported. People high 
in ED pathology, or in restraint, consistently exhibited attenuated positive associations with 
high-fat food. It must be noted that despite the fact that the phenomenon of ego depletion is 
well established and has been extensively replicated (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 
2010), the ego depletion paradigm used in Study 2 was not successful. Nevertheless, the results 
from the implicit attitude measure do not support the hypothesised model. If people with 
elevated pathology do not hold an implicit preference for high-fat food, such associations 
cannot, by definition, drive impulsive eating behaviour in a state of ego depletion. The model is 
therefore unlikely to be a suitable account for the cognitive processes which underlie 
disinhibited eating following dietary restraint. 
Possible explanations for this pattern of results can be derived from either the APE 
model, or the IR model. The APE model suggests that implicit attitude change occurs when a 
novel affective reaction to an old stimulus takes place. If group differences in implicit food 
attitudes are the result of implicit attitude change (i.e., high-fat food preference is attenuated 
as a consequence of dietary restraint or increased body dissatisfaction), then they could be 
explained by changes in affective response. Presumably, once a person begins dietary restraint, 
certain food change in subjective valence – e.g., cake becomes “fattening” rather than “tasty”. 
This hypothesis was supported by increased ambivalence towards high-fat foods in the high-
pathology group in Study 2. However, the APE model posits that implicit attitude change can 
only take place if the novel affective response is also endorsed by propositional reasoning. 223 
 
Participants in Studies 2 and 3 maintained positive explicit associations with high-fat foods, 
which indicates a lack of such endorsement. This dissonance between the implicit and the 
explicit attitude is similar to that observed in Study 1, which assessed self-esteem. Perhaps the 
discrepancy reflects differences in the mechanisms of attitude change on an implicit and explicit 
level. Restrained participants may be engaging in a self-imposed type of operant conditioning, 
in an attempt to change the way they think about foods which are inconsistent with their 
weight loss goal. However, there is no research which definitively supports or rejects this 
explanation, so further research is necessary to obtain better insight into thought processes 
common during dietary restraint. Furthermore, the results of Study 4 did not fully support 
implicit attitude change as a consequence of restraint, so evidence to support the APE model 
account is currently limited. 
An alternative explanation can be derived from the IR model. The IR model suggests that 
implicit attitudes consist of complex semantic networks. Parallel distributed processing allows 
for different associations to be activated under different contexts. It is possible that, instead of 
attitude change, the context of dietary restraint temporarily activates a different set of implicit 
associations, such as “cake – fattening” rather than “cake – tasty”. Changes to motivation and 
salience under the new diet goal could mean that different stimuli are attended to in the 
everyday environment (e.g., gym advertisements rather than fast food deals), or attended to 
from a different perspective. Some research indeed supports the idea that context can change 
the outcomes of implicit measures (Sherman et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2003). However, the IR 
model is strongly based in neuroimaging data, and this explanation is therefore best explored 
through, for example, fMRI research, in order to detect any functional differences in response 
to food words in a state of dietary restraint, and not. 
Overall, the findings of Study 2 and 3 suggest that ego depletion is not likely to play a 
significant role in eating disinhibition following dieting. In fact, the results were contrary to 
expectations: people with elevated ED pathology appear to have less positive associations with 
high-fat food. Further research is required to disambiguate what causes changes in implicit food 224 
 
attitudes. Future studies may assess changes in such attitudes following a) changes in goal 
salience, b) changes in context (e.g., after reading a tasty recipe versus after reading a pamphlet 
on the dangers of obesity), or c) changes in eating behaviour. Study 4 was designed to assess 
implicit attitude change following changes to eating behaviour. Although the results failed to 
reach significance, the results were consistent with implicit attitude change, rather than chronic 
cognitive differences between restrained and unrestrained eaters. Analyses of dieters’ 
behaviour suggested that they did not actively engage in dietary restraint: there were no 
differences in the frequency of food intake, hunger levels, self-reported restraint, or weight 
loss. The descriptive differences could have therefore taken place as a result of activating the 
diet goal alone, even if behaviour was unchanged. If this is the case, the result is consistent with 
the IR model, as a change in context (from not dieting to dieting) would have been sufficient to 
result in changes to implicit associations with high-fat food. Longitudinal research which 
disambiguates participants who change their behaviour from those who merely change their 
intentions is therefore necessary to track how this, respectively, affects implicit food attitudes. 
 
5. An evaluation of the IAT for implicit attitude 
assessment 
 
The reasons for using the IAT over the course of this Thesis have already been outlined in 
Chapter II (good psychometric properties; extensive body of supporting research), Chapter III 
(allows for comparison of relative associations strengths between stimuli; commonly used, 
which allows for comparison to other study outcomes), and Chapter VI (superior test-retest 
reliability compared to other implicit measures). However, the conceptual relevance of the IAT 
in the context of theoretical models of implicit attitudes had not yet been discussed in detail. 
The IAT can be arguably be considered to be consistent with the IR model. If implicit attitudes 
are formed within a semantic network, with different connections active based on context or 
on-line goals, then the IAT is the most appropriate measure to assess such changes within the 225 
 
context of eating pathology. Unipolar measures can assess positive and negative associations 
with a single target variable, such as “food”. The IAT, however, can detect changes in 
associations in one target concept relative to another; e.g., has liking for high-fat foods changed 
relative to low-fat foods? Has liking for food changed relative to fitness? If changes to 
association strengths take place as a result of context, the IAT can essentially use one target 
variable as an anchor point for comparison of another. This is particularly pertinent for Study 4, 
which was specifically concerned with implicit attitude change. It must be noted, however, that 
the IAT’s sensitivity to changes in context could also be considered a limitation. It is unclear how 
fast context can change implicit attitude activation. Some studies suggest that the “re-wiring” is 
instant (Sherman et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2003); however, the results of Study 4 suggest that 
two weeks of change in goal salience could have been an insufficient time period to yield 
statistically significant group differences. Further studies tracking implicit attitude change at 
several time points (for example, after an hour, a day, a week, two weeks, and a month) is 
necessary to develop a clearer picture of how implicit attitudes change under a naturalistic 
setting. 
Some of the criticisms which have been applied to the IAT are also relevant to the 
present body of research. For instance, it has been argued that salience symmetries could have 
an affect the IAT-D (Rothermund & Wentura, 2001). In Study 2, the “dessert” category included 
desserts which were highest-rated for taste, while the “vegetable” category included 
vegetables which were the lowest-rated for taste. This could potentially introduce an external 
bias to participants’ responses. However, this criticism is dependent on whether the IAT 
procedure is considered feature-relevant (each stimulus is processed independently) or feature-
irrelevant (each stimulus is encoded as an “exemplar” of its category). Although this issue is still 
open to debate, it must be noted that Study 3 included vegetables highest-rated for taste in the 
IAT, and found very similar result patterns to Study 2. 
Susceptibility to the effects of stimulus familiarity is another criticism of the IAT 
(Dasgupta et al., 2003). Indeed, explicit food ratings indicate that not all participants were 226 
 
familiar with the taste of all the foods used in the stimulus set. This could have potentially 
affected the results, as the IAT is designed to measure existing implicit associations with familiar 
stimuli. Ideally, stimuli used in implicit food attitude research should be tailored to each 
individual participant’s preferences and experiences. Unfortunately this was not feasible to 
implement in the current research due to practical constraints. 
Finally, the test-retest correlation of the Food IAT (r=.497), although comparable to the 
IAT median of r=.56 obtained by Egloff et al. (2005), and considerably higher than the lowest 
value of r=.16, was still not at a level desirable for a repeated measures design.  There are two 
possibilities to explain the relatively low correlation: a) the IAT is susceptible to a large amount 
of residual error, b) implicit attitudes are not very stable over time. These explanations are 
difficult to disambiguate, since it is impossible to measure implicit attitudes without using an 
implicit attitude measure; thus, any quantitative index of implicit attitudes will be, by default, 
an artefact of using an implicit attitude measure. Some studies have suggested that implicit 
attitudes are fairly malleable and can be changed over the course of one experimental study 
(Baccus et al., 2004; Olson & Fazio, 2001). However, little research has addressed the 
naturalistic conditions under which implicit attitudes do or do not change, contextual influences 
on change, and the time scales in which such change can take place. Alternatively, a 
methodological assessment of the IAT is necessary to explain the large variability in effect sizes 
(Greenwald et al., 2009) and correlations with explicit measures (Hofmann et al., 2005) which 
can be found across different IAT studies. 
 
Alternatives. Although alternatives to the IAT exist, many of them have various 
conceptual or methodological problems of their own. Test-retest reliabilities tend to be lower in 
other measures than in the IAT. The IRAP is a promising measure, but is derived from the REC 
model, which means that it places emphasis on language comprehension and semantic 
relationships, but not necessarily cognitive models of implicit cognition. Furthermore, the 
majority of the research in its support has been conducted by a single research team; 227 
 
replication from other research labs would be desirable. The EAST is a commonly used measure 
in implicit attitude research, but its predictive validity and other psychometric properties fall 
short of the IAT (De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). Nevertheless, it is a unipolar measure which 
can be used as an alternative to the IAT in studies which are specifically interested in single, 
rather than relative, implicit associations. De Houwer (2006) argues that subliminal affective 
priming paradigms (e.g., Klauer et al., 2003; Wentura et al., 2005) are the best available 
approach to implicit attitude assessment. However, as noted in Chapter II, there are issues with 
ecological validity, as we are usually aware of stimuli to which we react. Second, it is another 
unipolar measure, which may not be appropriate for studies which are specifically interested in 
relative association strengths. Nevertheless it is a strong candidate for implicit attitude 
assessment in future research. 
One of the problems with the available implicit attitude measures is that, despite the fact 
that they are all designed to measure implicit attitudes, convergent validity is rather low 
(Bosson et al., 2000). However, the reasons for this are not very well understood. Few studies 
assess the same concept using an array of different implicit measures; this makes it difficult to 
discuss possible differences in the different measures’ outcomes. Furthermore, the available 
measures currently assess either a) unipolar associations between target variable and valence, 
or b) relative associations between two target variables and valence. If a semantic network 
proposed in the IR model is valid, then a measure assessing the strengths of all immediately 
relevant associations may be necessary to develop. Ideally, such a measure would allow for 
variations to the number and types of variables assessed, and yield a spider-web-like output, 
indicating different connection strengths between the different stimuli. Such a measure will 
allow to measure differences in association strengths following changes in context, behaviour, 
goal salience, or experimental manipulation. However, such a measure may be overly complex 
to structure and analyse. 
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6. Limitations 
 
Participants. The reasons for including females only in the studies have been 
outlined in Chapter III; predominantly, this sample reflects the type of people most likely to 
experience elevated ED symptoms, as well as engage in dieting behaviours. However, these 
issues are certainly not restricted to this demographic only, and a sample consisting 
predominantly of young, slim, educated women still limits the generalizability of the findings. 
Previous research has indicated that social messages about dieting and weight loss are different 
for men than they are for women (Gough, 2007). Given that implicit attitudes are thought to 
develop as a consequence of repeated target-valence pairings, we could also expect men to 
hold different implicit attitudes towards foods compared to women. Further studies should 
address the role of implicit food attitudes in eating behaviour in men, with reference to gender 
differences in  social norms, cultural messages and subjective weight and diet goals (e.g., weight 
loss vs. muscle gain).  Differences in age (Drewnowski & Shultz, 2001) and socioeconomic status 
(Sobal & Stunkard, 1989; Roos, Lahelma, Virtanen, Prättälä, & Pietinen, 1998) are also 
associated with differences in explicit food attitudes and weight, and may therefore also be 
associated with corresponding changes in implicit attitudes towards food. The hypotheses 
addressed over the course of this thesis therefore cannot be generalised to all populations until 
further converging evidence from other populations emerges. That said, while we may expect 
some differences in implicit attitudes based on demographic variables, many social norms can 
be generalised to the Western population as a whole (e.g., thin is generally perceived as 
“better” than fat; self-control is generally “better” than lack thereof, regardless of gender, age, 
socioeconomic status, or education). 
Stimuli. The IATs used in Studies 2-4 used a rather simple dessert-vegetable dichotomy 
as a proxy for high-fat vs. low-fat foods. This was necessary within the methodology of the IAT, 
which requires target categories to be simple to categorise in order to ensure rapid responses 
from the participants. Nevertheless, this dichotomy is a very small aspect of the complexity of 229 
 
the types of food which are available in modern Western society. The “desserts” category also 
only pertains to sweet high-fat foods. Although research suggests that a liking for sugar is 
biologically innate (Birch, 1999; Drewnowski & Greenwood, 1983), it is possible that some 
participants simply do not have a strong liking for sugary foods, which could have affected the 
data. Indeed, some participants in the second ego depletion pilot (Study 2) have informally 
reported that a broader array of foods would have been more to their liking. Ideally, future 
studies should collect food preference data from participants prior to data collection, and tailor 
the IAT stimuli for each individual. This would result in findings which are more reflective of the 
individual experience and have more ecological validity. 
 
Design. Some of the methodological approaches used over the course of this Thesis 
did not prove to be successful. The ego depletion methodology designed in Study 2 failed to 
actually induce ego depletion, despite the fact that it was based on well replicated 
methodology (Hagger et al., 2010). The differences made to classical ego depletion 
manipulations were made with the intention of replicating Study 2 in a clinical sample, and 
therefore were subject to ethical considerations of data collection in this context. Because no 
suitable methodology was found, a clinical replication could not take place. However, further 
results from Study 3 suggested that the ego depletion model was not a viable explanation for 
disinhibited eating behaviour in elevated ED pathology. Nevertheless, a different pattern of 
results might be expected in clinical populations. One study has already found an attenuated 
implicit preference towards high-fat food in people with AN (Roefs et al., 2005); however, 
implicit food attitudes have not yet been assessed in bulimia nervosa. 
Methodology used in Study 4 also relied on self-report to identify restrained eaters. 
However, post-hoc analyses of eating behaviour suggested that restrained eaters did not 
actually engage in more restraint during the study than at baseline. This suggests that more 
stringent measures should be taken by future studies to ensure that behaviour which is central 
to the hypotheses of the study is adhered to. Further assessment of implicit attitude change 230 
 
under naturalistic conditions should also yield better parameters for the amount of time 
between sessions which should be sufficient for such change to take place. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The present Thesis was designed to assess the role of implicit attitudes towards food and 
the self in sub-clinical eating disorder pathology. Theoretical approaches to conceptualising 
implicit attitudes have been discussed, as well as different approaches towards implicit attitude 
measurement. Although no single theoretical model has been used in the discussion of the 
findings, the APE model and the IR model have been particularly appropriate in the 
development of possible explanations to account for the results. The IAT has been consistently 
used in the measurement of implicit attitudes. Although the measure has several limitations, it 
was the most appropriate given the relativistic nature of the majority of the hypotheses. The 
results of the empirical research suggest that discrepant self-esteem is prevalent in elevated ED 
pathology, but perhaps not integral to determining symptom severity, at least in a non-clinical 
sample. The hypothesis that implicit food attitudes underlie impulsive eating in a state of ego 
depletion was not supported. Contrary to expectations, people with elevated ED symptoms 
appear to have attenuated positive associations with high-fat food, with some indication that 
this tendency may be even more pronounced in unsuccessful restrained eaters. Finally, some 
indication was found that dietary restraint – or even the mere intention to engage in dietary 
restraint – could have an effect on implicit food attitudes. Research into the role of implicit 
cognition in eating disorder pathology is still in its infancy; a number of different assumptions 
and hypotheses must be addressed experimentally before a clear understand of the role of 
implicit attitudes in eating behaviour can emerge. Implicit measures themselves are prone to 
methodological flaws, and refining the available methodology is necessary to minimise error in 
the research results. 231 
 
Although implicit cognition is a young and promising field of research, findings from the 
current studies suggest that it may not play as significant a role in eating disorder pathology as 
previously hypothesised. Nevertheless, there are many future avenues for research to be 
undertaken in the field. A better understanding of implicit attitude change is needed, including 
whether (and how easily) such change occurs as a consequence of changes in implementation 
intentions, goal salience, or behaviour. The time scale of such changes is also not yet well 
understood. The IAT procedure could be improved with regards to test-retest stability, as its 
current psychometric properties do not lend themselves well to longitudinal design. Future 
studies in implicit food attitudes should consider tailoring stimuli to participants’ individual 
preferences in order to simulate real life experiences as closely as possible. Replications of the 
findings should also be made in male populations, with reference to gender differences in 
eating behaviours and ED pathology. 
Finally, the results could be extended to clinical ED contexts. Although the results of 
Study 1 did not support a practical application for implicit self-esteem assessment, it may still 
be adapted for screening or progress assessment in clinical patients. Very few studies have 
assessed implicit food attitudes in AN or BN, which could help understand the cognitive changes 
which take place on an implicit level following pathological changes to behaviour. Longitudinal 
research is also necessary to ascertain if changes to implicit food attitudes take place between 
sub-clinical and clinical levels of pathology, and if such changes do exist if they can be used in 
predicting treatment outcomes or likelihood of relapse. Although hypotheses on the role of 
implicit cognition in clinical EDs are, at this stage, tentative, further research in this area could 
help the development of a better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
behaviour which is less controlled, or attitudes which are less consciously accessible.    232 
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Glossary of terms 
 
 
AAT  Approach Avoidance Task 
AN  Anorexia nervosa 
APE  Associative-Propositional Evaluation 
AST  Affective Simon Task 
BED  Binge Eating Disorder 
BN  Bulimia nervosa 
DEBQ  Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire 
D-IRAP  An algorithm for calculating performance on the IRAP 
DTS  Differential task-switching 
EAST  Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 
ED  Eating disorder 
EDE-Q  Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire 
EDNOS  Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified 
EFAQ  Explicit food attitudes questionnaire (Study 2) 
HCS  Hunger and craving scale (Study 2) 
IAT  Implicit Association Test 
IAT-D  An algorithm for calculating performance on the IAT 
IR  Iterative Reprocessing 
IRAP  Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
MODE  Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants of Behaviour 
MPS  Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale 
NLE  Name Letter Effect 
NLT  Name Letter Test 
PFC  Prefrontal cortex 
PPPQ  Persistence, Perseveration and Perfectionism Questionnaire 
RE  Restrained eater 
REC  Relational Elaboration and Coherence 
REP  Relational Evaluation Procedure 
RSES  Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
SAWBS  Shape- and Weight-based Self-esteem 
SC-IAT  Single-category Implicit Association Test 
SE-IAT  Self-esteem Implicit Association Test 
TFEQ  Three Factor Eating Questionnaire 
TMT  Terror Management Theory 
unRE  Unrestrained eater 
UPPS-P  Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance and Sensation seeking Impulsivity Scale 
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Information Sheet 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet. 
Title of the Project: Implicit cognition and eating behaviours 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee CEHP/2010A/018 
Researcher contact details: 
Alisa Anokhina 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London WC1E 7HB 
e-mail: alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk 
tel.: 0207 679 8275 
 
Lucy Serpell 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London WC1E 7HB 
e-mail: l.serpell@ucl.ac.uk 
tel.: 0207 679 8275 
 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this research project. You should only participate if you want to; 
choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take 
part, it is important for you to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or you would like more information. 
The purpose of this study is to look at the relationship between people’s beliefs and their eating behaviours. 
By studying these patterns we hope to better understand how eating disorders can develop and how people 
with eating disorders can be better helped. 
The study should take no more than half an hour. You will be asked to complete a computerised task and to 
fill in some questionnaires. Some of the questions are related to your eating habits and the beliefs you have 
about eating and weight. Your responses are completely confidential and your responses will be identified 
only by a participant number which, after the completion of the study, will not be connected to you in any 
way. It will be helpful if you can complete the questionnaires in full, however, if you feel uncomfortable 
answering any of the questions, you are not required to give a response. 
Finally, we will ask to take your measurements (height and weight). 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you choose not to participate it will involve no 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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Appendix I: Study 1 informed consent form 
 
Participant _______ 
 
 
 
   
 
Informed Consent Form 
Title of the Project: Implicit cognition and eating behaviours 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee CEHP/2010A/018 
Participant’s Statement: 
I, ________________________________________________ 
agree that I have 
  read the information sheet and/or the project has been explained to me orally; 
  had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study; 
  received satisfactory answers to all my questions or have been advised of an individual to contact 
for answers to pertinent questions about the research and my rights as a participant and whom to 
contact in the event of a research-related injury. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without penalty if I so wish and I consent to the 
processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study only and that it will not be used for 
any other purpose. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled 
in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Signed:                                                                Date: 
____________________________________     _________________ 
Investigator’s Statement: 
I, ________________________________________________ 
confirm that I have carefully explained the purpose of the study to the participant and outlined any 
reasonably foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable).  
Signed:                                                                Date: 
____________________________________     _________________ 285 
 
Appendix I: Study debrief sheet 
 
 
Debrief Sheet 
You will be given a copy of this debriefing sheet. 
Title of the Project: Implicit cognition and eating behaviours 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee CEHP/2010A/018 
 
The purpose of study was to find the way self-esteem, perfectionism and eating behaviour are related. Some 
studies show that eating disorder symptomatology (such as chronic dieting) is related to “discrepant self-
esteem”: reflective feelings of low self-worth (measured using a questionnaire) coupled with intuitive feelings 
of positive self-worth (measured using the computer task). Research also suggests that discrepant self-esteem 
is also related to high perfectionism, which tends to be elevated in disordered eating. We are trying to explain 
these associations and untangle the relationship between these three components. 
 
If you are worried about your eating behaviour, your relationship with food or have any concerns about your 
body image, you should contact your GP. Alternatively, you can contact Beat, a UK-based eating disorders 
charity. Their website (www.b-eat.co.uk) contains information about eating disorders and getting help for 
yourself or anyone you might be concerned about. Their helpline number is 0845 634 1414. You can also 
email help@b-eat.co.uk 
 
If you would like to contact the researchers, please email Alisa Anokhina on alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk or 
call 02076798275. 
 
Thank you for taking part! 
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Appendix I: Study 1 demographic questionnaire 
 
 
Participant _______ 
Demographic questionnaire 
Age: _____ 
Ethnicity: 
White     
Asian or Asian British                           
Black or Black British                            
Mixed   
Chinese   
Other __________________________   
 
Nationality: _____________________ 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with an eating disorder? 
Yes                  No             Prefer not to say            
 
If yes, which? 
 
Anorexia nervosa                                
Bulimia nervosa                                  
EDNOS   
Binge Eating Disorder                         
Other __________________________   
 
When were you diagnosed? 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
Height: __________________________ 
 
Weight: __________________________ 
 
BMI: _____________________________ 
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Appendix II: Study 2 information sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Participants in Research Studies 
You may request a copy of this information sheet. 
 
 
 
“Personality, food attitudes and eating disorders” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
Alisa Anokhina 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk 
020 7679 8275 
Lucy Serpell 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
lucy@serpell.com 
020 7679 1256 
 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research project. You should only participate if you want to; 
choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take 
part, please read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or you would like more information. 
 
The aim of the study is to assess people’s eating habits and beliefs about food and eating. You will be asked to 
come in for two sessions, approximately one week apart. In each session you will be asked to fill out some 
questionnaires about your eating habits and attitudes towards different foods, work on a puzzle and complete a 
computer task where you will be asked to respond to different food words. Each session should last under 30 
minutes. 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you choose not to participate, you won't incur any 
penalties or lose any benefits to which you might have been entitled. However, if you do decide to take part, 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and asked to sign a consent form. Even after agreeing to take 
part, you can still withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
 
Please note that, for precautionary reasons, you are not eligible to take part in the study if you are allergic to 
nuts. 
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
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Appendix II: Study 2 informed consent form 
 
 
Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies 
“Personality, food attitudes and eating disorders” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
Participant’s Statement 
 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
agree that I have 
 
read the information sheet and/or the project has been explained to me verbally; 
had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study; and 
received satisfactory answers to all my questions or have been advised of an individual to contact for 
answers to pertinent questions about the research and my rights as a participant and whom to contact 
in the event of a research-related injury. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without penalty if I so wish, and I consent to the 
processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study only and that it will not be used for 
any other purpose. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled 
in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I will be sent a copy.  
Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained, and it will not be possible to identify me from any 
publications. 
I understand that if I am being paid for my assistance in this research some of my personal details will be 
passed to UCL Finance for administration purposes.  
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
 
 
Investigator’s Statement 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
confirm that I have carefully explained the purpose of the study to the participant and outlined any 
reasonably foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable).  
 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
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Appendix II: Study 2 debrief sheet 
 
 
12.12.2011                  version 1 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
“Personality, food attitudes and eating disorders” 
Thank you for taking part in our research. The aim of our study is to understand better why 
some people develop eating disorders and why different people develop different symptoms. 
The two key psychological concepts we are looking at are a) ego depletion and b) implicit food 
attitudes. 
 
Ego depletion refers to the fact that our self-control is limited. Research shows that if you “use 
up” self-control doing something, you will then be less able to exercise self-control afterwards. 
When a person is “tired” from using self-control, they are said to be in a state of ego depletion. 
This can explain why diets often fail: the more self-control a person uses up, the more difficult it 
becomes to continue using it. In this study, we manipulated ego depletion using plates of 
tempting (cookies) and not very tempting (radishes) foods and an unsolvable puzzle task. 
Presumably, not eating a cookie uses up more self-control than not eating a radish – so our 
participants would be more ego depleted in the cookie session than in the radish session. The 
puzzle is another self-control task, since it’s quite boring and requires perseverance. The 
amount of time participants spent on the puzzle task was a measure of how ego depleted they 
were: the more self-control they used up earlier in the session, the less they should have 
persevered. 
 
We measured ego depletion because it could explain behavioural differences between people 
with anorexia and bulimia and people who do not have an eating disorder. We are interested in 
whether resisting eating food depletes people with anorexia less, and people with bulimia 
more, than people without eating disorders. If so, this can partially explain differences in eating 
behaviour between them. 290 
 
 
A second thing we were interested in measuring were implicit attitudes towards food. Implicit 
attitudes are similar to intuition; they are emotional responses we automatically generate 
towards different stimuli, such as different food types. Most people have more positive implicit 
associations with high-fat, calorie-dense foods (like desserts) than low-fat, calorie-sparse ones 
(like vegetables). However, some studies have suggested that people with anorexia don’t have 
implicit preferences one way or the other. Because people tend to act on their impulsive, rather 
than rational, beliefs in a state of ego depletion, this might explain why people with anorexia 
can restrict their intake. 
 
 
If you have any further questions about the study, please contact Alisa Anokhina 
(alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk). If you have any questions about eating disorders or would like to 
seek further help, contact the beat helpline on 0845 634 1414 (if over 18) or 0845 634 7650 (if 
25 or under). 
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Appendix II: Study 2 demographic questionnaire for session 1 
 
Study 2               Participant _______ 
 
Demographic questionnaire (session 1) 
 
Age 
 
 
Which language do you speak most 
comfortably/fluently? 
 
 
Ethnicity  White   
Chinese   
Asian or Asian British   
Black or Black British   
Mixed   
Other  ___________ 
   
 
When was the last time you ate? 
 
 
Height (your best guess if you don’t know) 
 
 
Weight (your best guess if you don’t know) 
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Appendix II: Study 2 demographic questionnaire for session 2 
 
Study 2               Participant _______ 
 
Demographic questionnaire (session 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Nationality 
 
 
When was the last time you ate? 
 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with an 
eating disorder? 
Yes   
No   
Prefer not to say   
 
If yes, which?  Anorexia nervosa   
Bulimia nervosa   
EDNOS   
Binge Eating Disorder   
Prefer not to say   
Other  ___________ 
   
 
If yes, when were you diagnosed? 
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Appendix II: Study 2 explicit food attitudes questionnaire (EFAQ) 
 
Study 2               Participant _______ 
 
Food Attitudes Questionnaire 
Please read the food names below. For each food type, please rate how much you like its taste. 
Some of the foods listed come in different varieties: in those cases, rate the first variety that 
springs to mind. 
 
Beetroot  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Brownie  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Cabbage  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Celery  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Cookie  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Crêpe  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Pie  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Radish  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 294 
 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Turnip  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
 
Next, please rate how strongly you feel overall about the positive and negative aspects of each 
food (including taste, texture, nutritional content, etc.) For example, if you really like the taste 
of beetroot but really dislike its texture you might give a rating of ‘5’ for both positive and 
negative aspects. 
 
Beetroot  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Brownie  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cabbage  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Celery  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cookie  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Crêpe  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Pie  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Radish  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Turnip  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
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Appendix II: Study 2 Hunger and craving scale (HCS) 
 
Study 2             Participant ____ / Cond. ____ 
 
Hunger and craving scale 
 
Please read the statements below and circle the number on the scale which best describes how 
you feel right now. 
 
How hungry do you feel right now? 
 
Not at all  1     -     2     -     3     -     4     -     5    Very much so 
 
How much are you craving a radish right now? 
 
Not at all  1     -     2     -     3     -     4     -     5    Very much so 
 
How much are you craving an apple right now? 
Not at all  1     -     2     -     3     -     4     -     5    Very much so 
 
How much are you craving a cookie right now? 
 
Not at all  1     -     2     -     3     -     4     -     5    Very much so 
 
How much are you craving pasta right now? 
 
Not at all  1     -     2     -     3     -     4     -     5    Very much so 296 
 
Appendix II: Study 2 figures used in the ego depletion procedure 
 
Puzzle task A 
 
Try to draw the figure below without drawing over the same line twice or taking your pen off 
the paper. You are not allowed to bend or fold the paper, or use any other materials. You can 
have as many tries as you want, for as long as you want. Use the back of the page if you run out 
of space. 
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Puzzle task B 
 
Try to draw the figure below without drawing over the same line twice or taking your pen off 
the paper. You are not allowed to bend or fold the paper, or use any other materials. You can 
have as many tries as you want, for as long as you want. Use the back of the page if you run out 
of space. 
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Appendix III: Version 2 of the ego depletion procedure, information sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Participants in Research Studies 
You may request a copy of this information sheet. 
“Sensory food perceptions and cognitive flexibility” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
 
Alisa Anokhina 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk 
020 7679 8275 
Lucy Serpell 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
lucy@serpell.com 
020 7679 1256 
 
 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research project. You should only participate if 
you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you 
decide whether you want to take part, please read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or you would like 
more information. 
 
We are interested in how people evaluate the non-taste properties of food. You will be asked 
to attend two sessions, approximately a week apart, each one lasting approximately 15 
minutes. In each session you will be asked to give you opinion about different aspects (e.g., 
smell, texture, etc.) of different foods. You will then be asked to complete a Stroop task, 
which is a short measure of cognitive flexibility. 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you choose not to participate, you 
won't incur any penalties or lose any benefits to which you might have been entitled. 
However, if you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
asked to sign a consent form. Even after agreeing to take part, you can still withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason.  
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
 299 
 
Appendix III: Version 2 of the ego depletion procedure, informed consent form 
 
Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies 
 
“Sensory food perceptions and cognitive flexibility” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
Participant’s Statement 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
agree that I have 
 
read the information sheet and/or the project has been explained to me verbally; 
had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study; and 
received satisfactory answers to all my questions or have been advised of an individual to 
contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research and my rights as a participant 
and whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without penalty if I so wish, and I 
consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study only and 
that it will not be used for any other purpose. I understand that such information will be 
treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I will be 
sent a copy.  Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained, and it will not be possible to 
identify me from any publications. 
I understand that if I am being paid for my assistance in this research some of my personal 
details will be passed to UCL Finance for administration purposes.  
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
 
 
Investigator’s Statement 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
confirm that I have carefully explained the purpose of the study to the participant and 
outlined any reasonably foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable).  
 
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
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Appendix III: Version 2 of the ego depletion procedure, debrief sheet 
 
 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
“Sensory food perceptions and cognitive flexibility” 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in our research. The study you took part in was a pilot 
study for a research series on ego depletion and eating disorders. 
 
People have a limited ability to exert self-control. When we use self-control we 
deplete our energy stores and become less able to use self-control on a subsequent 
task. We hypothesise that the “sensory perception” task should have depleted 
participants’ self-control energy in the dessert, but not in the vegetable condition – 
because presumably it was difficult not to eat any of the desserts, but fairly easy to 
resist eating the vegetables. Participants should therefore have performed worse on the 
Stroop task in the dessert condition compared to the vegetable condition, as it is a task 
which also requires self-control. 
 
The methodology we are developing will be used in a study with clinical eating 
disorder patients in order to determine how their dietary self-control differs from non 
eating disordered participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have any further questions about the study, please contact Alisa Anokhina 
(alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk). 
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Appendix III: Version 2 of the ego depletion procedure, Stroop task 
BLUE  RED  ORANGE  GREEN 
YELLOW  ORANGE  RED  YELLOW 
PURPLE  YELLOW  BLUE   ORANGE 
PURPLE  BLUE  YELLOW  BLUE 
BLUE  ORANGE  RED  YELLOW 
GREEN   BLUE  PURPLE  GREEN 
GREEN  RED  ORANGE  PURPLE 
BLUE   PURPLE  RED  YELLOW 
GREEN  ORANGE  RED  RED 
RED  PURPLE  BLUE  YELLOW 
BLUE  BLUE  PURPLE  PURPLE 
GREEN  ORANGE  ORANGE  BLUE 
PURPLE  BLUE  GREEN  GREEN 
YELLOW  ORANGE  ORANGE  BLUE 
ORANGE  YELLOW  YELLOW  RED 
RED   PURPLE  GREEN  RED 
BLUE  PURPLE  GREEN   ORANGE 
GREEN  BLUE  RED  PURPLE 
RED  YELLOW  PURPLE  BLUE 
BLUE  GREEN  ORANGE  GREEN 
RED  YELLOW  RED  BLUE 
ORANGE  BLUE  GREEN  RED 
PURPLE  RED  PURPLE  BLUE 
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Appendix III: Version 2 of the ego depletion procedure, “Sensory perception questionnaire” 
(excerpt from desserts version) 
 
Sensory perceptions questionnaire 
 
 
 
(A) Desserts 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in our study. 
 
 
We are interested in how people evaluate the sensory properties of different food types. 
For the purposes of this study, we are interested in the non-taste properties of food, so 
please do not eat or otherwise taste any of the foods you are asked to evaluate as it 
will bias our results. 
 
There are five different foods we would like you to evaluate today. You can see these in 
bowls on the table in front of you, labelled 1 through 5. We would like you to carefully 
consider the contents of each bowl and answer the questions below about each one. 
 
You have ten minutes to do this, so please take your time and try to answer as 
honestly as possible. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers – we are simply interested in your opinion! 
 
You can handle the food as you like: touch it, smell it, peel it apart, poke it, etc. 
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Bowl 1 
 
Visually, how appealing does the food look to you? (please circle) 
 
Not 
appealing 
at all 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Extremely 
appealing 
 
Please comment on the visual appearance of the food: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please smell the food. How appealing does it smell to you? 
 
Not 
appealing 
at all 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Extremely 
appealing 
 
Does the food smell more artificially-scented or natural? 
 
 
 
 
 
Please touch the food. How do you rate the textile properties of the food? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bearing in mind what you know about the food from its appearance, texture and smell, 
how would you expect it to taste? How would you expect its taste to compare to similar 
foods (e.g., of a different brand, home made, your preferred variety)? 
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How likely would you be to select this food from a platter – e.g., at a party? 
 
Not at all 
likely 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
likely 
 
How often do you eat this type of food? 
 
Never   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Often 
 
If you were given the option to eat some of this food right now, how likely would you be 
to do so? 
 
Not at all 
likely 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
likely 
 
Please summarise your overall feelings about this food: 
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Appendix IV: Study 3 information sheet 
 
 
Information Sheet for Participants in Research Studies 
You may request a copy of this information sheet. 
 
 
 
“Attitudes towards food and eating behaviour” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
 
Alisa Anokhina 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk 
020 7679 8275 
Lucy Serpell 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
lucy@serpell.com 
020 7679 1256 
 
 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research project. You should only participate if 
you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you 
decide whether you want to take part, please read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or you would like 
more information. 
 
We are interested in people’s attitudes towards different food types and how it relates to 
their eating habits. You will be asked to complete two computer tasks, in which you will be 
asked to use keys to respond to words or pictures of food or objects, and also to complete 
some questionnaires pertaining to your beliefs about different foods and your eating. The 
study should take under 30 minutes and you will be reimbursed £3 to thank you for your 
participation (or given a course credit equivalent). 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you choose not to participate, you 
won't incur any penalties or lose any benefits to which you might have been entitled. 
However, if you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
asked to sign a consent form. Even after agreeing to take part, you can still withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason.  
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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Appendix IV: Study 3 informed consent form 
 
 
Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies 
 
“Attitudes towards food and eating behaviour” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
Participant’s Statement 
 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
agree that I have 
 
read the information sheet and/or the project has been explained to me verbally; 
had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study; and 
received satisfactory answers to all my questions or have been advised of an individual to contact for 
answers to pertinent questions about the research and my rights as a participant and whom to contact 
in the event of a research-related injury. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without penalty if I so wish, and I consent to the 
processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study only and that it will not be used for 
any other purpose. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled 
in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I will be sent a copy.  
Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained, and it will not be possible to identify me from any 
publications. 
I understand that if I am being paid for my assistance in this research some of my personal details will be 
passed to UCL Finance for administration purposes.  
 
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
 
 
Investigator’s Statement 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
confirm that I have carefully explained the purpose of the study to the participant and outlined any 
reasonably foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable).  
 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 307 
 
Appendix IV: Study 3 debrief sheet 
 
 
 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
“Attitudes towards food and eating behaviour” 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in our research. We are interested in why some people are 
successful at dietary restraint (i.e., dieting) while others find it more challenging. Dieting 
is a very complex behaviour: when we diet we have to reconcile the body’s physiological 
needs for nourishment with the self-restraint goal. Some research suggests that dieting 
can be so difficult because, over time, we form positive emotional associations with 
food, which then lead us to respond to food cues by impulsively approaching it. 
 
The two computer tasks you completed were designed to assess a) positive 
associations with food and b) the tendency to approach or avoid different food types. 
We are interested to find out how different associations and approach tendencies are 
related to people’s experiences with dietary restraint. Some studies have already 
suggested that people who are successful at losing weight tend to impulsively approach 
low-calorie, low-fat foods more than high-calorie, high-fat ones; we hypothesise that a 
positive emotional association with low-fat foods might underlie this tendency. People 
who are successful at losing weight could therefore feel less compelled to eat 
impulsively, despite not necessarily having a conscious preference for low-fat foods. 
 
 
If you have any further questions about the study, please contact Alisa Anokhina 
(alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk). 
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Appendix IV: Study 3 demographic questionnaire 
Study 3                       Participant ____ 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Age 
 
 
 
Which language do you speak most 
comfortably/fluently? 
 
 
 
Nationality 
 
 
 
Ethnicity 
 
White   
Chinese   
Asian or Asian British   
Black or Black British   
Mixed   
Other  ___________ 
   
 
 
When was the last time you ate? 
 
 
  __________  hours ago 
 
Height (your best guess if you don’t know) 
 
 
 
Weight (your best guess if you don’t know) 
 
 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with an 
eating disorder? 
 
Yes   
No   
Prefer not to say   
 
 
If yes, which? 
 
Anorexia nervosa   
Bulimia nervosa   
EDNOS   
Binge Eating Disorder   
Prefer not to say   
Other  ___________ 
   
 
 
If yes, when were you diagnosed? 
 
 309 
 
Appendix IV: Study 3 food attitudes questionnaire 
Study 3                       Participant ____ 
Food Attitudes Questionnaire 
Please read the food names below. For each food type, please rate how much you like its taste. 
Some of the foods listed come in different varieties: in those cases, rate the first variety that 
springs to mind. 
 
Asparagus  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Broccoli  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Brownie  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Brussel 
sprouts 
Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Cabbage  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Cake  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Celery  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Cookie  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Corn  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
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Cucumber  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Cupcakes  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Doughnut  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Ice cream  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Lettuce  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Muffin  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Pancakes  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Pie  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Pudding  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Radish  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
Tomato  Do you know what this food tastes like? 
 Yes      No 
If yes, how much do you like its taste? 
Not at all   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5 Very much   
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Next, please rate in turn how strongly you feel about the positive and the negative aspects of 
each food. 
For example, if you really like the taste of beetroot but really dislike its texture you might give 
a rating of ‘5’ for both positive and negative aspects.  
 
Asparagus  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Broccoli  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Brownie  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Brussel 
sprouts 
No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cabbage  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cake  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Celery  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cookie  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Corn  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cucumber  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Cupcakes   No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 312 
 
Doughnut  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
Ice cream  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Lettuce  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Muffin  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Pancakes  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Pie  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Pudding  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Radish  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
Tomato  No positive attitude    1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely positive 
 
No negative attitude   1   -   2   -   3   -   4   -   5   Extremely negative 
 
 
   313 
 
Appendix IV: Study 3 eating habits questionnaire 
Study 3                       Participant ____ 
Eating Habits Questionnaire 
Please circle the response you feel describes you best. 
If a question doesn’t apply to you, just leave it blank. 
 
 
1. Are you currently dieting? 
 
YES / NO 
 
2. How often have you dieted over the 
past year? 
 
-) Never [go to question 4] 
a) Once 
b) Twice 
c) Three times 
d) More than three times 
 
3. How well are you able to sustain a 
diet during these times? 
 
(Extremely well) 1   –   2   –   3   –   4   –   5   (Not at 
all) 
 
4. How constant has your weight been 
over the past six months? 
 
a) No weight fluctuation 
b) Loss of weight 
c) Weight fluctuation 
d) Weight gain 
 
5. How constant has your weight been 
over the past year? 
 
a) No weight fluctuation 
b) Loss of weight 
c) Weight fluctuation 
d) Weight gain 
 
6. Have the changes in weight been 
deliberate? 
 
YES / NO / Not applicable 
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Appendix V: Study 4 information sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Participants in Research Studies 
You may request a copy of this information sheet. 
“Food attitudes in weight loss” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
 
Alisa Anokhina 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk 
020 7679 8275 
Lucy Serpell 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London  WC1E 7HB 
lucy@serpell.com 
020 7679 1256 
 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research project. You should only participate if 
you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you 
decide whether you want to take part, please read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or you would like 
more information. 
 
We are interested in how people’s attitudes towards food are affected by weight loss dieting. 
In this study, we are including both people who don’t diet and people who are thinking about 
starting a diet soon. Because we are interested in any changes that happen over time, we 
would like you to come in for two sessions, two or three weeks apart. In each session you 
will be asked to complete two computer tasks, in which you will sort different words into 
categories (including names of food), and several questionnaires about your eating habits 
and attitudes. Each session should last about 30 minutes and you will be reimbursed £6 (or 2 
course credits) at the end of the study for your participation. 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you choose not to participate, you 
won't incur any penalties or lose any benefits to which you might have been entitled. 
However, if you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
asked to sign a consent form. Even after agreeing to take part, you can still withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason. 
 
We understand the sensitive nature of the information we are asking for. You will never be 
asked to divulge any information if you are not comfortable in doing so. All data will be 
collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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Appendix V: Study 4 informed consent form 
 
Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies 
“Food attitudes in weight loss” 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee as Project ID Number: CEHP/2011/039 
 
Participant’s Statement 
 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
agree that I have 
 
read the information sheet and/or the project has been explained to me verbally; 
had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study; and 
received satisfactory answers to all my questions or have been advised of an individual to 
contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research and my rights as a 
participant and whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without penalty if I so wish, and I 
consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study only and 
that it will not be used for any other purpose. I understand that such information will be 
treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I will be 
sent a copy.  Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained, and it will not be possible to 
identify me from any publications. 
I understand that if I am being paid for my assistance in this research some of my personal 
details will be passed to UCL Finance for administration purposes.  
 
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
 
 
Investigator’s Statement 
 
I, ______________________________________________ 
confirm that I have carefully explained the purpose of the study to the participant and 
outlined any reasonably foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable).  
 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________                  Date: ______________________ 
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Appendix V: Study 4 debrief sheet 
 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
“Food attitudes in weight loss” 
 
Thank you for taking part in our research. Our study was about the way attitudes 
towards food may change as a consequence of starting a weight loss diet. You may 
have been recruited into the study either as a non-dieter (you don’t usually diet) or as a 
dieter (you were planning on starting a diet before the study started). 
 
The computer task you completed was designed to measure your “implicit” food 
attitudes: that is, positive or negative associations you hold in memory for different food 
types. These associations are thought to be activated automatically when you come 
across that particular food, and may possibly affect how you behave in response to that 
food in certain contexts. Previous research suggests that these implicit associations can 
change when a person starts a diet – that is, their associations with high-fat food 
become less positive than usual. It’s possible that this may be especially true for people 
who find dieting more difficult: our study was partially designed to assess whether this is 
the case or not. 
The questionnaires which you completed were concerned with your relationship with 
food, eating and your body image. If we do find differences between dieters and non-
dieters (or between people who find dieting relatively easy compared to those who find it 
more difficult), we hope to use the questionnaire data to try and explain the kinds of 
relationships that may underlie these differences.  
 
If you have any further questions about the study, please contact Alisa Anokhina 
(alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk). 
If you are struggling with issues around food, eating or body image, “b-eat” is a non-
profit organisation which can help. Visit http://www.b-eat.co.uk, or see your GP. 
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Appendix V: Study 4 screening questionnaire 
 
Study 4 
 
Screening questionnaire 
Thank you for your interest in our study. If you would like to take part, please complete this 
screening questionnaire and return it to alisa.anokhina.10@ucl.ac.uk. We will then be in touch 
shortly to let you know if you are eligible. If you have any questions, you are welcome to 
contact Alisa Anokhina at the above email address. 
Please note that only women are eligible to take part in the study at present. 
 
 
1. Are you currently on a weight loss diet? 
 
 
YES / NO 
 
 
 
2. Are you currently on any other diet (e.g., 
for religious or medical reasons)? 
 
 
YES/NO 
If yes, please specify: _____________ 
 
 
3. Have you been on a weight loss diet in the 
past 12 months? 
YES/NO 
 
 
4. Do you intend to start a weight loss diet in 
the near future (within 2 weeks)? 
 
YES/NO 
If yes, please give approximate start date: 
____________ (e.g., “3rd of June”) 
 
 
 
 
5. Your height (your best guess if you don’t 
know) 
 
 
_____________ 
 
 
 
6. Your weight (your best guess if you don’t 
know) 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
7. Your age 
 
 
_____________ 
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Appendix V: Study 4 demographic questionnaire 
 
Study 4                       Participant ____ 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Age 
 
 
_____________ 
 
Which language do you speak most 
comfortably/fluently? 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
Nationality 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
Ethnicity 
 
White   
Chinese   
Asian or Asian British   
Black or Black British   
Mixed   
Other  ___________ 
   
 
 
Height (your best guess if you don’t know) 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
Weight (your best guess if you don’t know) 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with an 
eating disorder? 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No   
Prefer not to say   
 
 
If yes, which? 
 
Anorexia nervosa   
Bulimia nervosa   
EDNOS   
Binge Eating Disorder   
Prefer not to say   
Other  ___________ 
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Appendix V: Study 4 eating habits questionnaire (session 1) 
Study 4                      
Eating Habits Questionnaire 
Session 1 
Please circle the response you feel describes you best. 
If a question doesn’t apply to you, just leave it blank. 
 
1. Are you currently on a weight loss diet?  
 
YES / NO 
 
2. How many times have you started a new 
weight loss diet in the past year? 
 
a) Never 
b) Once 
c) Twice 
d) Three times 
e) More than three times 
 
3. How well are you able to stick with the diet 
during these times? 
 
        Not at all                         Extremely 
well 
0   –   1   –   2   –   3    
 
4. Are you currently on any other restrictive diet 
(e.g., for religious or medical reasons)? 
 
YES/NO 
If yes, please specify: _____________ 
 
5. Do you intend to start a weight loss diet in the 
near future (within 2 weeks)?  
 
YES/NO 
If yes, please give approximate start 
date: ____________ (e.g., “3rd of June”) 
 
6. How constant has your weight been over the 
past six months? 
 
a) My weight has not changed 
b) I have lost weight 
c) My weight has fluctuated 
d) I have gained weight 
 
7. How constant has your weight been over the 
past year? 
 
a) My weight has not changed 
b) I have lost weight 
c) My weight has fluctuated 
d) I have gained weight 
 
8. When was the last time you ate? 
 
 
  __________  hours ago 
 
9. How hungry do you feel right now? 
 
Not at all hungry                Extremely 
hungry 
0   –   1   –   2   –   3   –   4 
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Appendix V: Study 4 eating habits questionnaire (session 2) 
 
Study 4                        
Eating Habits Questionnaire 
Session 2 
 
 
Please circle the response you feel describes you best. 
If a question doesn’t apply to you, just leave it blank. 
 
 
1. Are you currently on a weight loss diet?  
 
YES / NO 
 
2. Are you currently on any other restrictive diet 
(e.g., for religious or medical reasons)? 
 
YES/NO 
If yes, please specify: _____________ 
 
3. Have you been on a weight loss diet at any 
point during the course of this study (~1 month)? 
 
YES/NO 
If yes, please give an approximate start 
date: ____________ 
and, if applicable, end date: __________ 
 
4. If you have been on a weight loss diet during 
the course of this study (~1 month), how well 
were you able to stick with it? 
 
     Not at all                          Extremely well 
0   –   1   –   2   –   3    
 
5. How constant has your weight been over the 
course of this study (~1 month)? 
 
a) My weight has not changed 
b) I have lost weight 
c) My weight has fluctuated 
d) I have gained weight  
 
6. When was the last time you ate? 
 
 
  __________  hours ago 
 
 
7. How hungry do you feel right now? 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all hungry                Extremely 
hungry 
0   –   1   –   2   –   3   –   4 
 
 